

Pierre Guillaume

Law and History

Statement in my defense
against those who accuse
me of defaming a person
or an individual or a group
of people because of their
origin or their belonging or
their not-belonging to an
ethnic group, or to a nation or to
a race or to a specified religion.

Translated by G. F. H.

AAARGH
Internet
2008

Original publication
Droit et histoire
Paris
La Vieille Taupe
1986

Translated into English by G. F. H.

2nd edition, corrected. January 2008

Both the French original and the English version can be downloaded from Internet at the following address:

<http://aaargh.com.mx/fran/livres/livres.html>

<http://vho.org/aaargh/fran/livres/livres.html>

AAARGH

THE WEBSITE WAS FOUNDED IN 1996

THE YEARLIES OF AAARGH

<http://revurevi.net>

Conseils de révision

Gaette du Golfe et des banlieues

The Revisionist Clarion

Il resto del ciclo

El Paso del Ebro

Das kausale Nexusblatt

O revisionismo em lingua português

Arménichantage

BOOKS (380) PUBLISHED BY AAARGH ON INTERNET

<http://vho.org/aaargh/fran/livres/livres.html>

<http://aaargh.com.mx/fran/livres/livres.html>

DOCUMENTS, COMPILATIONS, AAARGH REPRINTS

<http://aaargh.com.mx/fran/livres/reprints.html>

<http://vho.org/aaargh/fran/livres/reprints.html>

FREE SUBSCRIBE: (E-MAIL)

revclar@yahoo.com.au

elrevisionista@yahoo.com.ar

MAIL:

aaarghinternational@hotmail.com

We claim to be protected by the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights; <http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html>

AAARGH, TO AVOID DYING STUPID.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FIRST PART	4
The Facts.....	5
The Judicial Consequences.....	5
The Corpus Delicti.....	9
The Heart of the Problem.....	30
APPENDIX.....	33
SECOND PART.....	38
Truth and Falsehood in a Very Singular Civil Argument	41
The “Acts” of the Conference	55
Serge Quadruppani Referee of Intellectual Elegances.....	62
The Weight of Words.....	76
A Clarification.....	105
AN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS.....	119
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	123
ILLUSTRATIONS.....	124

FIRST PART

Statement for the
defense submitted
by the accused
at a public session
of the Seventeenth
Chamber of the
Tribunal De Grande Instance
in Paris on November 25, 1985

[9]

The Facts

On Saturday May 11, 1985, I personally undertook the distribution of a leaflet to all the people who stood in line at the Logos Theater, Rue Champollion, Paris Ve, where the film *Shoah* was being shown. This line consisted of about thirty people. A large contingent of police was present: a police van, a driver, two policemen, one officer and two guards equipped with bulletproof vests and submachine-guns.

It was the third time that I did this and each time I conducted myself in exactly the same way. Each time, after having peacefully given my leaflet to each person who extended his hand, I gave one or two leaflets either to the chief of the police detachment, or to the driver of the vehicle, or to an armed police officer, while asking them to give a copy of the leaflet to the chief of the detachment.

The first two distributions passed without incident.

This Saturday May 11, after the distribution had gone on as peacefully as the other two, two people left the line after having read the leaflet, advanced towards me while uttering threats and, having come to within approximately a meter of me, made some aggressive gestures, taken aback—according to my interpretation—by the absence of any apprehensive or defensive reaction on my part, by my calm, and by the fact that I looked at them peacefully in the eyes.

Two police officers intervened immediately, and got between us. I suggested myself, at the same time as did the [10] chief of the police detachment, that he proceed to check my identity. It was at this point that from the interior of the theater emerged an individual in a great state of agitation, who presented himself as “responsible for the maintenance of order for the film *Shoah*, a Jew, and a member of the L.I.C.R.A.”¹ and who professed in the middle of confused threats his intention to file a complaint.

Faced with my persistent calm, the chief of the police detachment invited me simply to get into the police vehicle, which I agreed to do while inviting him to also take down the testimony and the possible complaint of the latter individual.

The two people responsible for the first incident returned to the waiting line, and I was led, as well as the above-mentioned third person, to the police station of the 5th district where the police officer submitted his report, then to the police station of the 13th district where an inspector from the judicial police conducted my hearing and the checking of my identity and residence, while another inspector recorded the complaint and the deposition of Mr. Olivier-Jacques Friedler, born on June 24, 1952, Paris IVE, living at 108, quoted.... with B... (93).

The Legal Consequences

I did not imagine that this affair could have any legal consequences. However, on my return from vacation, a registered letter informed me that a suit against me had been filed in my absence at the city-hall of my home town. Indeed, a summons, dated August 12, 1985, invited me to appear on September 23, 1985 before the Seventeenth Chamber

¹ *L.I.C.R.A.* Ligue Internationale Contre le Racisme et l’Antisémitisme (International League Against Racism and Anti-Semitism).

of the Tribunal de Grande Instance in Paris, to respond to a charge of “public defamation regarding a person” (*diffamation publique envers une personne*).

This summons contains numerous oddities, of which the first is that it was issued on August 12. The alleged misdeeds occurred on May 11, and the period for filing a complaint according to the statute of limitations is three months, which thus elapsed on August 11, 1985. Is it a question of a culpable negligence in the pursuit of an offence, or an economic means of giving satisfaction to the self-esteem of a plaintiff and of his friends although their grievances do not appear well founded nor the offence well established? The question is of anecdotal interest. The summons is official. Charges have been made against me by the prosecutor of the Republic, and I do not intend to use formal arguments to flee my responsibilities and to avoid a debate on the basic issue.

The matter was brought to trial on September 23, 1985. I was absent but was represented by my lawyer, Éric Delcroix, my father having died the day before. A session for pleading was set for November 25, 1985. I thus received a new summons dated September 26, 1985 and specifying the new date; it was rigorously identical to the first except for one detail: the offence was not defined any more as “public defamation regarding a person,” but as “public defamation regarding an individual” (*diffamation publique envers un particulier*). The nuance is real although weak.

The elements mentioned above appear on the first page of the successive summonses (the blue page) under the responsibility and the seal of Antoine Genna, Bailiff (*huissier audiencier*) of the Tribunal De Grande Instance in Paris.

To this blue page are fastened three pages, under the (illegible) signature and the responsibility of the prosecutor of the Republic:

To have committed in Paris on May 11, 1985, in any case on the national territory and over an unstipulated period of time, the offence of public defamation regarding a person or a group of people because of their origin or their belonging or their not-belonging to an ethnic group, a nation, a race or a specified religion, by publishing and distributing the text reproduced below:

The complete reproduction of the alleged leaflet follows, then the following sentence:

Deeds covered and criminalized by Articles 23, 29, Paragraph 1, 32, Paragraph 2, 42, 43 and following, 47, 48 and following, of the Law of July 29, 1881.

Before reproducing and studying what constitutes the corpus delicti, that is, the text of the leaflet itself, let us study soberly [12] and with full attention what merit there is in the austere writings of the public prosecutor.

I have thus to answer for an offence allegedly done by me, the offence of public defamation.

I am accused of having defamed a person, but which person?

I am accused of having defamed an individual, but which individual?

I am accused of having defamed a group of people, but which group?

Would it be too much to ask the public prosecutor—whose job it is—to specify and individualize his charges?

All the more so since the action of the public ministry was initiated following a complaint by Mr. Olivier-Jacques Friedler, not mentioned in the quotation, who evidently

does not consider himself, unlike me, to be a simple person or a simple individual. He explicitly invokes a difference which—that is its function—differentiates him from other people and individual citizens (*des autres personnes et particuliers ressortissants*) of the French Republic. Mr. Friedler considers himself to be a person **plus** something else, an individual a bit individual (*un particulier un peu particulier*).

The words “person” and “individual” (*particulier*) are semantically complex and ambiguous, but are perfectly defined in their use as substantives and nouns, which is as follows:

PERSON Individual of the human species (*Petit Robert*, p. 1280).

INDIVIDUAL Private person, simple citizen (*Petit Robert*, p. 1240).

However, in his complaint, Mr. Friedler expresses himself explicitly “in his capacity as a member (*en qualité de membre*)² of the Jewish community of France.”

It thus is not a matter of a simple person or of a simple individual. Inasmuch as a French citizen in the justice system of French Republic invokes a particular quality which opens up for him, when in conflict with another citizen who is also a simple individual, certain judicial avenues (public faction), it seems elementary to require of this citizen that he precisely define this quality and that he provide elements of proof that he really possesses in his own right the quality which he invokes.

Mr. Friedler files his complaint in his “quality as a member of the Jewish community of France.”

Does he invoke his belonging to a Jewish ethnic group? or to Jewish nation? a Jewish race? a Jewish religion?

Each one of these modes of belonging to the “Jewish community of France” contains a potentially objective component (even if it is disputable) and an imaginary component which is essentially what produces the inner consciousness of belonging to... an ethnic group, **or** a nation, **or** a race, **or** a religion, and none of these modes of belonging to the “Jewish community of France” is interchangeable or indifferent³ with regard to the complaint which this **more-than-individual** (*ce particulier plus*) articulates with regard to me, and which the prosecutor has taken up.⁴

If I am accused of having defamed a person in his “quality as a member of the Jewish community of France,” this quality must be defined and established in order for it to be open to discussion by the defendant and to evaluation by the court. In other words, is Mr. Friedler Jewish because he takes part in a cultural community as he sees it (an ethnic community when the race depends on genetic factors), or because he belongs to a

² The word *qualité* in the phrase *en qualité de membre* can be translated most idiomatically into English as “capacity.” However, it occurs several times below by itself and in this same phrase, and there the sense of the passage demands that I translate *qualité* always as “quality” and never (even in this phrase) as “capacity.”

³ *interchangeable or indifferent* That is, these modes are not interchangeable with each other, nor is it a matter of indifference for the suit by which mode the plaintiff says that he belongs to the Jewish community.

⁴ For my part, I have always given proof, in all the acts of my public and private life, of an absolute indifference both to the origin of the people whom I happened to associate with, to like or not like, to praise or criticize, and to their belonging or not-belonging to an ethnic group, a nation, a race or a specified religion. One qualification however is in order. Whereas I established multiple relations with people of very diverse origins, ethnic groups, nations and races, over the last thirty years I have never established the least relationship which might to any degree be described as strong (*effective*) with anyone who claimed membership in a religion, but this indisputable allergy to the religious mentality manifested itself against all religions without exception, and thus against “no specified religion.” [Guillaume’s note]

Jewish race (a racist doctrine common to Nazi racism and to certain Jewish racist currents although genetic studies of populations have established that there is no Jewish race), or because he believes himself to be part of a Jewish nation (is he liable to profit from Israeli nationality in view of the Israeli law, the so-called Law of Return), or because he is of the Judaic religion, being born from a Jewish mother or having converted according to the Halakha?

[14]

The same questions arise if I am accused of having defamed a group of people. Which group? How is membership in this group defined? What are its limits? Indeed, faced with a charge of public defamation of a “group of people” because of their origin, of their belonging or not-belonging to an ethnic group or.... etc, one of the logical axes of the defendant’s defense could be to try to show that the allegedly defamatory remarks obviously do not apply to such and such a part of the ethnic group, nation, race, or specified religion, and that, consequently, his words, notwithstanding their possibly defamatory character, have not been stated **because of** the origin or ethnic group or nation or race or religion common to the group of people who consider themselves defamed, but rather have been stated for other reasons, yet to be determined. It obviously would not follow that the remarks would then become licit and justified; it would follow simply that the repression of these remarks would rise this time from the common law of defamation. The defendant could then be led to adopt the *exceptio veritatis*⁵ and the excuse of good faith, two forms of defense (*excuses absolutoires* “absolving excuses”) which are obviously excluded in the sphere of the application of Article 32, Paragraph 2, of the penal code (which concerns precisely the repression of defamation committed **because of** the origin or of the belonging or not-belonging of the people of the group defamed because of. . . etc).

In this case, and only in this case, the court does not have to know or to evaluate opinions, prejudices, or scientific or pseudo-scientific arguments, arguments of an ethnographic, historical, anthropological, genetic or theological nature, vulgar or sophisticated, coarse or subtle arguments, arguments which are based on ordinary considerations with regard to a particular origin or ethnic group or nation, or race, or a specified religion. The public prosecutor must prosecute and the court must repress the stipulated defamation, from the time that the charge which is likely to harm the reputation of a (defined) person or a (defined) group of people does not rest on reasons other than those defined by Article 32, Paragraph 2, that is, when the application to the person or the group of people allegedly defamed rests on nothing other than a pseudo-syllogistic deduction of the origin or the belonging or not-belonging of the defamed person or group to an ethnic group, etc.

And upon reflexion one sees that it cannot be otherwise, or the courts would have to either leave defamation unpunished, which would not please God.... or to venture supremely and arbitrarily into a field which is for them by nature foreign, that of opinion, prejudice, belief, love and repulsion, philosophical controversy and... scientific research, whether it be ethnographic, historical, anthropological, genetic or sociobiological.

One will measure the danger which awaits a laxist jurisprudence by weighing the fact that the history of humanity, since its origins, is full of conflicts between ethnic groups, nations, races, various religions, and that a laxist interpretation of the law would

⁵ *exceptio veritatis* “the exception of truth”: that is, that his defamatory words were true.

lead to prohibiting anyone, even with the best of reasons, from making reference to an ethnic group, a race, a nation, or a religion, in any other than positive terms, which is absurd. A plan to reduce all human conflict by the application of law is the very essence of totalitarianism. To try to attain the same result by means of a paragraph is rather ridiculous and recalls those good intentions with which, as everyone knows, hell is paved.

But, before returning to the astonishing jurisprudence of this paragraph and the use which virtuous leagues like M.R.A.P.⁶ and L.I.C.R.A. intend to make of them, let us consider the last remarkable element in the quotation of which I was the object.

Let us recall that I am accused there of having defamed a person or a group of people “[...] by publishing and distributing the text reproduced below.” There follows in the summons the reproduction of the text of the leaflet. This exact reproduction is followed by the phrase:

This full reproduction is followed by the phrase:

Deeds covered and criminalized by Articles 23, 29, Paragraph 1 - 32, Paragraph 2, 4-2, 43 and following, 47, 48 and following, of the Law of July 29, 1881.

We are faced with a list of articles in the penal code concerning the repression of various offences, [16] without any precise quotation of the reproduced leaflet for the purpose of delimiting and specifying the passages in it which would justify its being considered illegal, without any demonstration, not even a simple argument or reasoning which might allow one to define the relation between the reproduced leaflet and the reproached offences, **and even without any attempt to define the contents of the defamation allegedly committed!**

I am thus accused and I have to answer before the Seventeenth Chamber of the Paris Tribunal De Grande Instance for having committed an offence of **undefined and unspecified defamation**, towards a person, or an individual, or a group of people, because of their unspecified origin, **or** their belonging **or** not-belonging to an undetermined ethnic group, **or** an undefined nation, **or** an unspecified race, **or** a specified religion (?) which is not even named.

It would be wise to conclude that I am guilty of existing!

Is it necessary to recall Kafka or Courteline?⁷

So much incoherence and so much laxity signal a distress which a vengeful assurance, directly proportional to the denied distress, masks more and more badly and which a psychologist would qualify as reactionary. What really exceptional circumstances could lead the prosecutor of the Republic and the bailiff to make writs so little in conformity with the dignity of their office?

The Corpus Delicti

Now let us examine the accused leaflet.

It was presented in the form of a sheet 13.5 X 21, printed on both sides, without anything indicating which side was to be read first. We reproduce a facsimile of it with the sides in the order which the prosecutor chose:

⁶ M.R.A.P. (or MRAP) Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l’amitié entre les peuples (Movement Against Racism and for Friendship between Peoples).

⁷ *Courteline* Georges Courteline (1858-1929) a French dramatist and novelist.

“During a visit in Germany, I experienced (lit. “lived”) with great emotion the debate concerning the Holocaust. I succeeded in that period in escaping the hell of those terrible years.⁸ The time that I passed at Buchenwald and Auschwitz remains engraved in my memory in an indelible manner. During my three years of detention, I saw man at his primitive stage: the immoderation of men who held power over other men that verged on insane brutality; but also treasures of tolerance and the great soul of my people. **As the truth is indivisible, I must also say that in these difficult times I received help and comfort from many Germans and that I neither saw nor heard about gas chambers, but that I learned of their existence only after my release.** On these subjects, I am like many Germans, and I thus understand the doubt expressed so often now, and I judge that it is important that there be a complete examination done by people who did not take part at all in these events; for only the truth can help us to come to an agreement, between us—now—and in future generations.”

(The passages were underlined by the author).

Madame Ester Grossmann Palman 57
Holton (Israël)

“Reader’s Letter” from February 16, 1979 addressed to the newspaper
Westdeutsche Zeitung - Generalanzeiger (Wuppertal Edition)

References : Realschule (Junior High School)

88th year, No. 11, November 1980

VERBAND DEUTSCHER REALSCHULLEHRER

Hermann SCHROEDEL VERLAG KG

POSTFACH 81 0620

3000 HANNOVER 81

LA VIEILLE TAUPE - B.P. 9805 - 75244 PARIS CEDEX 05

[18]

In December 1980, on the channel Europe No. 1, in the show “Explain yourself” of Ivan Levai, Professor Faurisson had declared:

“The alleged Hitlerian gas chambers and the alleged genocide of the Jews form one and the same historical lie,⁹ which has permitted a gigantic political-financial swindle, whose principal beneficiaries are the State of Israel and international Zionism and whose principal victims are the German people,

⁸ “En visite en Allemagne, j’ai vécu avec une grande émotion la discussion relative à *Holocaust*. J’ai réussi à cette époque-là à échapper à l’enfer des années terribles.” That is, during a post-war visit to Germany she was witness to the Holocaust debate. “In that period” refers to a time before this visit, i.e., the time of the war. “In escaping the hell of the terrible years” means: in surviving the war.

⁹ *un seul et même mensonge historique*

but not their rulers, and the entire
Palestinian people.”

This sentence summarized the conclusions of the professor. He said at the start (en préambule) that none of these words was inspired in him by any political opinion whatsoever. This sentence was going to earn him two heavy penal convictions in France. Four years later, in February 1985, at the trial of Ernst Zündel in Toronto (Canada), the professor has just declared:

“The alleged Hitlerian gas chambers and the alleged genocide of the Jews form one and the same historical lie, which has opened the way to a gigantic political-financial swindle, whose principal beneficiaries are the State of Israel and international Zionism and whose principal victims are the German people (but not their rulers) the entire Palestinian people, and and, finally, younger Jewish generations which the Holocaust religion locks up more and more in a psychological and moral ghetto.”

Professor Faurisson repeated that none of these words was inspired in him by any political opinion whatsoever. He said that he was neither anti-Semitic, nor even anti-Zionist and that on a purely personal basis he deplored the existence of racism.

LA VIEILLE TAUPE - B.P. 9805 - 75224 PARIS CEDEX 05

[19]

This leaflet thus consisted of:

A letter of Mrs. Esther Grossmann, a Jewish deportee to Auschwitz;

The famous sentence of sixty words spoken by the professor;

The same sentence, slightly modified (*which has opened the way* in the place of *which has permitted*) and substantially supplemented (by the three last lines);

Some very short bits of information, references and comments.

This leaflet must be evaluated as a whole. It is the juxtaposition of these three texts and the interrelations among them which produce a meaning.

He who claims to be injured by a publication cannot isolate a part of it, to keep it separate, for that would denature its sense and purport: the things written must be viewed in their entirety as an indivisible whole, if one is to judge whether the author has exceeded or not the limits of the freedom of the press. (Dijon, February 25, 1931, D.H. 1931. 214.)

The complete reproduction, immediately after the famous sentence of sixty words, of an almost identical sentence spoken four years later by Professor Faurisson indicates quite well that he wanted to modify the synthetic, canonical expression of the results of

his research, and that this second sentence, significant as much by its resemblances to the other as by its differences from it, is intended, in spirit, to replace the first, a point which the author of the leaflet wanted to make. This second sentence thus becomes the most synthetic known form; it summarizes the conclusions not only of Professor Faurisson, but rather of a whole historical school which currently has, after forty years of purgatory, a considerable international audience, and which finally has just been recognized by French universities (cf. the thesis of Henri Roques on the Gerstein document, accepted with the praise “*très bien*,” University of Nantes, June 1985). This sentence was spoken before the court of Toronto, Canada, where the professor had had to testify “as an expert because of the extensive studies which he had conducted on the documents related to the holocaust of the Jews.”

[20]

In making this page precede (or follow) a letter of Mrs. Esther Grossmann, a Jewish deportee to Auschwitz and an Israeli national, who, in a text full of dignity, pleads in favor of the opening of a dialogue with the “revisionists,” the author of the leaflet indicates without ambiguity the general sense which he intended to give it, one excluding any systematic hostility toward the Jews.

It is however this leaflet which, following a complaint by Mr. Friedler, unleashed the public action by the public prosecutor. Insofar as this prosecutor does not provide the least information, either about the nature of the defamation which was done, or about the elements of the leaflet which were the cause of this offence, we are reduced to conjectures and assumptions.

Thus let us examine first the text of Mrs. Grossmann and try to see to what degree this text could constitute the offence, in the mind (?) of the prosecutor.

Of course, being the author, editor and distributor of this leaflet, I have some personal idea about the sense which I intended to give it. For me, it was anything but a defamatory leaflet; it avoided any *ad hominem* (or *ad homines*) attack; it carefully reproduced some already public information, and the text of Mrs. Grossmann connoted the whole point of the leaflet. The prosecutor saw it differently. Let us proceed by *réurrence*.¹⁰ Is the text of Mrs. Grossmann likely to be regarded as defamatory? At first sight, no? And at second sight, no again! And I have uselessly racked my brain, I still cannot imagine that the prosecutor can be upset about anything in this text. However, Mrs. Grossmann doubts the existence of gas chambers, even in the camp where she was deported. More exactly, she admits the legitimacy of the doubt and of a serene debate about them. She imagines then that it is quite possible that the revisionist historians are not monsters. Of course, her case is less serious than that of those who deny the genocide and the gas chambers. Is it not however just as dangerous for the maintenance of the official theses?

But one thereby leaves behind republican legal logic and enters into the logic of the Grand Inquisitor.

[21]

And Mrs. Grossmann’s case is far from being unique among deportees, Jewish or non-Jewish. On the contrary, there are lots of people like her, and the fact that their

¹⁰ An argument by *réurrence* (“recurrence”) is roughly equivalent to an argument by induction, i.e., “the process of estimating the validity of observations of part of a class of facts as evidence for a proposition about the whole class” (<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/induction>).

testimonies have been censured and repressed does not mean that they do not exist. On the contrary, it is utterly impossible for a deportee to get his testimony heard if it did not conform to the social demand, the myth, the “truths” allegedly established by the Nuremberg Tribunal and with the allegedly ocular testimonies of canonical and obliging witnesses, which explains the silence in which the majority of the deportees are locked up and the monopoly over the discussion which some leading figures and commemorative associations have established.

If the prosecutor were upset about this testimony and this plea in favor of tolerance on a controversial and taboo subject, that would at least have the advantage of revealing clearly 1) how the official thesis is maintained: by dismissing and repressing any disturbing point of view, and 2) by *récurrence*, how it was established. There is a precedent moreover in Germany, where a Jewish deportee, J. Ginsburg, who had doubts about the official theses since his visit in 1945 to the Maidanek camp and published in 1979 a booklet: *Majdanek in alle Ewigkeit?* (“Majdanek for all eternity?”); he saw his book seized and pulped. The other advantage is that despite all there is relatively little chance that the court follow the prosecutor’s lead. Neither the law nor jurisprudence seems to lend itself to this. The law: because, while waiting for the session on November 25, we still do not see on what the prosecutor could base his argumentation. And jurisprudence: because the well-grounded decision of the Court of Versailles in the affair opposing the Association Française Buchenwald Dora et Kommandos¹¹ to the historian Laurent Wetzell firmly re-established the rights of the historian and the witnesses, and also because, in the affair opposing the deportee Paul Rassinier to the F.N.D.I.R.P.,¹² the Court of Cassation ruled in favor of Paul Rassinier. (Let us recall that *Le Mensonge d’Ulysse*,¹³ a non-conformist testimony and analysis of a deportee, had earned a libel suit from the F.N.D.I.R.P. The Court of Bourg-en-Bresse had dismissed the plaintiff. On appeal, the Court of Lyon had condemned Rassinier to heavy fines, to fifteen days in prison with reprieve, and ordered the seizure [22] and the destruction of the book, whereas the prosecutor of the Republic had asked for the pure and simple confirmation of the judgment! The Court of Cassation threw out this decision, and the Court of Renvoi definitively dismissed the plaintiffs.)

If it does not appear to us that the letter of Mrs. Grossmann must have constituted the criminal element in the mind of the prosecutor, we must turn to the other side of the leaflet. The interlinking sentences (*Les phrases du liaison*)¹⁴ in italics do not appear either likely to constitute an offence. They state as briefly and objectively as possible some well-known and verifiable public facts.

By process of elimination and keeping in mind the surprises that the prosecutor may be reserving for us in the courtroom, we are thus led to conclude that it is the two

¹¹ *Association Française Buchenwald Dora et Kommandos* (French Association Buchenwald-Dora and Kommandos). A *kommando* (or *commando*) is a barrack for detainees, a work group of detainees, or a camp for prisoners of war.

¹² *F.N.D.I.R.P.* Fédération Nationale des Déportés et Internés Résistants et Patriotes (National Federation of Deported and Imprisoned Resistance Fighters and Patriots).

¹³ *Le Mensonge d’Ulysse (The Lie of Ulysses)* a book by Paul Rassinier in which he criticizes the orthodox concentration camp literature. For an English translation of this book, see *Debunking the Genocide Myth* (Los Angeles: Noontide Press, 1978), available on line at AAARGH.

¹⁴ *interlinking sentences* the sentences in-between the quoted passages which serve to interlink them and which provide background information about them: who said what and when.

sentences spoken by Professor Faurisson four years apart which constitute the undefined defamation for which I am reproached.

We will thus examine in order each one of these sentences, and the meaning and function of their juxtaposition and of the short introductory passages which accompany them. We will begin with the first, the famous sentence of sixty words.

This sentence, let us repeat, synthesizes the conclusions of a whole historical school, the revisionist school. It does not contain any defamatory charge with regard to a person or a group of identifiable people. None of the elements which make up this sentence is brought forward **because of** the origin or the belonging or not-belonging of a person or a group of people to an ethnic group, or to a nation, or to a race or to a specified religion; each element is brought forward rather because of extensive research carried out according to the routine methods of historical research, the criticism of documents, and the rules of the scientific epistemology which require that nothing be held as true which has not undergone the test of all conceivable attempts at invalidation (Karl Popper). This sentence, logically enough, is judged unpleasant by all those who, in good faith, believe that the genocide of the Jews and the Hitlerian gas chambers are established facts and who perceive, wrongly, the negation of their reality as being by nature [23] an attack on their reputation. This illusion was almost universal and is not the doing of any ethnic group, nation, race or particular religion. Reciprocally, the revision of the official history is not the doing of any origin, ethnic group, nation, race or particular religion. It does not imply, and does not arise from, any opinion, negative or positive, with regard to any origin or membership whatsoever. The majority of revisionist authors, if not all, initially were victims of this illusion, and it is the incredible persecution, to which they were subjected as soon as they tried to voice their questions and their doubts, which made them perceive the psychological and social mechanisms which had allowed the illusion to get started. It was not the doing of any origin or particular membership which allowed this illusion get started. Rather, it was initially born from the universal need to find a scapegoat which exonerated the victors and the war itself of the too real atrocities which led to the indisputable extermination of several tens of millions of men, women, and children (in the camp of the victors as well as in that of the vanquished).

However, the judgment of the Court of Cassation of June 28, 1983 which confirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which had substantially modified the judgment of the Seventeenth Correctional Chamber, rendered definite¹⁵ the conviction of the professor for having spoken this sentence.

One thus finally sees the outlines of the possible reasoning of the prosecutor of the Republic: the Court of Cassation confirmed the conviction of the professor and judged this sentence defamatory. Mr. Guillaume reproduced it. He is thus guilty of having maliciously circulated this condemned statement. The prosecutor could actually in this logic have used Article 35bis of the law (ord. May 6, 1944):

All reproduction of an accusation (*imputation*) which was judged defamatory will be considered as done from bad faith, barring proof to the contrary by its author.

[24]

However, the prosecutor definitely did not cite this article in the summons to the defendant. Negligence? Certainly not! The prosecutor did not cite this article because he

¹⁵ *definite* but subject to future revision. [Guillaume's note]

could not do so without occasioning reference to Article 35 which it supplements. However, Article 35 makes explicit reference to the *exceptio veritatis* and the excuse of good faith, that is, to the possibility, for someone charged with defamation, to bring the proof of the truth of contents of the defamatory accusation (*imputation*), or, at the very least, of its good faith, all things excluded within the framework defined by Paragraph 2 of Article 32. The law thus prohibited him from using Article 35bis and, moreover, he could not do so without raising the lid of Pandora's box. It is thus up to the prosecutor to establish my bad faith and the malicious intention which would have driven me to reproduce this sentence. However, this malicious intention does not exist. The reproduction of this sentence is followed by:

This sentence summarized [imperfect indicative]¹⁶ the conclusions of the professor.

And by:

This sentence was going to earn him two heavy penal convictions in France.

We are thus in the realm of the free exchange of information, and what is more in the realm of exact and objective information: more precisely, in a matter like the case covered by Article 41 of the law on the press (ord. Nov 17, 1958). It is understood that the legislator and the courts in defamation cases want to provide protection against reproductions of the defamatory words, even when accompanied by mention of their condemnation, for the malicious well know the principle: "Defame, defame, some of it will always remain." Of course, to our mind, this sentence is not defamatory. But the Court of Cassation has judged differently. Ah well, even if this sentence were defamatory, its reproduction might nonetheless be licit and non-malicious. This sentence, spoken on the waves of Europe 1, had hundreds of thousands of listeners; it was widely reproduced in the press, at the time [25] of the trial, although frequently truncated. In fact, our reproduction underscores with bold type the passage most frequently truncated. Moreover, this sentence, or its approximate contents, is in everyone's head. There is a whole school of history developing which continues to support the making of similar statements in publications too numerous to be cited, and even before a jury for a university doctorate. Its distribution (of less than a hundred copies!) in a line for the showing of the film *Shoah* (where it was less likely than almost anywhere else that there be someone unaware of the essential contents of this sentence) excludes the possibility of any malicious intention, or at least of this vulgar mischievousness which the law and the courts intend to suppress.

Moreover, this sentence had very often been reproduced but accompanied by defamatory comments about the professor without any prosecutor becoming worried or expressing concern. More precisely, mention of the conviction by the Court of Cassation

¹⁶ The words in brackets are also in the French text. Guillaume notes the imperfect tense of the verb *résumait* (here translated by a simple English past tense: "summarised") presumably to emphasize that Faurisson has not changed his opinion about these conclusions. The French imperfect may, like the English imperfect, describe a past continuous action completed in the past (e.g. "was summarizing"), but, unlike the English imperfect, may also describe any past action (continuous or simple) if the action is not fully completed in the past. For example, to express: "I spoke French when I was young, but do no longer" (action of the verb is fully completed in the past), French would employ a compound perfect tense: "J'ai parlé français . . ." but to express: "I spoke French when I was young, and still do" (action of the verb is not fully completed in the past but continues on into the present), French would employ an imperfect: "Je parlais français . . ."

was generally accompanied by dishonest comments suggesting that this sentence had been judged mendacious in regard to all its elements, and that from now it was illegal to maintain any of the professor's theses and that they had all been struck down by the law. This is obviously absurd since Article 32, Paragraph 2, under which this judgment was reached, excludes the judges from the need to know, and even from the need to make a pronouncement about, the possible truth-content of the statement considered to be defamatory. The professor was thus twice defamed, tainted in his reputation as an ordinary person, in that he saw himself treated as a "racist," and in his reputation as a researcher and academic, when it was suggested that his conclusions were grossly untrue and that they rested not on documentation and argumentation, but on idle considerations and on an "essentialist" view of "the Jews" in general.¹⁷

[26]

All these considerations make it abundantly clear that our reproduction was not likely to contribute to the diffusion of an unhealthy rumor.

Quite to the contrary, no society can survive without a specific division between good and evil, supported by institutions which are its guarantee. The penal code, on the one hand, and the courts, on the other hand, are in our Republic some of these essential institutions: their function is to say what is evil and to repress it. In a democratic and republican society, no one is obliged to approve the decisions of the courts and the articles of the penal code, but everyone is obliged to respect them. The ruling was respected, and the judgment carried out. But no criticism is possible, and no social life, if the wrong-doing (*le mal*)—what was condemned—cannot be clearly stated. Worse, that would mean that the legal order does not fully assume responsibility for its decisions. And it ought, barring anarchy or totalitarianism, to fully assume responsibility for them or **correct them**.

We believe we have shown that the tribunal ought to absolve the defendant, the author, editor and distributor of the leaflet, for the reason that all his actions were legitimate, even if the tribunal continues to consider defamatory the sixty-word sentence that the defendant reproduced in a context which is not only textually, but also intellectually and morally, different.¹⁸

If the tribunal judges differently, it will have to justify its estimate of the defamatory character of the aforesaid sentence. It will undoubtedly be able to evoke the jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation. It will even be able to take up again the argumentation of the court, but it will have to do it **under its own responsibility and in support of its own argumentation**. The tribunal will undoubtedly show the greatest consideration for the decisions of the court but, to judge the defamatory or non-

¹⁷ The most obvious and most shocking example of this misrepresentation (*détournement*) was made in M.R.A.P., *Chronique du flagrant racisme* (Chronicle of Flagrant Racism), Éditions de la Découverte, «Cahiers libres », No. 387, foreword by Casamayor, who had accustomed us to more relevance: it was he who had written, so precisely, in regard to the concept of collective responsibility created by the charter for the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal: "It should be known that sectarian fanaticism, oppression, and tyranny are at the end of the road." One finds in an appendix the text of the judgment from July 3, 1981 without mention of the rulings which inform (*réforment*) it. It is inconceivable that Casamayor did not detect the logical and legal error which deduces truth-content from a judgment about defamation made under the auspices of Paragraph 2 of Article 32. [Guillaume's note.]

¹⁸ *different* i.e. from the original context in which Faurisson spoke these sixty words.

defamatory character of this sentence, **the tribunal is bound initially by the text of the law.**

The court believed it detected (exposed some motifs) in this sentence an attack on the reputation of “the whole [27] Jewish community” (*l’ensemble de la communauté juive*). But Professor Faurisson and the present defendant constantly protested against this captious and non-literal interpretation of the sentence. Others have also protested against this interpretation; among them, to cite but a few, are the witnesses who presented themselves at the bar¹⁹ of this chamber of the district court (*en première instance*): Claude Karnoouh, an ethnologist, research fellow at the C.N.R.S.,²⁰ Jacob Assous, an electrician, Michèle Noël-Israëllovitch, a psychologist, and Serge Thion, a sociologist, research fellow at the C.N.R.S.

The Court of Cassation based its interpretation on the words: “alleged genocide of the Jews” in arguing that these words would aim at the Jewish community as a whole (*l’ensemble des juifs*). But it is they who use the words “genocide of the Jews” in referring to the events which occurred in the course of the Second World War, they who claim that the authorities of the Third Reich put into effect a policy aiming at the extermination of all the Jews, whereas Professor Faurisson denies not only that European Jews as a whole were exterminated, but also that a policy aiming at this result had ever been implemented, and thus denies that the word “genocide,” created in 1943 by Raphaël Lemkin, is suitable for accounts of the persecutions and the death of too great a number of Jews during this war. Consequently, the only term of the sentence upon which the court bases its thesis that the speaker aimed at “Jews as a whole” is ascribable not to the speaker but to his adversaries, and the speaker specifically disputes the relevance of the term!

Moreover, the Court of Cassation seems to accept as a certainty that there was a “genocide” aimed at “Jews [28] as a whole.” However, to speak only of the geographical sphere under domination of the German army, in Denmark, in Tunisia and Libya, the Jews did not undergo any persecution: in Denmark, because of the firm attitude (but not armed) of the king and the population; in Tunisia and Libya, because the presence of Arab Jewish communities in Arab countries was a matter of indifference to the authorities of the Third Reich.

In France, it remains extremely difficult to estimate with certainty the losses of the French Jewish community (Jews of French nationality) and of the Jewish community of France (all the Jews on French ground) for the reason that the Committee of the

¹⁹ These witnesses were insulted and spit on even in the courtroom, in particular Claude Karnoouh and Jacob Assous, because there was a score of people acting as a group going by the name of The Sons and Daughters of Jewish Deportees of France and chaired by the attorney Mr. Klarsfeld. But the course of the debate sufficiently impressed these young people so that conversations were started between them and friends of the professor, in particular Assous Jacob, Alain Lebelbaum and myself, and continued late into the evening. *Le Droit de vivre (The Right to Live)*, [a monthly journal published by the LICRA] in its account about this court session, even evoked the traumatism which these young people had undergone, without specifying the nature of this traumatism. In any case, the courtroom was never again invaded by a troop of *tricoteuses* and many later sessions dedicated to this affair were conducted in perfect serenity. [Guillaume’s note. *tricoteuses* “(female) knitters,” “fabricators,” “liars”; the term derives its derogatory sense from its usage during the French Revolution to refer to women (overly enthusiastic supporters of the Revolution) who knitted while attending the trials.]

²⁰ C.N.R.S. Centre national de la recherche scientifique (National Center for Scientific Research).

History of the Second World War, which carried out its investigation during twenty years, reveals its results only in bits and because the figures revealed are much lower than and in contradiction with the figures of the Serge Klarsfeld's *Memorial*,²¹ which seemed a fairly reliable source with regard to the number of the deportees, although it is completely unusable with regard to the numbers of the dead and of the survivors, since it holds for dead and even for "gassed" the deportees who did not come *spontaneously* to register themselves as survivors.²² In any event, it is possible, according to the available figures, to affirm with absolute certainty that the demographic losses of the French Jewish community are clearly lower than 10%, which goes against the generally accepted idea that the survivors are the exception, which would confirm the extermination of the majority. It was thus not necessary to forge a new word: *genocide*, to describe a tragic reality perfectly denoted by the French word: *decimation*. One will be astonished besides that an allegedly well-known reality is successively designated by words of strong ideological content but of doubtful semantics, like *genocide*, which became prevalent in the media in the sixties, then *holocaust*, a product of the seventies, and finally *shoah*.

But let us return to the sixty-word sentence and the motivations for its condemnation by the Court of Cassation.

The first element of the sentence: "The alleged Hitlerian gas chambers and the alleged genocide of the Jews form one and the same historical lie" appeared on page 4 of the cover of the *Mémoire en défense (Statement in Defense)* deposited by the professor in November 1980 before the first chamber of the civil tribunal, in answer to the allegation of L.I.C.R.A. and seven other associations that he had "voluntarily truncated certain testimonies such as that of Johann Paul Kremer." Only the tribunal, and then the Court of Appeal, had to know the basic issue of the historical debate. The professor should thus have profited, at least with regard to this element of the sentence, from the immunity provided in Article 41, Paragraph 3, of the law:

There will be a basis for legal action for defamation, injury or insult neither in reports about judicial debates, if made in good faith, nor in spoken speeches or written materials introduced in courts.²³

The professor, moreover, had a twofold right to profit from this immunity. This sentence was broadcast on the station Europe 1 during an interview conducted by Ivan Levaï intended to provide a report about the evolution of the judicial debate in progress, and to respond to the deliberately untrue and defamatory statements made two days earlier on the same station about the same subject—the trial in progress—by Mr. Jean Pierre Bloch, the president of L.I.C.R.A. (not less than twelve deliberate demonstrable lies). This double judicial immunity on the order of legality (written material once

²¹ *Memorial* a book by Serge Klarsfeld in which he lists the names of the Jews deported from France, and notes those who died and those who survived.

²² One will note that according to the documents furnished by the C.D.J.C. and the Auschwitz Museum one should consider as "gassed" Simone Jacob, born July 13, 1927 at Nice, who has since become Simone Veil (convoy 71), and Henri Krasucki, born September 2, 1924 at Wolomin (convoy 55). [Guillaume's note. Simone Veil, after the war, held many posts in various French governments and in 1979 became President of the European Parliament. She is still alive and most famous for having legalized abortion in France as Minister of Health in 1974. The Polish-born Henri Krasucki became a leading member of the French Communist Party after the war and died on January 24, 2003. C.D.J.C. = Centre de documentation juive contemporaine (Center for Contemporary Jewish Documentation)]

²³ Underlined by us. [Guillaume's note]

introduced in court and later cited within the framework of a honest report, made in good faith, about legal debates) was also demanded by the rudiments of logic and epistemology. Indeed, how is the potentially defamatory character of the sentence to be evaluated independently of an evaluation of its truth-content? Jean-Pierre Bloch moreover had explicitly recognized this during his own interview, two days earlier, in declaring that there was no question of a lawsuit about “racial defamation,” [30] but rather: “It is a lawsuit which we are bringing against a historian who is not serious”... and “We will prove it.” It is very precisely the failure of L.I.C.R.A.’s lawyers and experts in the basics of the historical debate which led L.I.C.R.A. and M.R.A.P. to resort to a diversionary penal operation, supplemented by a very effective press campaign.

The civil trial concluded with a ruling by the First Chamber, Section A, of the Paris Court of Appeal, rendered on April 26, 1983, after four years of debates and examination of the historical documentation of the professor and of his adversaries. The court ruled:

Considering that the present proceedings were initially started by L.I.C.R.A. at the time of the press articles noted above—and mainly of the two letters addressed to *Le Monde* by Mr. Faurisson in December 1978 and January 1979—but that during the course of the trial the issue was widened by the doing of Mr. Faurisson himself, who interjected into the debates his work entitled *Mémoire en défense (Statement in Defense)* whose object is to explicate his theses and to answer charges brought against him by alleged associations;

Considering that it comes out from these various publications, as also from conclusions proposed to this court, that the research of Mr. Faurisson concerns the existence of the gas chambers which, if we are to believe the many testimonies about them, were used during the Second World War to put to death in a systematic way a part of the people deported by the German authorities;

Considering that, to address temporarily the historical problem which Mr. Faurisson wanted to raise on this precise point, it seems suitable to note that the charges of levity (*légèreté*) brought against him lack relevance and are not sufficiently established; that indeed the logical approach of Mr. Faurisson consists in trying to show, by an argumentation which he considers to be by nature scientific, that the existence of the gas chambers, as they have usually been described since 1945, is an absolute impossibility, and that this in itself suffices to invalidate all existing testimonies about them or at the very least to render them suspect;

That, if it is not the court’s duty to come to a conclusion about the legitimacy of such a method or about the range of the arguments propounded by Mr. Faurisson, then neither is the court permitted to affirm, with regard to the nature of the studies to which he has dedicated himself, that he has set aside the testimonies by levity or negligence, or deliberately chosen to ignore them;

That, moreover, no one is able to convict him of lying when he lists the many documents which he says he has studied and the organizations under whose auspices he has made investigations during more than fourteen years;

That the value of the conclusions defended by Mr. Faurisson thus falls solely within the sphere of the opinion of experts, historians and the public.

It turns out from this extract that Professor Faurisson was led to state the conclusions which are his at the end of extensive research, carried out in a rigorous way, according to the routine methods of criticism, as he has always maintained. And, moreover, his adversaries were not able to put into evidence even a single error in his documentation or reasoning.

However, the Court of Cassation was led to render its judgment without being informed of this important ruling, which has still not been made public (except by La Vieille Taupe in J. Aitken, *Épilogue judiciaire de l'affaire Faurisson*, dépôt légal : August 1983) although the court ordered the publication, at the request of the plaintiffs, and that Professor Faurisson paid the necessary sums to which he was compelled. The Court of Cassation thus made its pronouncement at a time when, apart from some specialists familiar with the historical case, the reality of the “genocide” and of the gas chambers seemed verified and where it was difficult to admit that their denial could rest on “reasons” other than a hostility toward Jews in general, which explains the interpretative intemperance of the Court of Cassation with regard to this unhappy sentence and with regard to the law.

But the tribunal which must judge me is not unaware of this ruling, and cannot ignore it in its efforts to evaluate this same sentence.

With regard, more particularly, to the second element of the sentence judged defamatory, the part about “the political-financial swindle whose principal beneficiaries are the State of Israel and international Zionism,” the Court of Cassation recognized that the matter would be licit if it aimed actually and exclusively at the State of Israel and international Zionism. But the Court of Cassation nevertheless considers the statement illicit in that it aims at “the Jewish community as a whole,” without providing any semantic and textual justification for its interpretation. The Court of Cassation, taking up again the reasoning of the Court of Appeal, writes (ruling, p. 4):

The alleged genocide and the gigantic political-financial swindle, the fruit of this historical lie, could concern the [32] Jewish community only if presented as participating in this swindle and allocating to itself the profits.

<i>could concern only</i>	The court gives no indication about what allows it to proclaim this pseudo-evidence.
<i>Jewish community</i>	It is not named and nothing indicates in the contested text that it is understood.
<i>presented as</i>	Nothing like it in the contested sentence!
<i>as participating in this swindle</i>	Precisely not!
<i>and allocating to itself the profits</i>	Precisely not! Only two beneficiaries are named!

Moreover, in the first part of its sentence, the court arbitrarily connects (by the coordinating conjunction *and*) “the alleged genocide” and the “gigantic political-financial swindle,” whereas, in the sixty-word sentence, these two concepts are clearly not put on the same plane, neither logically nor chronologically. The alleged genocide constitutes an element of a historical lie *which has permitted* a swindle... The Court writes: “The gigantic swindle, *fruit of this historical lie.*” By introducing the words *fruit of*, the court introduces a concept of consequence which not only is foreign to the original text, but is expressly excluded by the words *which has permitted*, which in the professor’s sentence connect the historical lie to the swindle. By introducing *ex nihilo* terms, reasoning, and connections which are not in the original sentence in order to try to justify its interpretation, the Court of Appeal showed *a contrario* that the sense which it claims to detect is not found there.

One can perfectly well conceive [of the possibility] that, the genocide having taken place or the illusion of genocide having developed, no one seek to exploit it for particular political objectives. In the given circumstances, the swindle is not the inescapable fruit either of the genocide or of the [33] historical lie; the swindle is the fruit of the political passion which benefits from a universal belief.

Thus, contrary to what the court (ruling, p. 5) maintains, “the Jewish community as a whole” “was not presented as participating in this gigantic swindle whose profits it allocated to itself.” Only the principal beneficiaries were cited: the State of Israel and international Zionism, the state and the nationalist ideology which supports it. There could have been other beneficiaries: the victorious states as a whole and in particular the Soviet Union, but certainly not the Jewish community as a whole, of which whole sectors were not beneficiaries but were rather victims of this swindle, and in particular all the currents opposed to the Zionism, which were submerged and marginalized, and more particularly the religious Jews *Neturei Karta*, of which there are many in Jerusalem and in the United States: they do not recognize the State of Israel, and those in the ghetto of Machearim in Jerusalem continue to regard themselves as Jordanian nationals. One could also cite the Arabic Jewish communities as a whole, who saw their situation degraded because of the creation of the State of Israel, and worsened still more by the conscious provocations of the Zionist movement with the aim of causing the exodus of these populations toward Israel (false murderous anti-Semitic attacks, organized in 1951 in Iraq by the Israeli secret service and about which there is exhaustive documentation available to the public in Israel).

Those who had been beneficiaries of this myth of universal culpabilisation became at last its victims, Winston Churchill, General De Gaulle, Roosevelt, and certain leaders of the American Jewish community, who, along with Pope Pius XII, are accused of having known and of not having denounced before the face of the world the existence of the Hitlerian gas chambers. “As of September 1942, some knew : Churchill, De Gaulle, Roosevelt, and even some leaders of the American Jewish community.” (General meeting of the C.R.I.F., March 24, 1985, a report in the *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, March 27, 1985, page 3, which specifies: “Silence is a crime, it is a great fault in the face of history (*devant l’histoire*).”)

In any event, independently of the logical reasons which oppose the court’s interpretations, by [34] overinterpreting the text and by extrapolating from it, the Court of Cassation leaves behind its proper role and the law. To give an analogy, if I accuse

Professor Raul Hilberg of having quoted in support of his theses some obviously apocryphal documents by truncating the too absurd passages, for these would have destroyed the credibility of his source, can one imagine that Mr. Poliakov²⁴ would attack me for defamation, under the pretext that one can make the same reproach against him?

Furthermore, by introducing into the sixty-word sentence an imputation which is not there, that is, with regard to “the Jewish community as a whole,” the Court of Cassation should logically conclude that there one leaves the sphere of application of Paragraph 2 of Article 32 of the law on the press, which represses the offence of defamation of *a person* or *a group of people* because of their origin or of their belonging or their not-belonging to an ethnic group, or to a nation, or to a race, or a specified religion, and that one supposes then that a person or a group of people is indicated or identifiable inside “the Jewish community as a whole.”

The law does not say anything about the expression of thoughts (*considérations*) of a general and vague nature about an origin, an ethnic group, a nation, a race or a religion “as a whole.” These general thoughts, not derivable by syllogism and which are not applicable to the totality of the people composing the whole (marginal cases may occur where the group of identifiable people coincides with the totality of the whole) belong to the *disputatio perennis*.²⁵ The controversies in this respect are licit and essential to the dignity of the Mind and to freedom of expression.

Who does not see that the surprising solution adopted by the Court of Cassation, under the circumstances, would end up prohibiting any possibility of expression not only of any social, ethnic, national, racial or religious prejudice, but would even prohibit the expression of any opinion other than a positive one by a sociologist, ethnologist, nationalist, historian, geneticist, anthropologist, sociobiologist or theologian, an absurd solution, without however our being able to specify the feeling, whether of fear or jubilation, which comes over us before this prospect.

In order to leave in the dark no part of this serious affair [35] which concerns principles, we will take the most neutral and dispassionate example possible.

One frequently hears mention of “Perfidious Albion” without any prosecutor being stirred. These kinds of evaluations are licit, independently of the judgment that each individual might make about their truth (*pertinence*). In the same way, it is frequently said and taught that Joan of Arc was burned in Rouen by “the English,” although Joan of Arc was burned in Rouen by French Catholics. The responsibility of *the English*, in this case, is a product of pressures and power-relations stemming from politics, from a kind of diffuse collective responsibility, which lends itself to historical and philosophical discussions of which there has been no lack. It is obvious in this case that *the English* does not indicate the assemblage [*collection*] without exception of the nationals of the English nation. On the other hand, whoever would write the words “Joan of Arc” on a bus of English tourists visiting Rouen would fall into the sphere of application of Article 32, Paragraph 2, in that he defames a group of people, the passengers of the bus, by attributing to them, in this case by the mere form and logical context of the inscription, a responsibility for the burning of Joan of Arc, because of their belonging to a nation. In this case, repression should be automatic, without the courts’

²⁴ *M. Poliakov* a Jewish holocaust historian, mentioned several times below (as is also Raul Hilberg).

²⁵ *disputatio perennis* (Latin) “eternal dispute.” That is, they are things that man will always want to discuss and dispute.

having to discuss and know the reasons of all kinds upon which was based the anger of the graphomaniac who, wanting to take vengeance upon all the English, goes so far as to take it out on these English.

This parable is in conformity with the law and with jurisprudence:

Vague and general attacks directed against communities, associations or groupings, and which specify neither the deeds nor their authors, are insufficient, however reprehensible their violence, to constitute the offence of defamation and public insults. (Crim. 22 nov. 34, D.P. 1936. 1.27, note de M. Nast ; 16 déc. 1954, D. 1955. 287, rapport de M. le conseiller Patin; 5 mai 1964, D. 1964. Somm. 103.)

The offence of defamation exists only to the extent that the author of the publication has the intention to attack the honor and the reputation [*considération*] of him [or them] whom he names.” (Req. 8 fév. 1909, D.P. 1909. 1. 535. Crim. 28 janv. 1916, D.P. 1920. 1. 95. Trib. civ. de la Seine, 29 mars 1926, D.P. 1928. 2. 68, note de M. Nast.)

[36]

The ruling delivered in the Faurisson affair deviates from this jurisprudence, and it will be noticed that many judicial decisions also deviate from it in affairs where L.I.C.R.A. and M.R.A.P. were civil parties, and more particularly when the Jewish community considered itself involved (jurisprudence about “anti-racism”).

We thus should put to rest the initial question that we asked ourselves with regard to the writings of the public prosecutor, by generalizing it.

What really exceptional circumstances explain these deviations?

There is no answer to this question at the legal and judicial level. To the contrary, these circumstances result from the subversion of the Republic’s legal and judicial apparatus by an anthropological ideology which is foreign to it and which could take hold only thanks to the illusion of the genocide of the Jews and to the exaggerated culpabilisation which resulted from it (notwithstanding the real but as yet undetermined culpabilities for all too real persecutions).

It fell to Mr. Pierre Vidal-Naquet to summarize in concise terms the essential features of this anthropological ideology:

1. Anti-Semitism is not an opinion, it is a crime;
2. I regard as anti-Semites all those who challenge what is sacred for the Jews.²⁶

These two proposals, which the majority of the readers will have read without quivering, however constitute the complete subversion of the anthropological bases of republican law, which presumes, for there to be a crime or offence, the positive commission of an act defined beforehand by the law, and the beginning of the enactment of the criminal intention. The feeling or the opinion, not followed by an effect, falls within the jurisdiction of neither the law nor the judiciary. Consequently, in French law, the anti-(whatever) is an opinion or a feeling which can be freely expressed.

Moreover, in French law, the crime or offence must be defined objectively, independently of the author’s opinions or feelings, and of the particular nature of the victim. The penal code recognizes only crimes and offences against the public good (*la chose publique*) and against *individuals*.

[37]

²⁶ *Je tiens pour antisémites tous ceux qui s’en prennent à ce qui est sacré pour les juifs.*

On the contrary, the first proposition strongly states that an act, the fruit of an anti-Semitic opinion or feeling, committed against a Jewish person or symbol is more serious than the same act, the fruit of any opinion or feeling whatever, against an ordinary individual. The negative form (anti-Semitism is not an opinion) and the use of the strong word (crime) force one to conclude that the formula is not generalizable; that it concerns a specific case.

Vidal-Naquet would not accept the symmetrical proposals

1. Anti-Catholicism is not an opinion, it is a crime;
2. Anti-Americanism is not an opinion, it is a crime;
3. Anti-Nazism is not an opinion, it is a crime.

This surprising conception, which makes Jews a specific entity, is not an aberration on the part of Mr. Vidal-Naquet; it is at the foundation of Jewish legal anthropology and it is explicitly formulated in the Torah and Talmud, the illusion of “genocide” providing a laical basis for the secular (*profane*) re-activation of this thousand-year-old idea (Mr. Vidal-Naquet is an atheist and is not circumcised).

The second proposal is still more surprising. Mr. Vidal-Naquet delivers the definition of what is sacred “to the Jews,” and imposes on gentiles the respect, under penalty of crime, for all that “is sacred for the Jews,” whereas he himself, an atheist, does not have respect for Judaism, and proclaims this, although Judaism, nevertheless, remains sacred for many Jews. Inconsistency? No! Mr. Vidal-Naquet would regard as a demonstration of anti-Semitism the attacks which he allows himself with regard to the Judaism, if these attacks emanated from us, and in that he is consistent with himself: the situation of the Jews is specific (!). But, for Mr. Vidal-Naquet, who is a historian, Jewish history alone is really sacred—the history of the Jews,²⁷ and above all the memory of the genocide and the gas chambers. To deny the genocide and the gas chambers is a crime. C.Q.F.D.!²⁸

[38]

I regard as criminals all those who challenge what is sacred for Catholics, the French, etc.

Wherein one sees that the conflictuality that some had believed they could throw out the open door by a laxist and broad interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Article 32 makes its return, tenfold more powerful, by the window.

But this laxist jurisprudence exists in the deeds and the ideas of which Mr. Vidal-Naquet is only the most concise spokesman and these deeds and ideas have actually contaminated the Republic’s judicial apparatus.²⁹

Wherefore it turns out that, in the secular (*laïque*) Republic, the only sacred element which finds itself protected in the Republic’s actions is “what is sacred for the Jews.” That some deduce from this that the Republic has become a Jewish republic is an exaggerated conclusion in my opinion. It shows in any case that a bout of madness (*un*

²⁷ In other words, the holy history (*l’histoire sainte*). [Guillaume’s note]

²⁸ C.Q.F.D. Ce Qu’il Fallait Démontrer (What It Was Necessary To Demonstrate).

²⁹ The French text reads as follows, minus the words in brackets: “Mais cette jurisprudence laxiste existe dans les faits et les conceptions dont M. Vidal-Naquet n’est que le porte-parole le plus concis [et ces faits et conceptions] ont effectivement contaminé l’appareil judiciaire de la République.” My translation assumes the presence of the words in brackets; some such words are necessary for the sentence to make sense.

délire) rarely fails to arouse a corresponding (*symétrique*) madness, and that it is time to get our feet back on the ground.

We have thus demonstrated successively that the court should release the defendant even if it persists in considering the sixty-word sentence defamatory.

We have demonstrated that the tribunal could not rightly limit itself to invoking the authority of the jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation, but that it should justify its evaluation under its own responsibility, and that it could not rightly take over the reasons (*motifs*) of the court because those reasons are contrary to the law that it is its job to apply.

We will show now that this sixty-word sentence is defamatory with regard to neither a person, nor a group of people, nor the Jewish community as a whole, nor anyone whatever, for the simple reason that it contains no charge which is defamatory.

The Court of Cassation clung to the goal, without ever attaining it, of showing that the professor “aimed at the Jewish community as a whole,” and without realizing that by the same stroke it sawed off the branch of Article 32, Paragraph 2. But the court remained extraordinarily discreet on the nature and the contents of the defamatory charge itself. Contrary to its own jurisprudence:

[39]

The Court of Cassation controls, in the prosecuted writings, the elements legally necessary for the crime of defamation. (Crim. 28 nov. 1934, D.P. 1936. 1. 27 ; 5 mai 1953, D. 1953, 444 ; 16 déc. 1954, D. 1955. 287, rapport Patin.)

The court exhibits in this case an astonishing laxism. It restricts itself to writing (*not while pointing to the text of the sixty-word sentence or a part of this text*, but following a sentence of the Court of Appeal which it cites between quotation marks):

the offence of public defamation aimed at by the summons was consequently established in all these elements.

This is an illusionist’s magic act. The text to which the Court of Cassation points is not a text of the professor, but a text of the Court of Appeal which denatures the professor’s text substantially—the text at issue is that of the sentence which we analyzed above on page 32—and even in regard to this composite sentence, the court does not specify the elements constituting the crime although the sentence contains several pejorative words imputing different accusations.

What are they objecting to? Is it the word *alleged* juxtaposed with *genocide*?

Is it the words *historical lie*?

Is it the words *gigantic political-financial swindle*?

Or is it the bond introduced between the historical lie and the swindle by the words *fruit of* which constitutes the defamatory accusation?

In other words, is it the fact of denying the reality of the genocide, is it the fact of charging the State of Israel and international Zionism with a swindle, or is it the relation arbitrarily introduced by the Court of Appeal between these two kinds of accusation, which is, for the Court of Cassation, constitutive of the offence?

On page 5 of its ruling, the Court of Cassation, at the end of five *Seeing that’s*³⁰ which could be reversed without stating a manifest untruth³¹ (the epistemological method

³⁰ *Seeing that’s* That is, five paragraphs each beginning with “Seeing that” (*Attendu que*).

³¹ That is, exactly the opposite of what is said in each of these five paragraphs (about the sixty-word sentence) is not manifestly untrue.

of Karl Popper, attempt at invalidation, improperly translated into French as “attempt at falsification” [in English: *falsify*],³² affirms in a sixth paragraph that the Court of Appeal has (?) justly stated (?) that actually (?):

[40]

the Jewish community as a whole was presented as participating in this gigantic swindle of which it allocated to itself the profits.

And the Court of Cassation continues:

That thus are established the denounced defamatory accusations that the court [of appeal] justly evaluated while basing itself on the nature of the fact at which they are directed.³³

Thus it is established that the Court of Cassation did not exercise its control over the legal elements for offences of defamation **in the prosecuted writings**, but that it exercised its control **in the writings of the Court of Appeal**, without moreover thereby clarifying the legal elements.³⁴

The Court of Cassation nevertheless showed a remarkable perspicacity in its evaluation of the ruling of the Court of Appeal by stating without ambiguity the anthropological and legal nexus behind this whole affair:

The Court of Appeal *did not establish* the denounced defamatory accusations **on the basis of republican law** (*en se basant sur . . .*).

The Court of Appeal evaluated the denounced accusations **on the basis of the nature of the fact at which they are aimed**.

The Court of Appeal evaluated the denounced accusations **on the basis of the nature of the “genocide.”**

And not on the nature of the **defamatory deed**.

The Court of Cassation has ratified.

The tribunal then will not find any help in the ruling of the Court of Cassation to substantiate, *in the prosecuted writings*, the *elements legally necessary for the crime of defamation*.

It will remain for it, and it remains for us, to lean over the exact text of the litigated sentence.

The alleged Hitlerian gas chambers and the alleged genocide of the Jews form one and the same historical lie...

Here we have an assertion in negative form. The Hitlerian gas chambers and the genocide of the Jews did not exist and *together form one and the same entity* (*représentation*) qualified as a historical lie.

³² Karl Popper maintained that scientific theory is empirically verifiable, and is distinguished from non-scientific theory by its falsifiability (or, *pace* Guillaume, invalidatability), that is, by the fact that a single experiment with results that conflict with the theory serves to refute the theory. Theories (like Marxism and Freudianism) which cannot be refuted by any such experiment are hence non-scientific.

³³ That is, it is thus established that the denounced accusations are in fact defamatory, i.e., the accusations which the court of appeal justly deemed defamatory while basing this opinion on the nature of the historical fact whose truth these accusations called into question.

³⁴ That is, the court did not scrutinize the sixty-word sentence and clarify what are the elements in it which justify a conviction for defamation; it rather scrutinized the statements by the Court of Appeal, but without clarifying what light they shed on this issue, i.e., the issue of what are the elements in the sixty-word sentence which justify a conviction for defamation.

It is a statement summarizing the work of a whole school of history, the non-conformist, minority one which [41] is opposed by a whole school of history, the dominant, majority, and *quasi*-official one.

This statement *designates* no one as author of this alleged historical lie.

This statement is defamatory neither with regard to a person, nor with regard to a group of people, nor with regard to “the Jewish community as a whole.”

For jurisprudence, honor consists in not having anything on one’s conscience with which to reproach oneself, anything which is contrary to morals, whereas respect (*considération*) is related to public esteem since it depends on the idea which others have of a person (T.G.I. Versailles, 17 janv. 1985).

Therefore, those defamed by the revisionist statement would be only people designated (or identifiable) in the statement as having employed means contrary to honor in the maintenance of what is described as a historical lie. There is no such thing in the text.

With regard to respect (*considération*), the judicial problem is more complex, insofar as the text explicitly aims at discrediting an (alleged) belief and discredits indeed those who attached too openly their name to a “muscular” defense of this (alleged) belief. **But it does that to the exact extent to which the simple statement would appear true.** There is thus no defamation, not only because no one is designated, but because the defamatory character of the charge depends, *ab ovo*,³⁵ on its content of truth, and on the reception by the public of this possible content.³⁶ Indeed, the respect which those supporting the opposite statement enjoyed—in particular thirty-four historians—has not suffered up to now on account of the impious statement. It is on the contrary its speaker who earned himself a lousy reputation and saw collapse the respect which he enjoyed up to that point. If the defamatory character of the statement *depends* on its possible content of truth, there is no defamation. It harms honor and respect only if this honor and this respect were partially usurped. Were not the works of Semmelweis and of Pasteur, in their time, perceived by the medical authorities at that time as [42] attacking the honor and respect of medicine?³⁷

Caution! It is not here a question of the *exceptio veritatis* which excuses the defamatory charge, if it is true; quite to the contrary it is a question of an accusation which is *potentially* defamatory *only if it is true* and accepted by the public. If an accusation is *potentially* defamatory, it is not defamatory.

On the contrary, the accusation of swindle is defamatory (except in very particular cases) because he who is accused of swindling will be able to clear himself of the charge of swindle by showing that he did not do acts which might be so described; he cannot clear the word *swindle* itself of its pejorative sense. The charge of swindle remains defamatory in itself, even if the person charged is exonerated.

³⁵ *ab ovo* Latin, “from the egg,” i.e. “right from the start.”

³⁶ More literally, “is suspended, *ab ovo*, from its content of truth and from the reception . . .”

³⁷ A revisionist statement (in any field), as soon as it manages to be expressed, is analyzed not as a defamation but as a challenge, thrown and taken up, an invitation to fight in the field, in an honest combat, i.e., under the circumstances in an intellectual and scientific debate. Honor and respect will be distributed by the results of the combat, and not by the intervention, at the request of one of the parties, of the cardinal’s guard. [Guillaume’s note]

But, by using the same reasoning, could not one maintain that only the presence of the word *lie* in the part of the sentence at issue—historical lie—implies, not a—defamation in the judicial sense, but an intention to defame?

The word *lie* is made more precise and connotations are added to it by the word *historical*. It is not a question of a vulgar lie. A *historical lie* supposes that a rumor, a myth, got its start in secular history and acquired the status of historical truth. That supposes a universal collective illusion. Contrary to the simple lie, it does not imply a subjective consciousness of lying; it excludes this, at least at a social level. The charge of historical lie calls for a judgment about reality: truth or forgery?—and not for a moral judgment. Historical lies are innumerable, although by definition one can cite only recognized lies or those on the way to being recognized: the legend of William Tell (taught until 1983 by the Swiss textbooks), the fire of the Reichstag allegedly caused by the Nazis (still taught this [43] year in certain textbooks, but rejected by all the specialists), the auto-genocide (!) by the Khmer Rouges (a journalistic myth denied by the specialists and undermined before its acceptance) or the famous donation of Constantine, etc.

Let us come now to the second part of the sentence:

“which allowed a gigantic political-financial swindle, whose principal beneficiaries are the State of Israel and international Zionism...”

This statement imports a charge of swindling.

This swindle is of a *political*-financial nature. Only two parties are designated as being the principal beneficiaries. Nothing indicates in what this swindle consists. In any case, the words *which has permitted* exclude that this swindle is related to the birth of the (alleged) historical lie. On the contrary, these three words indicate that the historical lie was completely established and provided the backdrop and the situation in which the swindle could develop. Concerning this swindle, which remains indefinite, there is nothing which indicates that its principal beneficiaries are its principal authors; nothing indicates even who are its authors. There is a statement which attacks the State of Israel and international Zionism, and, for this very reason, there is no defamation, for this statement attacks neither the honor nor the respect of private individuals, and the honor of a state is not morals (*la morale*) but sovereignty, and the respect due to an ideology is a matter of opinion.

Descriptions of someone as a swindler, robber, forger, without further precision, do not constitute acts of defamation [but are insults, N. de l’A] (Crim. 29 juill. 1865, D.P. 66. 1. 48 ; 31 janv. 1867, D.P. 68. 1. 96).

Now, the alleged swindle is not defined in the text.

Vague and general attacks directed against collectivities (such as the catholic clergy and the seminaries), associations or groupings, which specify neither the deeds nor their authors, are insufficient, however reprehensible their violence, to constitute crimes of defamation and public insult. (Crim. 22 nov. [44] 1934, D.P. 1936. 1. 27, note de M. Nast ; 16 déc. 1954, D. 1955. 287, rapport de M. le conseiller Patin ; 5 mai 1964, D. 1964. Comin. 101)

And, moreover:

Attacks of a theoretical nature, directed against a conception of the role of judicial institutions in society and stemming from an *opinion*³⁸ about the

³⁸ Our italics. [Guillaume’s note]

functioning of the institutions of the State, do not constitute, no matter how bitter, the crime of defamation. (Crim. 22 mars 1978, Bull. crim., n° 115, p. 289.)

It is only in the field of political polemic about opinions and doctrines related to the role and the functioning of the fundamental institutions of the State that good faith is not necessarily subordinated to prudence in the expression of thought. (Crim. 27 juill. 1981, Bull. crim., n° 238, p. 630.)

Thus, jurisprudence and the law make a distinction between criticism, polemic, even attack (all of which come within the province of licit and free opinion) and defamation. But let us return to this second part of the sentence.

If somebody had written:

The Hitlerian gas chambers and the genocide of the Jews form together one and the same tragic reality which allowed a gigantic political-financial swindle whose principal beneficiaries are the State of Israel and international Zionism... no one, apart from the Zionist movement, would have found anything there to censure, and the nature as well as the contents of the swindle from which the State of Israel and international Zionism profit would not be affected by whether the gas chambers and the genocide are mythical or real! But what then is this mysterious swindle that the text absolutely does not define? Or rather, does not the mystery lie in the fact that the nature and the content of this swindle are also perfectly and immediately perceived by the readers of one or the other of these sentences, whereas these sentences say absolutely nothing about them? There is only one rational explanation for this miracle: the nature and the content of the swindle are in everyone's head, are quite obvious, and it is no more necessary, when one mentions *the swindle* [45] *from which the State of Israel profits*, to specify of what one speaks than it is necessary, when one evokes a "frigidaire," to specify that one speaks about a refrigerator. But, then, why reproach Professor Faurisson when he says what everyone already knows, and, if there is any wrong-doing (*mal*), is this wrong-doing in the prosecuted writing or in the heads of those who receive it, regardless of whether they are friends or foes?³⁹

The swindle (*escroquerie*; from *scroccare*: to unhook) in question is the shameless exploitation for *particular* political ends of the universal culpabilisation drawn from the tragic fate of the Jews during the war, whatever this fate was.

And none of these words, as he had said at the start, was inspired in him (Faurisson) by any political opinion whatever.

He said that he was "neither anti-Semitic nor even anti-Zionist."

This *observation* was inspired in him only by its obvious... obviousness; and the stating of this obvious fact attacks only this aspect of Zionist policy. And to state the obvious fact that "the French" sunk the *Rainbow Warrior* does not imply that one is anti-French.

³⁹ Intimation and insinuation are, rightly, as reprehensible as clear accusation. Still, it is necessary that the intimation and insinuation result from the text of the prosecuted writing. That recalls to me an incident with a dormitory supervisor who intended to punish me because I was whistling the air of a bawdy song and who, to get out of the impass where he was put by my remark: "I was only whistling it," justified the punishment by: "he knows licentious songs." To top it all, I in fact did not know the words. But that was the occasion for my learning them. [Guillaume's note]

Even in Israel, voices arise, increasingly numerous, of those who worry about the artificial and paranoid character of a policy of “memory” of the dead, and plead for a policy based on the real existence of the living Israelis (the film entitled *Le Vautour* [*The Vulture*] and “The Holocaust, A Danger to the Jewish People,” by Boaz Evron, in the monthly Hebrew literary magazine *Yiton* 77, May-June 1980, English translation: Israleft News Service, P.O., Box 9013, Jerusalem, Israel).

Is it really necessary to continue? And to analyze the last part of the sentence which concerns [46] the victims of the political-financial swindle and which is all the less defamatory inasmuch as in our culture the fact of being a victim harms neither one’s honor nor one’s respect, though this does not remedy the victim’s situation. Is it necessary to analyze the modified sentence, which specifies the sense of the sixty-word sentence and which, obviously, replaces it? The replacement of the words *which has allowed* by *who opened the way*, words of a fairly equivalent sense, aims only at underscoring their function by the unusualness of the difference.⁴⁰ And the last addition, the words pertaining to the younger Jewish generations, does not need any explanation, but prohibits categorically the specious interpretations which have been made.

The Heart of the Problem

In conclusion, there is a much more fundamental argument which prohibits one from holding that any one of these statements is defamatory towards a person, or a group of people, or “the Jewish community as a whole.” This argument is of a judicial and anthropological order. It is impossible to hold these statements as defamatory without holding, *a contrario*, that the alleged Hitlerian gas chambers and the alleged genocide of the Jews are components of the honor and the respect of a person, a group of people, or “the Jewish community as a whole.”

This idea is ridiculous and odious in the case of a person and of a group of people. Is it more maintainable on the level of “the Jewish community as a whole”? Let us note that this conception exists; it rests on a certain structure (*structuration*), in the individual and social imagination (*l’imaginaire*), derived from one’s relation to the deaths, to the victims, to memory and to history. The individual imagination is a matter of opinion; the social imagination is a matter of culture. The relevance of the various points of view is an object of controversies. This is in any case a reductive point of view, narrowly ethnic (if one feels oneself connected to (*si on se réfère à*) the Jewish ethnic group), nationalist (if one feels oneself connected to Zionist doctrine), or religious (if one feels oneself connected to Judaism). But how many Jews *died for France*? how many Jews *died for Communism*? how many Jews [47] *died for humanity*? etc., and who is doing the counting?

⁴⁰ That is, the difference between the two sets of words is minor, and it is unusual to call attention to such a minor difference, but, by doing so, one clarifies the import of these words. The point is that “has permitted” need not mean anything more than “opened the way.” The Jews who exaggerated their plight in the camps opened the way for the swindle, but they did not cause it: they merely *permitted* it to happen. Likewise, if you open a window and someone jumps through it to his death, you may be said to have *permitted* that death, but you cannot rightly be said to have *caused* it. Faurisson’s original statement hence does not state or imply that the Jews who lied about their plight in the camps *caused* the swindle. It does not accuse them of anything other than lying.

Does not the tragic dignity of the dead rather reside in the conviction that, if it happens that one lives for something, one always dies for nothing?

The doctrine of the timeless solidarity of the ethnic group, and thus the eminent place of the dead, in the honor, the respect and the rights of the ethnic group, are at the heart of Judaism, a mono-ethnic religion. This constant doctrine of the judicial and warlike anthropology of the “people of God” expresses itself explicitly in the Pentateuch (the Torah) and the Talmud (its rabbinical exegesis). Although at the heart of the Messianic expectations of Judaism is the hope to see all peoples finally renounce their particular anthropology in favor of Judaism, this hope, for orthodox Judaism at least, is related neither to the holocaust nor to the secular experiment of Zionism and the State of Israel, but to the arrival of the Messiah. This doctrine, which could justifiably be regarded as anti-Semitic by many Jews, notwithstanding the fact that it is shared by many Jews (!), does not have a legal basis in the Republic. And, according to other doctrines, quite as respectable, the honor and respect due to the dead for their life’s deeds or acquired by the circumstances of their death, belong only to dead and to them alone, and must be preserved by the undertakings of the living. That is precisely the implicit doctrine of republican law:

Articles 31, 32 and 33 will be applicable to defamations or insults directed against the memory of the dead only when the authors of these defamations or insults intend to attack the honor and the respect of the heirs, spouses or sole living legatees.

If the authors of defamations or insults had or had not the intention of attacking the honor and the respect of the heirs, spouses or all living legatees, these will be able to use, in both cases, the right of reply envisaged in article 13⁴¹ (Code pénal, loi sur la presse, art. 34.)

[48]

This Article 34, about which one will note that it emanates from a law of September 29, 1919, immediately after the holocaust of millions of combatants, leaves open to free evaluation and to controversy among the living the honor and respect due to the dead. Is this the result of indifference? Certainly not. But of the clear recognition that any regulation leads to giving, either to the State, or to associations, or to private individuals, a power over public opinion, in the name of the dead. The idea that one could mobilize again⁴² the dead did not enter the public consciousness (*l’Esprit public*) after the Great War.

The dead belong to history.

⁴¹ If one analyzes productions like *Holocaust*, *In the Name of All Mine*, *Shoah*, etc, and all the obsessional concentration camp literature, like the “answers” to revisionist works, one will agree that this right is exercised without obstacle and is not threatened. [Guillaume’s note]

⁴² *mobilize again* (*remobiliser*) That is, enlist in the army again for the purpose of using them again. The Jews in effect do this with their dead by invoking them constantly for purposes of extortion.

That justice moreover has the duty to refuse to give its guarantee to such and such a presentation of a historical event;

Seeing that the historian is not limited to conformism, that nothing prohibits him from making history, even “committed”⁴³ history with the proviso that he not use bad faith, by deforming or truncating the documents on which he has worked;

Seeing that when an author expresses his historical opinion, he is only exercising his free right to criticize; [...]

Seeing that there arises the problem of the memory of some conflicting with the memory of others; [...]

Seeing, in conclusion, that to condemn Wetzel would be equivalent to saying that there exists in France an “official” thesis of history;

That France honors itself as being a democratic country where freedom of expression, especially when it rests on historical research, must be able to act (*jouer* “play”) without constraint, that criticism is essential to freedom of thought in a true democracy;

Seeing that historical criticism most especially cannot be enclosed within too narrow limits and often requires the use “of defamatory imputations,”⁴⁴ that the historian who acts in good conscience, after having checked his information without distorting it, cannot be condemned;

Seeing then that we must enter the process of release... [T.G.I. Versailles, 17 janvier 1985.]

Paris, November 1985

⁴³ *committed (engagée)* That is, prejudiced by the author’s affiliations, beliefs, etc.

⁴⁴ Under the circumstances, the accusations of Mr. Laurent Wetzel against Mr. Marcel Paul were truly of a nature to ruin definitively the honor and reputation of the historical personage. [Guillaume’s note]

[49]

APPENDIX
TO THE FIRST PART

The document that we present in this appendix is a letter sent to Madame the President of the Tribunal of Versailles in a closed-door session; it concerns an affair comparable to the Faurisson affair, in that it touches on principles, namely: the right of a citizen to support historical theses which are non-conformist and considered to be unpleasant by commemorative associations, while at the same time these theses are supported by solid documentation and serious historical research.

It will be noticed that, in the drafting of this capital judgment, the court took up the statements of principles which were involved in both the judgment and then the ruling in the Faurisson affair, but it drew from them the logical conclusion by dismissing all the claims of the plaintiffs.

However, the court was able to obtain knowledge of the text of this decision only by the communication which I took the trouble to make. Moreover, as it will be noted, the Tribunal of Versailles has not been afraid to reproduce in its judgment a phrase taken from my letter, reproduced below in italics in the body of the letter.

Wherefore it turns out that although Robert Faurisson has been condemned, his trial has nevertheless contributed to restore an essential freedom to Laurent Wetzler, and to all historians, and that in 1985 La Vieille Taupe contributed to “speak the law.”⁴⁵

⁴⁵ contributed to “speak the law” (*a contribué à dire le droit*) That is, it was right in what it said about the law and thus contributed to a correct understanding of the law.

PIERRE GUILLAUME
Editeur-In-Chief
Of La Vieille Taupe
16, rue 75005 PARIS

MADAME THE PRESIDENT
of the Tribunal De Grande Instance De Versailles
Fifth Chambre
Avenue de l'Europe
78000 VERSAILLES

Paris, December 24, 1984.

Re. : F.N.D.I.R.P.⁴⁶/Wetzel

MADAME PRESIDENT,

It was reported to me that the name of Paul Rassinier was brought up in the discussion after my departure, by one of lawyers of the F.N.D.I.R.P. at the time of the lawsuit brought by this association against Mr. Laurent Wetzel.

That also brought up there was the judgment reached in what has become known as the "Faurisson affair."

Paul Rassinier, himself a deportee to Buchenwald and then to Dora, had been prosecuted by the F.N.D.I.R.P. for having reported and described in unconventional terms his experience in Nazi camps. After long years of proceedings, all the claims of the F.N.D.I.R.P. were finally dismissed.

The abusive framework in which the writings of this deportee were presented leads me to send you the texts, for purposes of clarification (*pour information*). Indeed, ever since that period a problem has arisen about *the conflict between the memory of some and that of others* and about the right of a deportee to testify out of the framework imposed by the organizations who want a monopoly over the memory and the commemoration.

On the question of the rights and duties of the historian posed by the trial in progress, the judgment of July 8, 1981 is added to a jurisprudence of which there are fortunately few parallel examples in the democratic countries.

I believe it my duty to inform you that the publication made by the *Recueil Dalloz-Sirey*, which is probably the privileged source of the information for the court, is seriously defective and was condemned in severe terms by Le Tribunal De Grande Instance of Paris, First Chamber, First Section (Judgment of November 23, 1983, of which there is an appeal coming to the session of the court on January 31, 1985). Moreover, the judgment of July 8, 1981 was reformed by the Court of Appeal of Paris, First Chamber, Section A, in its ruling of April 26, 1983, although none the parties had filed an appeal against it.

This ruling, which thus constitutes the doctrine of republican justice in this matter, was published *in extenso* under my care in J. Aitken, *Épilogue judiciaire de l'affaire*

⁴⁶ *F.N.D.I.R.P.* Fédération Nationale des Déportés et Internés Résistants et Patriotes (National Federation of Deported and Imprisoned Resistance Fighters and Patriots).

Faurisson, and was the object, to my knowledge, of no other publication. This is why I allow myself, Madame President, to send to you the following attached documents.

1. *Le Mensonge d'Ulysse (The Lie of Ulysses)*, by Paul Rassinier;
2. *Intolérable Intolérance*, which contains (pp. 174-191) the only rigorous publication of the judgment of July 8, 1981;
3. *Épilogue judiciaire de l'affaire Faurisson*, which contains (pp. 5-15) the complete text of the ruling of April 26, 1983;
4. A leaflet reproducing the essence of the judgment condemning the faulty publication made by the *Recueil Dalloz-Sirey*.

So that my present step not lend itself to any tendentious interpretation, I am sending a copy of this letter, accompanied by the same documents, to the lawyers of each party and to Mr. Delcroix, Professor Faurisson's lawyer, so that he may bring it to the attention of the court that is to convene on January 31, 1985 for the appeal lodged by the Dalloz Company.

I ask you to accept, Madame President, the homage of my sincere respect.

PIERRE GUILLAUME.

P.J.

Copies to: Mr. Patrice Cohen-Seat

Mr. Joe Nordman;

Mr. Henri Noguères;

Mr. Jacques Miquel;

Mr. Stephan Pavia;

Mr. Bertrand Lavril;

Mr. Éric Delcroix.



Les baobabs.

SECOND PART

[55]

The six texts which constitute this second part were written between 1982 and 1985. They have remained unpublished because in France it is impossible to publish and distribute such texts, except by doing it oneself, at one's own expense and with the risk of being sued and persecuted in other ways.

They are thus documents on the censured activity of La Vieille Taupe in regard to the Faurisson affair. It is for this reason that they are published here just as they were when lying dormant in our files.

Only the first of these texts is directly related to the judicial ups and downs of the affair. Written before the rendering of the ruling of the Court of Appeal in the civil trial which alone touched on the historiographic basis,⁴⁷ it aimed at announcing the epistemological and legal stake of the judicial debate in progress, the stake that our adversaries have been in a hurry to forget.

It consists of a long technical development on some questions which were then in the center of the debate. These developments are now outdated, the last uncertainties which remained having been eliminated at the time of the Zündel trial, in Toronto (Canada), in spite of the pathetic efforts of the court's president to exclude these technical aspects from the trial.

The second text relates to some curious aspects of the conference which was held in the Sorbonne and which has finally just been the subject of a publication (Colloque de l'École des hautes études en sciences sociales, L'Allemagne nazie et le génocide juif, Gallimard-Le Seuil, Paris, November 1985, 607 pages). Our text is unfinished. We publish it such as it is, although, to some extent, it covers the same material as the fourth text, written one year later, precisely for the reason that, written one year earlier, it was more precise in the narration of events dependent upon memory.

The third and the fourth texts are reactions to the editorial and journalistic events of the time. They are [56] the occasion for dotting some i's and for broaching, in honor of (à l'occasion de) the 1984 generation of eyewitnesses (the sole survivors), the general question of the witnesses about whom one tells us, in addition, that they have all been exterminated.

The fifth text gives a progress report on the relations between Noam Chomsky and La Vieille Taupe. This text is the only one to have known a small circulation (twenty-five copies) to cauterize a crisis which developed in the revisionist camp at the periphery of La Vieille Taupe. The conflicts, however minor, are the occasion for reaffirming principles and for determining in actual practice the orientation of an action.

Lastly, an exchange of letters between a respected editor and a semi-clandestine editor underscores the intellectual ambiance which continues to prevail in France to this day.

The publication of this book and the verdict of acquittal rendered by Seventeenth Chamber on December 9, 1985, while this book was in the process of being printed, should close, we hope, the period of obscurantist terror which has reigned in these

⁴⁷ historiographic basis that is, the basis for Faurisson's thesis.

matters since the indictment brought on January 5, 1951 by the F.N.D.I.R.P. against Paul Rassinier, and should completely restore freedom of expression for witnesses and historians. That is the only thing at stake which La Vieille Taupe explicitly⁴⁸ hoped to gain in this affair. Beyond that, La Vieille Taupe asks only that it be allowed to return to its usual concerns.

So far as we are concerned, the historiographic debate is finished. Henri Roques' thesis, defended on June 15, 1985 before the University of Nantes—with honors “très bien,” by ruining the credit granted up to now to the Gerstein document and the Zündel trial, by ruining the credit granted up to now to Rudolph Vrba's testimony and the film Shoah, by ruining the credit granted up to now to the testimony of Yan Karski,⁴⁹ have just closed a debate in which, [57] moreover, since the above-mentioned conference no historian is any longer willing to put himself at risk.

Deserted by the historians, the exterminationist front is now entirely held by Claude Lanzmann and the film Shoah. In the presentation which he himself makes of his monumental film, Claude Lanzmann recognizes explicitly that there exists no document, no material trace, which would prove the genocide and the existence of the gas chambers (the Germans destroyed it all: the thesis of the special squad, the eraser of traces, which leaves no trace of itself). There remains the living memory of the living witnesses. He will thus record, for history, these testimonies. For the nonce, he reveals the existence of some witnesses who remained unknown up to now, and he neglects also some too well known witnesses (Martin Gray, Moshé Garbarz, Alter Fajnsilberg, Maurice Benroubi, etc.).

Claude Lanzmann thus works as an ethnologist who records the “living memory of people.” For this reason his film is a great ethnological film about Jewish storytellers.

But the anthropologist knows that it is characteristic of myth to give rise to witnesses and testimonies. In terms of history, the work of Claude Lanzmann is rigorously tautological. The specific question which the historian asks himself, and which defines his discipline since Thucydides, is this one: “Are these witnesses telling the truth?”

To solve this question, it is necessary and it is enough to listen to what they say.

This affair is solemn (grave). It has ceased to be serious.

One has much reproached me for having been confined, for seven years, to a “pointillist” defense of revisionism. Admittedly. But one always writes for readers, even when one has little hope of being published. And about what should one speak to readers who are not already capable of recognizing that two and two make four.

⁴⁸ For its implicit aims, see Finkielkraut, *L'Avenir d'une négation*, Paris, Le Seuil, 1982, 187 pages. [Guillaume's note]

⁴⁹ Yan Karski is certainly the man who, along with Vrba, did the most to persuade the Allied authorities of the ongoing reality of an extermination and of gas chambers. It is the testimony of Vrba which is at the origin of the W.R.B. Report, itself an essential part of the Judicial Notice which was given to the American prosecutors assigned to question the war criminals, and which the defendants did not have the right to dispute. [Guillaume's note. W.R.B. = War Refugee Board]

[59]

TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD IN A VERY SINGULAR CIVIL ARGUMENT

The International League Against Racism and Anti-Semitism (L.I.C.R.A.) has indicated, on May 14, 1982, its conclusions in the civil suit brought against Robert Faurisson, the only one which really touches on the historical basis for the affair. They were written after an appeal made by R. Faurisson of a judgment obtained by this league before the Tribunal De Grande Instance De Paris. This judgment was published and was the object of a profound discussion in the collective work *Intolérable Intolérance*.⁵⁰ The conclusions deposed by R. Faurisson, on October 13, 1982, occupy forty-five typed pages and answer the charges of the league point by point. Such length—as also such amplitude—is unusual in the judicial annals of our country.

The conclusions of the league, on the one hand, and the conclusions of R. Faurisson, on the other hand, constitute the two essential documents submitted to the court by each of the parties to provide it grounds for its decision,⁵¹ and starting from which it will have to compose its judgment. The pleadings, in a civil trial, are intended only to illustrate and to introduce an essentially written procedure.

We have considered it expedient to bring to the attention of an alerted, if not warned, public the arguments of the two parties involved. For this purpose, we invite the reader to refer to the complete text of the conclusions of each.⁵² The ancient Greeks would have called these writings *dissoi logoi*, contradictory speeches on the same subject. These concern a very controversial issue of contemporary history.

[60]

It falls to us to propose some things to read for the benefit of those who find these judicial writings repulsive. It would be a pity that the obvious austerity of these paragraphs deprive them of a spiritual relaxation which has become rare in these times of crisis and anxiety.

Let us start with the charge brought by the very honorable league. R. Faurisson is shown “to have distorted the presentation of history” and to have “voluntarily truncated

⁵⁰ Note of the AAARGH: the book can be found at this address:

<http://vho.org/aaargh/fran/polpen/intolerable/iitdm.html>

⁵¹ More literally, “to permit it [sc. the court] to establish its conviction” (*pour lui permettre d’établir sa conviction*).

⁵² Available upon request from La Vieille Taupe for 30 F. [Note of the AAARGH: These conclusions are found in the volume: *L’Incrovable affaire Faurisson*, at this address:

<http://vho.org/aaargh/fran/archFaur/1980-1985/RF8212xx2.html>; the brochure itself is at this address:

<http://vho.org/aaargh/fran/archFaur/1980-1985/RF8212xx1.html>. One will find a commentary on the whole affair, along with the documents, in the unpublished (1984) volume: *L’écllosion révisionniste*, published by the AAARGH in 2004 at these addresses: <http://vho.org/aaargh/fran/livres4/eclorev1.pdf> and <http://vho.org/aaargh/fran/livres4/eclorev2.pdf>.]

certain testimonies such as that of Johann Paul Kremer,” professor of medicine, who performed a service of sixty-six days in the Auschwitz camp.

This falsification and this truncation, for which no textual evidence is cited, is supposed to constitute an attack on the interests of the members of the league. These interests are defined in three accusatory paragraphs:

Seeing that the L.I.C.A.⁵³ is a regularly declared association, that according to its statutes proposes for itself:

To fight by all the means in its capacity against racism and anti-Semitism which dishonor humanity;

To defend by an action, at the same time preventive and positive, the right to existence and to peace of the victims of racism throughout the whole world;

To realize by the union of men and women of all opinions the reconciliation (*rapprochement*) of peoples, peace between the races, and equality among men;

Seeing that the questioning of the extermination of populations because of their belonging to a race, something of which Nazi Germany rendered itself guilty under the influence and the directives of the chancellor Adolf Hitler, and the questioning of the gas chambers which were used as the means to attain this “final solution,” constitute an attack on the collective interests of the members of the L.I.C.A.:

Seeing that indeed the recalling and the respect for historical truth which⁵⁴ has led to the industrial and organized extermination of more than six million people because of their belonging to a race, by the implementation of a policy and of a criminal organization, constitute precisely the means of fighting against racism and anti-Semitism since they allow one to show the aberrations and the crimes which these scourges have generated in the course of contemporary history; [...]

In the district court, the defendant was condemned.

The judgment does not charge him with any falsification, voluntary or involuntary. It points to no truncation. [60] The defendant was convicted, not for falsification but for imprudence, for having treated, it seems, a too recent subject. The judgment nowhere imports that the defendant was imprudent in the sense of having uttered a lie or made an error. The tribunal declares that it is incompetent to slice the truth in history.⁵⁵ The text of the judgment thus does not exclude the hypothesis that the defendant committed his culpable imprudence by speaking the truth. This judgment recalls that of the celebrated Roman procurator. Pontius Pilate refused to come to a conclusion about the truth of the charges brought against Jesus, but he had to abandon him to the religious and homicidal hatred of the Sanhedrin.

⁵³ *L.I.C.A.* Ligue internationale contre l'antisémitisme; in 1979 it changed its name to Ligue internationale contre le racisme et l'antisémitisme (*L.I.C.R.A.*).

⁵⁴ What is the antecedent of “which”? [N.d.A.] [Guillaume’s note. This question points to the general incoherence of the passage, which is at least partly conveyed in the translation and which I will not attempt fully to explicate, except to point out that the French verb which I have translated as “has led” is indeed singular (*a conduit*) and that the French verb which I have translated as “constitute” is plural (*constituent*).]

⁵⁵ That is, to determine historical truth.

Jesus not being a Roman citizen, the procurator, foolishly decried [by the crowd], concluded that he did not have to take part in obscure quarrels about Judaic theology. That is most likely what President Caratini wished to do. Professor Faurisson being a French citizen, he nevertheless could not abandon him to the regular arm of the league. He thus convicted him of this very vague charge which can mean anything, and thus means nothing. The defendant believes that this evasion is wrong. He persists indeed to maintain that he stated a truth: the magic gas chamber has only an imaginary existence. The forty-five sheets of his conclusions expose a part of the reasons which force him to maintain this statement.

It is necessary to note that, if it is from now on imprudent to repeat the assertion of the professor, that is only because he who would risk it would incur *ipso facto* a conviction. The judgment of President Caratini is of a performative character: *it does things with words*, it creates the thing by saying it:

Dear Professor, you are imprudent, because [since] I condemned you.

If this judgment is confirmed, its performative virtue would be transmitted to future generations and it would become, in fact, imprudent to maintain the incriminated statement, and one could no longer decide in any way at all if this statement is true or false. Our children would thus have the advantage of knowing what it is advisable not to say, while the unhappy professor could not, [62] before being condemned for having said it, suspect that it was imprudent to say it.

There is thus here a titanic conflict between the logic of Aristotle and that of the President Caratini. Aristotle's logic posits indeed that of the two following statements:

1. The (homicidal) gas chambers existed.
2. The (homicidal) gas chambers did not exist.

one is necessarily true and the other false.

The Court of Appeal now confronts an alternative:

1. Either to make a pronouncement about what is true and what is false;
2. Or to declare itself incompetent and to throw out the charges of the league.

Indeed, one hardly sees how it can confirm ever so little the judgment of the district court which it would thus render executory, all the more so because the Court of Cassation will not be able to maintain a judgment in the form of an evasion, based on a performative statement which creates the law instead of applying it. This difficulty has not escaped our neighbors over the Rhine, since one discusses there, they say, the possibility of a law which will prohibit the questioning of the generally admitted ideas about the genocide and the holocaust. This question was also mentioned in the European Parliament, and the Jewish organizations demand a law of this type in Great Britain. However, although the question has been bandied about for nearly four years, no project to date has arrived at the office of any assembly. This solution, which would withdraw from judges the occasion for difficult and distressing reflexions, is not without disadvantages. It would initially be necessary to write the law, and thus to define with a minimum of precision what it would be forbidden to question, at a time when even the most conformist historians are less sure of their certitudes. It would probably be easy to find a majority to vote for the law and an unanimity of the people's elected officials not to ask the true questions, but how can one prevent the cultivated public from wondering sooner or later why, in all the history of humanity, the gas chambers and the genocide are

the only historical truth which needs the help of the law to be maintained. Because, [63] of course, if the truth affirmed by the law is so apparent as to be universally obvious, what need is there for a law? and if the truth imposed by the law is not so apparent as to be universally obvious, how is it right for there to be such a law?⁵⁶

For that is the heart of the problem. The league involved itself in a proceeding against R. Faurisson while thinking that the existence of the gas chambers belonged to the set of things whose obviousness is uncontested. But the trial by its very existence makes manifest that at issue here is an “obviousness” that is contested.

The league said: Faurisson exists, and the revisionists... exist, but they do not really exist! Their arguments are incoherent. They exist only like an aberration of the mind.

But in a law-suit the very rules of the civil proceeding do not allow one to lock oneself up in autistic certitudes. It is necessary to argue. One argued therefore.

Let us take again the two contradictory and incompatible statements:

1. The (homicidal) gas chambers existed;
2. The (homicidal) gas chambers did not exist.

Each one of these statements, according to whether it appears true or false, constitutes a potential falsification of history; but, apart from totalitarian regimes where history has a guardian, no one has the job of defending this great lady. Democratic wisdom leaves to history the burden of defending itself.

However, each one of these statements rests on historical works, on arguments and on documents. The works which support the false statement necessarily contain serious gaps (to err is human), the arguments contain weaknesses (the flesh is weak), the documents were badly interpreted (let him who has never sinned throw the first stone). But one will also probably find faulty omissions, the denaturations of documents and falsifications: errors (*fautes*) which are substantive and perfectly perceptible (*objectivables*).

If these errors are made on both sides, this will lead to a discussion without end, without the possibility of reaching a decision, until new documents [64] appear. The court will be able to consider only the documents commonly known at the moment of the indictment or accepted by the defendant who, in fact, has accepted all.

These considerations are absolutely general and apply to any research which arrives at a false conclusion. The league thus had the choice between two solutions: either to bring the proof of the truth of its statement by bringing a proof (were it only a single proof of the existence of even just one homicidal gas chamber); or to bring the proof of crippling faults committed by R. Faurisson in his works.

Indeed, if the gas chambers existed, and if the league possesses the proof of this, R. Faurisson will be confronted, in making his defense, with the impossible task of deconstructing this proof. He will then have to ask for pardon or persist doggedly. If he persists doggedly, his defense will then necessarily contain serious gaps, his arguments will reveal their weakness. He will be constrained to make rash interpretations of documents. One will be able to point out the culpable omissions, the abuses of documents, that is, their falsifications.

⁵⁶ Lit. “If the truth imposed by the law is of the order of obviousness which imposes itself universally, what need is there for a law? and if the truth imposed by the law is not of this order of obviousness, of what right is the law?”

The league risked these two solutions before the court, without giving up the use of pathos, as is its wont and which serves it so well.

From its trunk, stuffed with diamonds (an abundance of proofs), it extracted, on the advice of Mr. George Wellers, that which it regarded as its most beautiful diamond (the journal of S.S. Doctor Johann Paul Kremer). For greater security, it added to it a second diamond of a less beautiful water⁵⁷ (the confessions of this same Johann Paul Kremer—retracted confessions, something of which the league and R. Faurisson were unaware, this fact having been discovered only later by Jean-Gabriel Cohn-Bendit).

In his *Mémoire en Défense (Statement in Defense)*, R. Faurisson showed that the diamond was only a fake, without even using Kremer's retractions; and by his linguistic study Jean-Gabriel Cohn-Bendit brought the proof that this diamond is a fake!

Not only did R. Faurisson not wrongly interpret, truncate or denature Kremer's journal, but he brought positive material proof of the reckless interpretations and denaturations of this document [65] by the authors on whom the league relied. These denaturations could be interpreted only as the conscious or unconscious contamination of the document itself, as a result of the belief shared by its translators and editors. The same is true with regard to all the points raised by the league without exception.

Must one conclude from this that the league's entire stock of diamonds is composed in fact of glassware? That would be overhasty, but one cannot avoid observing that the league manifests a visible repugnance to subject new diamonds to the analysis of the professor and the tribunal.

It is at this time that in the Parisian intellectual circles there appeared a very surprising theory. An academic, in the columns of *Le Monde*, claimed to be able, by using a supposed hypercritical method, to make us doubt the reality of the War of 1914-1918. This professor has not been driven out of the University, has not been harassed, did not incur the wrath of the associations of ex-combatants. Has boundless tolerance made such progress in France? The Rabbi Sirat, moreover, has propounded the same ideas on television, without causing the least stir, even in the historians of the Great War. However, "my grandfather was gassed with mustard gas. He died after the war as a consequence of this gasing." This testimony does not constitute a proof. However, we defy anyone to interject doubt between the statement and the materiality of the stated facts. On the contrary, if a hypercritical critic decides to check and seeks documents concerning the disability pension, the date of the death, the place of the wound... if he checks it all out, the reality of the Great War, far from disappearing, will take on an increasingly concrete thickness, without it being necessary to seek other proofs. On the contrary, the study of any testimony related to the gas chambers led, progressively, to growing perplexity. Criticism does not dissolve the truth, it establishes and strengthens it. It dissolves the forgery. Sophistry can certainly create illusions and deck out the forgery in the colors of the truth, but in a necessarily transitory way, for the extreme subtlety of sophism cannot long [66] deploy its charms without allowing its sophistical structure to be seen.

This surprising reaction, this mythical construction of a supposed hypercritical method ready to magically dissolve truth aims right from the start at denying any relevance to the professor's arguments. Confronted with the brutal revelation that the best diamond selected by the league is now only glass, the mind, rather than to admit that this

⁵⁷ *of a less beautiful water*, i.e. of lesser clarity

diamond was, from time immemorial, only glass, and to risk another diamond, prefers to endow R. Faurisson with the magical or diabolical ability to transsubstantiate diamonds. This makes it possible for the mind to preserve all its confidence in the value of the diamonds in the trunk and justifies avoiding in the future the risk of another such deplorable transsubstantiation.

This mechanism of the mind, which aims at denying *a priori* any value to the opposing arguments, locks up the mind in a logic of denial. Psychoanalysts know its etiology and its destiny; they do not know its duration.

The league was locked up in a logic of denial.

Denial of the arguments of the adversary, of which it can take account only by coarsely falsifying them, denial of even the existence of its adversaries, in the pathetic attempt to deny the existence of the revisionist school of history and the works which it produces, works which are increasingly numerous and of growing quality.

Although the league denies its adversaries, it does not deny adversity, for it needs that to exist. "Revisionism does not exist, I have met it," the league proclaims pathetically. And thus at the time of this affair the league finds itself involved in a trial, which consists essentially of a *disputatio* between the league and a school of history which the league claims does not exist, about a subject which it claims could under no circumstances be the object of a *disputatio*.

Such is the paradox of this trial.

[67]

Let us come to the text of the conclusions. If we leave aside the technical paragraphs related to the admissibility of the requests, the argumentation of the league is limited to merely enumerating "the faults made by Mr. Faurisson according to the articles 1382 and 1383 of the civil code."

ART 1382. – Any and every deed of a man, which causes harm to another, obliges him, by whose fault it happened, to repair it.

ART 1383. - Everyone is responsible for the damage which he has caused not only by his action, but also by his negligence or his imprudence.

The faults imputed to R. Faurisson are classified under four headings:

1. *The "judicial sources dismissed."*

The two penultimate paragraphs deserve that one stop there. Faurisson is there accused of dismissing in "some words and without seriously explaining himself further" the testimonies of the "rare survivors of the *Sonderkommandos*," he is then accused of having dismissed "also without any explanation" the "testimonies and accounts" of five "S.S. officials": Höss, Kremer, Entress, Broad and Gerstein.

Now, Faurisson gave very serious and lengthy explanations about each of these cases, including documents and pieces of evidence sent by the unpredictable league and deposited with the tribunal. Some of these testimonies and accounts were the subject of exhaustive criticisms by revisionist authors. The report deposited with the tribunal is mainly devoted to the testimony of Kremer. The reports of Gerstein have been the object of disagreement by historians hostile to Faurisson. The account of Pery Broad, denied by its author, is a total fabrication from the British services, so much so that this S.S. officer, who is supposedly describing a gassing of which he was a witness, rather describes the scene, as seen from the interior of the gas chamber, adopting the point of view and the

feelings of someone being gassed! No (expert) historian any longer lends the least credence to Pery Broad's testimony.

Thus, in two paragraphs, the league commits the flawed imprudences with which it reproaches R. Faurisson and commits the especially formidable imprudence of revealing the extreme fragility of the sources upon which it intends to set its certitudes.

In the following paragraph, the league reproaches R. Faurisson with having "also failed, by a culpable negligence, [68] to mention some important documents conflicting with his thesis." The league gives evidence, this time, of a remarkable prudence by not mentioning any of the allegedly omitted documents. Is it necessary to recall that the league has never mentioned any document conflicting with its own thesis; that it mentioned the existence of critical works only while coarsely denaturing them; that it never even mentioned the conclusions of the most official historians upon which it elsewhere relies, when these conclusions deviated even a little from the version of the facts that it intends to promote? Has not the elusive league failed to mention, even in its judicial writings important documents provided by Faurisson and deposited with the court? In fact, the revisionists, constrained to deconstruct and initially to confront the arguments and documents provided by their adversaries did not omit any important one. And better! How did the league not realize that it was enough for it, within the framework of this trial, to name just one of the allegedly omitted and allegedly important documents conflicting with the thesis of R. Faurisson, in order to force him to confront this document and so to reveal either his imprudence or the league's imprudence?

2. *The "omissions of Mr. Faurisson."*

A comparison with the responses of the accused reveals here a similar mechanism. The league appears seriously imprudent in its charges. It refers to documents in whose existence it is the only one who still believes and goes so far as to attribute imprudently and without proof to Eichmann himself the establishment of an alleged official report from the real conference of Wansee, and this, against the opinion of many specialists.

3. *The "denaturations of texts."*

4. *The "fallacious technical interpretations."*

This is the only point which is the object, on the part of the league, of a discussion and of a precise documentary argumentation. We will come back to this.

Having reached the end of this list of the faults allegedly committed by R. Faurisson, the reader will note that, apart from the fourth and last point, the league provides, strictly speaking, no true demonstration in support of such damning charges.

The charge of denaturations of texts is supported with no [69] precise reference either to the place in the denatured text or to the place in the denaturing text, which would allow the court to note the fact of the denaturation. As for the omissions and dismissals, the league affirms for example: "seeing that it turns out and that it is proven that..." (p. 7, paragraph 9). "It turns out"? how? where? under the terms of what criteria? "It is proven" by means of what proof? The league sees no need to support any of these assertions. It does not hesitate to reiterate untruths whose falseness was allowed even by specificities on which it relies; it does not hesitate to refer to documents whose apocryphal character was shown in the very course of the proceedings.

However, that it obtained the condemnation of R. Faurisson in the district court poses a real problem, even if the tribunal did not follow the league in its conclusions and if it remained prudently vague in the definition of imprudences with which it persists in reproaching R. Faurisson. Simply to describe this disconcerting judicial phenomenon, the anthropologist is constrained to put forth the following assumption: the heavy charges launched by the league exerted such an effect of incantation or intimidation that the court did not have the presence of mind to require the elementary justifications that it would have demanded for any other charge, and as was its duty to do.

Did the tribunal confusedly feel that the simple application in this case of the normal rules of judicial procedure would lead to a rupture of the religious consensus which surrounds these questions, and did it retreat by reverential fear from the doors of this taboo?

That is what the reader will not be able to fail to discover while reading with attention the conclusions that the appellant, that is, Professor Faurisson, opposes to the respondent, namely the league.

We are now going to try to distinguish the essential springs of the controversy and the underlying mechanisms which are at work and clarify their most painful aspects.

We will look closely at the last two counts of the indictment launched by the league. These are indeed the [70] “fallacious technical interpretations” and the “denaturations of texts” which are likely to allow the reader, who is respectful of documents and attentive to the facts, to form an opinion when he is faced with two contradictory discourses (*discours*).⁵⁸ The decisive element is there in that it makes it possible to decide, although it should be noted that many revisionist authors questioned the existence of the gas chambers without even supposing that their realization presented any technical difficulty.

“When a fictitious account is suitably made, it does not contain in itself the means of destroying it as such” (Vidal-Naquet, *Esprit*, p. 47). More precisely, every discourse is compared with the other discourses (with the discourses of the others) and checked for the materiality of the facts that it states. We will study the two discourses which have been submitted to us, while being particularly attentive to the capacity which each demonstrates to take into account the opposing discourse, the other’s discourse, and the materiality of the facts, and reality in general.

A discourse unable to take into account the other’s discourse and which rejects reality is closed unto itself and becomes delirious.

Let us start with the “fallacious technical interpretations.”

With regard to the reliability of Höss’s confessions and Mr. Truffert’s opinions, the professor provides in his own conclusions some explanations to which there is need to add only a simple note: they reveal to us the curious way in which one of the lawyers of the league claims to consult an expert about the facts. The letter of the attorney Korman aims at obtaining a document draped in the authority of the expert, which can be used in a trial against R. Faurisson. It hardly constitutes an attempt to obtain a clear answer to the technical question actually at issue. We are however at the very heart of the subject: are massive homicidal gasings materially and technically possible, for example, in the room represented as a homicidal gas chamber by the league, the Leichenkeller 1 from

⁵⁸ *discours* can usually be translated as “speech,” but here and below it refers to the entire testimony of a witness in a trial, the account that he gives, not to a single speech by him.

Crematory II and, in particular, was it possible to penetrate without a gas mask into this room to handle there, without special precautions, the thousands of bodies of [71] the gassed. To answer these technical questions by the authority generally accorded to Höss's confessions is precisely to replace the technical argument with an argument from authority.

In four years, this question has not obtained a satisfactory response in spite of many attempts. In his book, *Les chambres à gaz ont existé (The Gas Chambers Existed)*, Mr. George Wellers precisely points out that the temperature of the corpses higher than twenty-six degrees centigrade [26 °C = 78.8 °F], the boiling point for HCN [hydrogen cyanide], eliminated the retention of gas by condensation, which is true, but he did not treat the dissolution of the HCN in perspiration and bodily fluids, the adherence of the HCN, the gas pockets in between the piled up bodies, the retention by capillarity, the condensation on the concrete walls in winter in particular, nor the condensation caused by ventilation even when the air temperature is lower than twenty-six degrees. No explanation was provided concerning the possibility of ventilating a room which is filled with corpses and whose system of ventilation is known, but banal and very insufficient, whereas in the American homicidal gas chambers the presence of an extremely powerful extractor does not eliminate the need to carefully wash the body of the condemned while taking particular precautions (gas mask, rubber apron, rubber gloves), even then when there is a single body, when there is no comparable obstacle to the air circulation,⁵⁹ and when the temperature of the corpse is, there too, immediately after death, higher than twenty-six degrees.

Thus, the league did not manage in four years to provide an answer to the technical and material questions of R. Faurisson, that the Nazis are supposed to have solved in a few weeks, without anyone's being able to put together the slightest evidence that they ever asked themselves these questions.

However, if these material and technical problems (these are not the only ones) indeed lent themselves to a practical solution, this solution should be conceivable and exposable. On the contrary, should one not realize that the testimonies of men like Höss or Gerstein, thought to be technicians of mass gassings, while their avowals are supposed to be spontaneous and co-operative, give a description of the gassings as summary, [72] simplistic and abstract as that which reigns in the heads of all, and should not one deduce from this that the depiction, which they make of the gassings at the time when they write it, comes from the same source as that which reigns in the heads of all and that this source is not concrete?

By refusing to hear the questions, by avoiding them, by suppressing them, by responding with an argument from authority to a question of a strictly technical nature, is there not on the part of the league "fallacious technical interpretation" and denial of the other's discourse? In the same way, by referring to a magical ventilation, without studying the real capacities of the ventilation equipment actually installed, is there not on the part of Mr. Wellers and the league "fallacious technical interpretation"?

Moreover, neither the league nor Mr. Wellers show in what regard R. Faurisson's technical interpretations would be fallacious. The one and the other affirm that they are fallacious, since the gassings existed. Tautological reasoning, and besides irrefutable if

⁵⁹ *no comparable obstacle to the air circulation* that is, no obstacle comparable to the many bodies in the gas chambers envisioned by the league.

the gassings took place, but which constitutes, in itself, a refusal to really consider the technical arguments.

The translation of *Vergasungskeller*, in the document of January 29, 1943, deserves particular comment. The league, in its written conclusions, affirms in an absolutely peremptory manner that the term *Vergasungskeller* means *gassing cellar* (*cave de gazage*), which, in its mind, implies homicidal gassing, whereas evidence abounds that the Germans used the word *Vergasung* to refer to disinfection gassings. *Vergasung* can thus mean, according to the context, either *carburation* or *gassing*. The word *carburation* can cover various realities, according to whether it is a question of a carburetor of a car, or equipment described in the technical notes of a manufacturer of crematories, and intended to preheat the gas mixture admitted into the furnace with the help of the hot gases collected in the back of the furnace. The word *gassing* can also refer to either a disinfection gassing or a homicidal gassing.

In *Le Monde* of January 16, 1979, R. Faurisson had protested against the reckless use of this document and the abusive translation *gassing cellar* with a homicidal sense. He wrote: “in the letter that one quotes for me from January 29, 1943 (a letter which is not even marked as usual “Secret”) *Vergasung* does not mean gassing but carburation. *Vergasungskeller* indicates the basement room where the gas mixture is made which supplies the crematory furnace.”

In his attempt at an answer (*The Gas Chambers Existed*), Mr. George Wellers by no means disputes that the word *Vergasung* can, in certain cases, mean *carburation*, nor that the crematoria can be equipped with this equipment identical to that of the Siemens furnaces, nor the fact that, when this equipment is installed in a cellar, the technical notes use the term *Vergasungskeller* to indicate the equipment itself as well the room in the basement which contains it. Contrary to the league, Mr. George Wellers heard the objection, he understood it. And he has, vis-a-vis the objection, a partially scientific and materialist attitude. He refuses to create the thing with the aid of the word. He brings in the opinion of a technician of the furnaces, he gets information about the material constraints of such an installation. And he shows thus that the *Leichenkeller*⁶⁰ 1 of the plan (*plan*)⁶¹ cannot have been a *Vergasungskeller*, in the sense which the professor attributes to it, a carburation cellar (*cave de carburation*). His demonstration is convincing, except that the professor never claimed in his article in *Le Monde* that he thought that the *Vergasungskeller* was identical with *Leichenkeller* 1. Neither the S.S. Hauptsturmführer,⁶² the author of the letter, nor R. Faurisson gives the least indication which would make it possible to locate and to specify the site of this *Vergasungskeller*. Furthermore, nothing permits one to identify it with *Leichenkeller* 1 and to attribute this identification, as something obvious, either to the author of the letter or to the professor.

What one knows, on the other hand, is that at the time when the letter was written—January 1943—the installation had not been carried out. One can thus think that the letter’s author designates by *Vergasungskeller* the basement site designed to receive these installations, which is currently empty. It is then a question of the basement room

⁶⁰ *Leichenkeller* “Corpses-cellar”

⁶¹ A *plan* in French can mean *plan*, *map*, *layout* or *blueprint*.

⁶² *Hauptsturmführer* was a military rank in the SS. It was roughly equal to that of a “Captain” (“Hauptmann”) in the regular army (from the Leo Online Forum).

designated on the plan as *Leichenkeller 3*, and which will in the end serve another purpose, or of a space, not clearly identified, underneath the room with the furnaces?

These complex and highly technical installations [74] at this time had not been fully completed, nor were the side generators, indicated on some Topf and Sohn papers (*notices*) and envisaged initially on the plan. In fact, in the end they installed only some more rudimentary side ventilators intended to increase the air flow. As a whole, the material realization of Crematories II and III, at the end of 1942 through the beginning of 1943, is more rudimentary than is envisioned in the known plans from 1941-1942. The cremation capacity of the furnaces is reduced proportionately.

In the current state of the documentary and (crude) archaeological research, no specialist has yet managed to provide an absolutely satisfactory localization for this *Vergasungskeller*, and a completely convincing demonstration.⁶³ However, this localization is necessary to grasp a final translation of this term.

Let us note, however, that, contrary to the league, Mr. Wellers does not refuse *a priori* the sense suggested by the professor. Having identified once and for all, and without proof, the *Vergasungskeller* of the letter with *Leichenkeller 1* of the plan, he utilizes technical materialist arguments to prove that this *Leichenkeller 1* can in no case have been a carburation cellar, which, I repeat, seems obvious and had never been envisaged by anyone other than him. He concludes from this that the word *Vergasung* thus cannot, in this case, be translated by *carburation*. There remains the sense *gassing* that, in his book, he interprets immediately in the sense of homicidal gassing. He concludes from this that *Leichenkeller 1* is a homicidal gas chamber. The word *Vergasung* creates the thing.

But, in a letter of May 24, 1982 addressed to the *Bulletin des Amis de Paul Rassinier* (*Bulletin of the Friends of Paul Rassinier*) (in response to a leaflet in connection with the Exposition of the Deportation, 1933-1945), Mr. Wellers takes the trouble to eliminate the interpretation “disinfection gassing” which no one had suggested. There too he adopts a partially scientific and materialist attitude. He refuses to admit that the word is enough to create the thing; he provides concrete documentation on the thing itself. Here are his own words: “[...] it would be good to specify immediately, for the readers of Mr. Faurisson, that this suggestion does not hold up. Indeed, in a letter dated May 28, 1942, the firm [75] Degesch, the manufacturer of the disinfection chambers in the Nazi concentration camps, responds negatively to an order for disinfection chambers of 75 cubic meters, because that presents some very big technical difficulties in comparison with the manufacture of the usual disinfection chambers of 25 cubic meters, and it declares impossible the construction (*aménagement*) of disinfection chambers of 200 cubic meters. Then, it is obvious that in the case of a chamber of 506.10 cubic meters, its conversion (*aménagement*) into a disinfection chamber is out of the question.”

The arguments of Mr. Wellers seem here correct except the supposition that *Leichenkeller 1* ($210\text{m}^2 \times 2.41 \text{ m} = 506.10\text{m}^3$) was divided by partitions and included equipment of which we have not the smallest part. But how can one, after having validly shown that *Leichenkeller 1* of the plan can have been neither a carburation cellar nor a disinfection cellar, conclude that it necessarily was a homicidal gas chamber, without explaining to us why the severe technical constraints cited by the firm Degesch disappear magically since here it is a question of gassing men and not lice?

⁶³ *demonstration* i.e. proof that it is not merely a satisfactory site but the actual one.

This time, the word creates the thing. The gas chamber exists because it is named, or because one believes that it is named.

Is there not there “fallacious technical interpretation” and even evaporation of all technical considerations?

This mental attitude, which reappears so crudely in the last discussions about the existence of the gas chambers, is it not precisely the attitude which is at the origin of the myth and explains its birth: the word creates the thing? Indeed, there were many dead in the camps, there were many gas chambers (for disinfection) and many gassings.

We had to turn aside from the judicial writings and the text of the conclusions to inform the reader about a small part of the debates which continue out of court on the same subject and of which the league takes no account although at the same time the authors from which it draws its certitudes do take part in these debates. The league rejects the debate and wants to block it by a court order. Basing itself on an expert’s opinion deposited in the court and [76] signed by Mr. Borten, the under-oath honorary translator, the league claims peremptorily that *Vergasungskeller* means gassing cellar and that carburation cellar or gasification cellar would be arbitrary fantasies, linguistically impossible. In another expert opinion which the league mentions in the following paragraph, the same Victor Borten claimed that the word *Leichenkeller* did not exist in German, that it was a word used exclusively among the Nazi leaders employed in the extermination, to indicate a criminal reality. This manner of interpreting a document (in this case the plan of Crematory II, published for the first time by the professor in Serge Thion’s book *Historical Truth Or Political Truth?*, where the word *Leichenkeller* appears where Victor Borten expected to find *Gaskammer*) makes one think of the test which psychologists well know and which consists of presenting to a patient a series of inkspots and asking him to describe what he sees. The descriptions inform one more about the imagination of the patient than about the inkspots themselves.

In his conclusions, the professor reports multiple proofs of the utilization of the word *Leichenkeller* in non-criminal contexts. Is it necessary to add that in 1974 the municipality of Berlin inaugurated a crematory equipped with a *Leichenkeller* of five hundred places; the project dates back to 1963, the preliminary studies to 1965 and the final draft to 1969, and its construction started in 1972. The word *Leichenkeller* appears on the plans and in the technical notes. Should it be concluded from this that the municipality of Berlin, chaired by ex-chancellor Brandt at the time of the first studies, is a criminal organization which has had a homicidal gas chamber built?

As for the “denaturations of texts,” for which the professor has been reproached, it will not escape the reader that the two paragraphs of the incomparable league are surprisingly laconic. R. Faurisson is supposed to have denatured Kremer’s journal. Since no reference is provided, the reader, eager to check the assertions of the immaculate league, will be constrained to read it all and to compare the stipulated writings with those of the professor on this subject. He will note first that the latter did nothing of the [77] sort. He will notice in passing that the professor scrupulously quotes the documents and the arguments likely to support the thesis of his adversaries, that he presents his own argumentation while taking an extreme, quasi-maniacal care to differentiate clearly the documentary element from the interpretative activity. But he will also discover, if there comes to him the diabolical idea of continuing the comparison, that some immortal writings, emanating from eminent historians such as Messrs. Poliakov, Wellers,

Klarsfeld, etc., contain in fact some blatant denaturations of texts, of which the professor gives precise examples.

Thus the cited texts were indeed the object of denaturations.

The reader may begin to feel a bit dizzy. The charges of the league, which he was right to find too vague, are revealed to be in fact all too precise, since they point to the fact that there have well been, in this affair, “fallacious technical interpretations” and “denaturations of texts.” Our guardian, the league, in spite of itself, has thus spoken the truth: it is mistaken only in its designation of the guilty party. Its false charges are truthful confessions.

How does one explain such a state of affairs?

The psychoanalytical experience makes it possible to elucidate how a message, when it proceeds from a culpability repressed into the unconscious of the subject, “returns to its transmitter but in a reversed form,” according to the joint formulation of C. Lévi-Strauss and J. Lacan. The message of the apostolic league is an accusation of falsification. The fact that it returns to it⁶⁴ reveals then *urbi et orbi*⁶⁵ the unconscious falsification from which the charge proceeded and which it aims to repress.

In other words, although the charges of the virtuous league are false, they are not without a basis. Their falseness well reveals the essence of the repressed questions which adhesion to the holocaustic legend entails and proceeds. We are able then to understand that this enterprise of universal culpabilisation has as its function to repress and mask its own unconscious culpability.

The holocaust legend which proclaims, with contempt for any serious historical investigation, the existence of a concerted plan [78] for the industrial extermination of the Jews by means of gas chambers, is a terrifying defamation, with regard not only to the government of the Third Reich, but especially to the German people and to non-Jewish humanity, which in its entirety is accused of having, without protest, let this monstrosity be committed. This holocaust story is an incredible incentive to racial hatred in that it introduces into the gigantic human catastrophe of the Second World War the idea of a radical Jewish difference. It tends to relativize and even to justify the war itself and all other atrocities. Obviously, and in a caricatural way, the events which have occurred in Lebanon show that the holocaustic defamation of humanity serves to relativize the exactions and massacres of which the Jewish State has made itself guilty. What weight do the tons of anti-personnel fragmentation bombs dropped on the Palestinian camps and the slaughters of Sabra and Shatila carry in face of the 6 million people gassed? The holocaust story aims at giving in the end a tranquillizing portrayal of the war, in that it provides a culprit and draws aside from criticism the anthropological roots of the war itself. This is why it was adopted by the victors.

The legendary aspects of the holocaust (gas chambers and genocide) obliterate the real aspects of a massacre of more than 50 million human beings. They add to the massacres, persecutions, mass terror and enslavement in the work camps, a religious significance—the theology of hell and the devil. This new belief then produces in its faithful a false understanding (*conscience*) of our collective history during the course of the Second World War. It presents the Jewish community as specific victim of this war, the only “innocent” victim. But of what are the millions of non-Jewish dead guilty? It

⁶⁴ *that it returns to it*, i.e., that the message returns to the league.

⁶⁵ *urbi et orbi* Latin: “to the city and the world”; hence, “to everyone.”

renders the global Jewish community innocent of any participation in the war and any responsibility for it, whereas it took part fully in this war, and not only as a victim; it did so according to the methods determined by its particular structures.

The time to conclude has come: the league, holding a falsified vision of history, accuses him who is restoring the truth of falsifying the history upon which it has relied [73] up to now. If R. Faurisson is a falsifier, it is in a paradoxal meaning⁶⁶ of the term: in restoring at least a minimum of respect for the documents and the facts, he cannot avoid revealing the falsifications on which our beliefs rest. He accomplishes the *falsification* of the falsification.

The task of a true league against racism, if it were not a Zionist office, would be to fight with all its force against a vision of the world which institutes a true psychological and political line of demarcation between Jews and non-Jews and against a rumor issuing from the real sufferings of the victims exploited by the war propaganda and now used in an ignoble way that is an insult to the memory of all the victims of the war and of concentration camp systems.

Paris, October 1982.

With the participation of J.-L. TRISTANI.

⁶⁶ In the sense in which the epistemologist Karl Popper employs it. [Guillaume's note]

[80]

THE “ACTS” OF THE CONFERENCE OR THE MISFORTUNES OF VIRTUE

The conference on “National-Socialism and the Jews” was held at the Sorbonne from June 29 to July 2, 1982. Its title has apparently been modified. Documents placed at the disposal of those attending the conference carried the title: “Nazi Germany and *the Extermination of the Jews.*”

According to the journal *L’Histoire*, which was the first to announce this conference, the avowed goal (sic!) of this meeting was “the publication of the acts of the conference.” So we will have to wait for this volume (which they told us would be “erudite, thick and necessary,” probably in a co-edition Gallimard/Le Seuil) in order to know what part of what was actually said they will consider it useful to publish. The only elements we currently have are those which Messrs. Raymond Aron and François Furet agreed to deliver at the time of a press conference held at the Maison des sciences de l’homme at the end of this conference, and of which we have a recording *in extenso*. To tell the truth, this press conference, whose audience had been carefully selected, seemed less intended to support the diffusion in the public of the topics broached than to help friendly journalists “to control the emotional contents of the question.” If one judges by some of the articles published in the press under the pens of Messrs. Théolleyre (*Le Monde*), Lindenberg (*Le Matin*), Rozenzweig (*Libération*), Finkielkraut (*Le Monde, bis repetita...*), these journalists knew how to justify the confidence placed by the organizers in their high conception of journalistic deontology and understood perfectly what it was appropriate to say and not to say. One will thus regret all the more that the only Anglo-Saxon journalist present, less familiar with our customs, took the liberty of giving to Professor Faurisson, who [81] had been violently attacked by the speakers, a recording of the aforesaid press conference.

Consequently we need to await the official publication of the Acts of the conference in order to be able to evaluate the historiographic debate in progress. It is no longer these Acts which will now be the subject of our discussion, but rather a certain number of behaviors and intrigues which have little place in our university traditions.

We will not reconsider the professor’s prohibition from even being present as a silent observer (he had proposed this) at a conference provoked by “the echo of his theses” and where would be broached the “delicate [sic!] question of the gas chambers.” We do not know—because we did not seek to know it—by whom, when and how this meeting was organized; how the participants were selected; why certain professors of the Sorbonne and of the Committee of History of the Second World War did not take part in it. Let us note however that several researchers wrote to Mr. François Furet to request an invitation as soon as the holding of this conference was announced by the journal *L’Histoire*. All received a negative reply, with variable explanations. One was told that the meeting room was too small to allow for the admission of new listeners. Another was gotten rid of under the pretext that only specialists could take part in it. A specialist, accustomed to this kind of meeting, could not obtain an invitation. He was suspected of lacking the requisite firmness of heart with regard to revisionism. The requests must have

been numerous since a tenured (*agrégé*) professor and researcher received as a response a pre-printed circular letter on which only the date and the name were handwritten.

For the occasion, the Sorbonne was put in a state of siege. Parking was prohibited on Rue des Écoles, Rue Saint-Jacob and Rue de la Sorbonne. Two police vans were parked at Place Paul Painlevé. Barriers marked out a security perimeter. In the large hall providing access to the meeting room where the conference was held, there circulated several campus policemen and the administrators in charge for the Sorbonne. Militants from Jewish organizations were there to lend a hand and [82] advised from the height of (*du haut de*) their youth and experience the campus policemen, in order to be ready for any eventuality.

This stratagem was not superfluous since, in spite of the precautions taken, the infamous Faurisson, flanked by his abominable editor, managed to penetrate into the center of the proceedings, armed with ten booklets which he planned to distribute. The one and the other, to foil the supervisors, were disguised as human beings. Thanks to this diabolic trick, they were indeed able to give their prose to some members of the audience and even to start with two of them an animated but courteous conversation. Worse, they sold four booklets entitled *Response to Pierre Vidal-Naquet*, before the intervention of the supervisors drove these merchants out from the temple of disinterested culture.

The list of the speakers and the topic for the talks and papers were indicated at the entrance. This list consists only of college professors from various universities. The name of one speaker however is missing from this list, and his paper, although it had long been included on the program, will probably not be reproduced in the Acts of the conference. However, his paper brought a sense of joy to the assembly, and some regarded it as the key to the whole operation: one finally had proof of the existence of gas chambers at Auschwitz. The speaker in question is Jean Claude Pressac, formerly a pharmacist in the Parisian suburbs. Here are the terms in which Luc Rozenzweig presents him in *Libération* (July 15, 1982, p. 10):

THE GAS CHAMBERS: THE PROOF

Among those who doubted them [the gas chambers and the genocide], a pharmacist, J.-C. Pressac. Emulating Faurisson, he studied attentively the plans and the archives of the Auschwitz camp to seek confirmation there of “trickery.” And he returned with... the proof of the existence of at least two gas chambers in the Auschwitz camp. This proof he furnished to the participants of the conference by showing them, in plain black and white, order forms written by carpenters for a supply of tight windows for the “Gaskammer.” The workmen did not have the euphemistic decencies of the persons in charge. And it was not only a question “of killing the lice,” as claim the “revisionists”; otherwise, why would these shutters open from the exterior?⁶⁷

In his press conference, Raymond Aron speaks of a very rare document of which one did not yet know. That is to say, of a German bureaucratic text in which *Gaz chamber* (probably a lapsus for *Gaskammer*) was used in a direct way. Raymond Aron does not cite the name of J.-C. Pressac.

⁶⁷ One can see that the journalist is brain-dead since he does not see the stupidity of this argument. There are no lice, alive or dead, who will open the shutters from the interior. [Guillaume’s note]

Thus, the conference feels the need to resort to a non-historian to furnish once again a “new” proof, as if the old “proofs” seemed less convincing than they will admit to us. Apparently, neither Luc Rozenzweig nor Raymond Aron are familiar with the case; they speak and write with false self-confidence, for, let us undeceive them, there exist very many German documents containing in clear print the word *Gaskammer*. The only question is whether this word hides the reality of a criminal homicidal chamber or a banal disinfection chamber. Faurisson, in 1978, revealed to the public the disinfection chambers of Auschwitz: in *Vérité historique ou Vérité politique?*⁶⁸ ... Raul Hilberg, in answer to a question by Guy Sitbon in *Le Nouvel Observateur* of July 3, 1982, envisions for the first time that the same rooms may have been able to serve both purposes.

We will not here try to get to the heart of the discussion. Let us simply note that the journalist, like the professor of sociology, after having attended the conference, gives evidence of a total ignorance of the case by presenting as exceptional a document containing the word *Gaskammer*. Such documents are numerous. There were at Auschwitz very many gas chambers for disinfection. Many are intact. One does not show them to the tourists. One never speaks about them in the exterminationist works, so much so that Professor Faurisson is the first to have revealed their existence.

And let us return to the conference and its semi-clandestine messiah: J.-C. Pressac telephoned me in the course of 1979, he had come back from Auschwitz. He had heard much talk about Professor Faurisson, in the conversations of the tourists and the authorities of the museum. He had many things to say to us and greatly desired to meet the professor. An appointment was made. The first meeting and the majority of the subsequent ones [84] took place at my home, except for one in the residence of J.-C. Pressac.

J.-C. Pressac is forty years old. He is a pharmacist in the Parisian suburbs. He has a good income that he uses to live the least badly possible. He has some hobbies. One of his first remarks upon entering my home was to be astonished at the facility of meeting us, Faurisson and me: “You are not afraid?” My door was not armored. I opened without checking the identity of the visitor! He was astonished that a “leftist” like me can be interested in this whole affair. He himself was of the extreme right-wing, but more philosophically than politically. Politically, he did not believe in it. His past activities were limited to participation in some of the annual banquets organized by Pierre Sidos. His “abstract” sympathies were rather with Nazis and Pétainists. He had many Jewish friends. About the persecution and massacre of the Jews during the Second World War, he did not make a moral judgment. “War is war. It is in man.” “All that is regrettable.” He does not have nothing against the Jews, although the Jewish organizations “were starting to annoy him.” “They are everywhere!”

He seemed to want to explain himself directly to me, while Faurisson expressed a growing and visible irritation with regard to all this conversation. I thought for my part that the clearer things were the better, and that it was in our interest to know with whom we were dealing. It was thus necessary to let the talk continue.

“At the Auschwitz museum, everyone knew about Faurisson’s work. It had a funny effect on them!” At that point, Faurisson asked for specific information about specific people.

⁶⁸ *Vérité historique ou Vérité politique (Historical Truth or Political Truth?)* by Serge Thion (La Vieille Taupe) 1980, <http://vho.org/aaargh/fran/livres6/STvhvp.pdf>.

Pressac had read Robert Merle's novel, *La mort est mon métier* (*Death Is My Trade*). He had been fascinated by this book (which I have not read) and by the character of Höss (one of the camp commanders) in Merle's book. He had himself written a Nazi-inspired historical novel. He had no intention of publishing it; besides that was "impossible and unthinkable." There was no question even of getting me to read it. "But no, Guillaume, it is not for you, moreover you could not [85] understand it"—and he had gone to Auschwitz to write the chapter on the industrial extermination of the Jews. But there, "hell...it didn't work out!" He had made on-site material observations very close to those of Faurisson. It is there that there appeared another facet of Pressac's astonishing personality. He has an extremely pointillist, material and technical approach to things. He did not question the extermination of the Jews, but things necessarily had to have occurred otherwise. In any case, he had brought back from Auschwitz some documents, hundreds of photographs and a big bunch of information.

It is on this basis that there was established for one year, among Pressac, Faurisson and me, a curious collaboration. Pressac and Faurisson together studied the plans, the documents, the photographs; they determined the layout of the sewer drains, of the cesspools, of the ventilation systems; they established the dates of construction, the successive modifications; and, in this work, Pressac gave proof of some truly exceptional qualities. However, a surprising relationship had been established between Pressac and me. He was, at the very least, a curious personality! He was astonished by what he called my openness and my broad-mindedness and took as total indifference to ideas in general what is in me a real indifference to ideas which remain ideas. He even ended up entrusting to me, along with some strong precautions and recommendations, his novel wherein I was able to note the constancy of his technical and materialist mind and wherein I had confirmation of his earthy sincerity, because I had asked myself several times what game he was playing and if we were not dealing with a provocateur, not that that would have made any difference to us.

At the time of the meetings with Pressac, we had even found something in common. We were both alumni of the military academy La Flèche, and I had been present, at the time of a school festival, at a Nazi-inspired sketch staged by him and for which he had been severely reprimanded. That was in 1959.

At each work meeting, Pressac announced upon arrival: "There it is! I've got him now! The teacher screwed up! Ah! yes, there, he screwed up!" When Faurisson arrived, he was almost always greeted by a: [86] "Sorry! But you screwed up!" But, each time, the arguments did not hold up more than a few minutes. The majority of the time, the discussion concerned minor details. Sometimes Pressac made good points. Thus, such and such a photograph which one believed to be of Crematory II in construction was of Crematory III (they are symmetrical). Pressac, by calculating the trajectory of the sun and by studying the shadows cast, had restored the truth. Basically, there was no discussion. Pressac is practically ignorant of the whole historical file. He knows well only the material elements and the documents of Auschwitz. Therefore, Pressac and Faurisson discussed all the physical material details. One spoke of the gas chamber, the other of *the place* (local) *which they tell us was a gas chamber*. But Pressac was obviously increasingly perplexed and laughed very loudly over the absurdity of certain reports or over glaring errors, and especially the profound ignorance of the museum authorities.

At this point in time it was agreed that Pressac would go back to Auschwitz to carry out there some last research that Faurisson could not do himself any more. To obtain access to the documents and the places, he would present himself as an independent researcher, determined to give a progress report on the question and to counter Faurisson. Pressac envisioned writing his pharmacy thesis on disinfection at Auschwitz, and writing a book which would contain all the material information on the buildings, which he would entitle *Auschwitz: Criminal Architecture*. Faurisson insisted that one would need at least a question mark and that it would be necessary to distinguish clearly the facts and the documents from the interpretations. Pressac made a disarming answer: he wanted the agreement of the museum, therefore no question of a question mark and no question of casting doubt on the gassings. The important thing was to have access to the documents and to publish a synthesis of it. It was a matter of making a material synthesis, not a historical synthesis.

Often Faurisson interrogated me: “He is really curious, this Pressac. What game is he playing? What do you think he really thinks? It is impossible to know.” To which I answered: “He does not know that himself.”

This second voyage to Auschwitz was made while the [87] preparation for the Faurisson trial was going at full speed. Pressac was on the site at Auschwitz while a swarm of lawyers from the L.I.C.R.A. had settled in at Warsaw and ordered from the museum, more than one year after the indictment, quantities of photocopies of documents.

Pressac returned with a formidable harvest of documents and photographs. He was enchanted by the museum, and the museum by him. He seemed like the Messiah, the only man able, apart from Faurisson who was disqualified in advance, to clear up the archaeological and material question of the buildings of Auschwitz. By misfortune, he had not been able to carry out the only two precise researches that Faurisson had asked him to make!

He invited us to his place to share his discoveries with us and to show us hundreds of slides. He seemed persuaded, taking into account the welcome that he had received, that the persecution of which Faurisson was victim would soon be only a memory. He had given *Vérité historique...*⁶⁹ to Kazimierz Smolen. Everyone would be forced to recognize the quality of Faurisson’s work. The museum was ready to yield on all. The two sluice-gate trusses, bof! The quantities of victims, all is to be re-examined... It was enough to admit the principle of the gassings. Did he believe in them himself? God alone knows.

While we were waiting in the dining room of his villa, which is surrounded by high walls and has a heavy iron gate, he expressed suddenly a certain hesitation. It was necessary to bring down the screen and projector, and tens of cases of slides. Finally he said: “Listen, it would be simpler to do it upstairs, but, Guillaume, you understand, do not pay attention to what you will see, you will be shocked.”

Finally, we go up. Reason of his embarrassment and his hesitation in making us go up? Quite simply the presence of a whole collection of objects of Nazi mythology. A bust of Hitler, a helmet of the militia, Russian and German rifles, bayonets, a S.S. dagger,

⁶⁹ See the preceding note.

books, books on all the weapons and armies of the world, disks of music and French, German, Russian military songs etc.⁷⁰

[88]

It took several hours to see all the photographs. But, in spite of very many photographs of disinfection rooms and of parts of the camp that Faurisson had been able to visit, there was nothing really essential. We were quite frankly disappointed that he had not carried out the only research likely to be decisive.

Faurisson, exhausted by legal persecution, ruined, overwhelmed by money and family concerns, was very tired. He had soon to make less frequent his trips to Paris, and I alone maintained contact with Pressac, who remained always very effective for determining the width of an opening in masonry, the date of a construction, of an order, etc.

At that time, I am firmly convinced that Pressac absolutely no longer believed in the gassings at Auschwitz. He advised us to fain belief in them in order to be able to continue material research, while telling oneself that the materiality of the places, of the facts and of the documents would lead in any event to a total revision of the official thesis.

It is at this time that he had me meet one of his Jewish friends, Mr. Silbermine, who at fourteen years of age had been deported to Auschwitz along with several members of his family, and was the only survivor. He had kept him abreast of his interest in and his research on Auschwitz, but in a rather curious way, as I was to find out later. I had indeed several conversations with Mr. Silbermine, and I gave him our books, but he did not read them. That did not prevent us from having courteous and even pleasant conversations. Mr. Silbermine besides caused a small scandal by having a public discussion with me at the time of the appeals trial, before rejoining some of his L.I.C.R.A. friends. Pressac gave the following speech: "I did material research on Auschwitz. In this affair, no matter who says no matter what. Even the Auschwitz museum or the C.D.J.C.⁷¹ says no matter what. It's not astonishing that the revisionists exist; certain things which they say are correct. It is necessary to put all this in order." At this level of abstraction, only a narrow-minded individual could be offended. That is a [89] program which will create unanimity from Vidal-Naquet to Faurisson. But it is from here on that things become complicated.

In any case, the material study of Crematories II, III, IV, V having yielded all that it could yield and having been largely overtaken by the other aspects of the debate, my meetings with Pressac became less frequent. He remained nearly one year without giving any news or asking for any, and then suddenly reappeared one evening around 10 p.m., all excited and all sheepish at the same time. He was coming from Vidal-Naquet's, who had shown himself content with his work, and he was going to give a talk (*faire une communication*) at the next conference!

He was unaware of all the persecutions and the aggressions of which we had been victims. He even believed the trial to be finished. He thought that all was going to besettled. In any event, "they" would be obliged to recognize the material proofs

⁷⁰ Need it be said?: these mythological odds and ends, in my eyes, are neither more nor less dangerous than portraits of Che Guevara, Stalin, Mao Tse-Tung, crucifixes, hands of Fatma or stars of David. [Guillaume's note]

⁷¹ C.D.J.C. Centre de documentation juive contemporaine (Center for Contemporary Jewish Documentation).

(*évidences*), and they could no longer maintain the official version. “You do not imagine, Guillaume, what they are ready to release.” After having ... to him ... [End of the manuscript.⁷²]

Paris, May 1983

⁷² The essay, which started with an eye on the imminent publication of the *Acts of the Conference*, stopped when it appeared that this publication would be deferred.

Finally, and contrary to my forecast, the paper of J.-C. Pressac was included, but in an appendix (!) and preceded by a sibylline note. The text of Pressac is not so bad (*triste*)! Perhaps it is necessary to see in it a piece from an anthology on the practice of the ketmarm—the ambiguous art of affirming orthodoxy while destroying it (see Czeslaw Milosz). [Guillaume’s note. On ketmarm or ketman, cf. Christopher Hitchens, “*The Captive Mind* Now: What Czeslaw Milosz understood about Islam,” at: <http://www.slate.com/id/2105821>: “‘Ketman’ is a term from ancient Persia, brought to Milosz’s attention by Arthur Gobineau’s book *Religions and Philosophies of Central Asia*. (Gobineau, now rather despised for his ethno-theories, was a senior French diplomat in Tehran for many years of the mid-19th century.) He had noticed that the dissidents in Persia, long accustomed to theocratic tyranny, had evolved a style of their own. As Milosz had himself observed about intellectuals under totalitarianism, the need for survival often involved more than just keeping your mouth shut. Tough moments could often arise where you had to make positive, public affirmations of loyalty and even enthusiasm. So with the oldest form of oppression known to the mind: that of religion.”

[90]

SERGE QUADRUPPANI REFEREE OF INTELLECTUAL ELEGANCES

The various intellectual fashions (*modes*) are presented, and the author, the referee of elegances, tells us what it is necessary to think, in trying to keep up with the true Parisian chic.⁷³ This true Parisian chic, which the author was lucky enough to meet by chance, is composed of a dash of intellectual rigor, a finger⁷⁴ of abolition of commodity production, a finger of abolition of the State, a situationist cherry and some spices (see the recipe on page 15 of the Catalogue).

The final chapter presents the fashion for 1984 to us. The low necklines are vertiginous, front and back. The skirts are long, but split to the hips; they let one glimpse the abysses of perplexity. But these audacities stop where propriety starts. Because this tonic and provocative (in the good sense of the term) fashion must however be wearable downtown. “A step in front of the masses....but not two.”

What then will be the intellectual fashion for 1984 according to our referee of elegances? It will center around the Faurisson Affair. Did the gas chambers exist, or did they not exist? “The question does not seem really important.”

Mr. Elegance does not have an opinion because he does not have a choice: as long as one of the two opinions does not have citizenship (*droit de cité*), he will refuse to choose between the two (pages 316-317). In other words, there is no question of expressing an opinion [91] as long as courage is needed to do it; that would exceed the limits of propriety.

It will be noticed that, if the author does not come to a conclusion about Faurisson’s theses, he has the elegance and the prudence not to affirm the existence of the gas chambers. One never knows! For, in 1983, when one has even a partial knowledge of the case, it also requires courage to affirm that the gas chambers existed...if one thinks of the future.

Ah well, while congratulating the author for having so perfectly fulfilled the promises of the title, we will cross the limits of propriety by examining the last chapter of his book from the point of view of simple intellectual rigor and by asking ourselves whether, in discussing the Faurisson affair, he did not actually make all the blunders which he attributed to the intellectuals whom he criticizes in his more or less relevant way.

The chapter on the affair opens with a discussion of the standpoint of Daniel Cohn-Bendit as reported in *Le Monde* (March 15-16, 1980). Our despiser of the media apparently did not ask himself if *Le Monde* had correctly and honestly reported the standpoint of Cohn-Bendit!

However, the standpoint there reported was that not of Daniel, but of Gabriel Cohn-Bendit. He had contacted *Le Monde* in order to undo the disastrous effect of a publication in *Le Matin de Paris* of a letter of his, truncated by Catherine Clément and

⁷³ Concerning the book of Serge Quadruppani, *Le Catalogue du prêt-à-penser français depuis 1968*, published in Éditions Balland in 1983. [Guillaume’s note.]

⁷⁴ a *finger* an amount in a glass as high as the height of a finger lying flat on a table.

preceded by an anonymous letter which denatured its sense. During the most tragic time of the affair, Cohn-Bendit, already completely convinced of the inexistence of the gas chambers, but still believing in the historical reality of the genocide, hoped to help Faurisson and to work for the re-establishment of a dialogue by making an official statement in which he indicated firmly his support for Faurisson while at the same time dissociating himself from him on certain points. The text in *Le Monde* seriously denatured the meaning of Cohn-Bendit's initiative, which was in favor of Faurisson but contained both some rhetorical reservations intended to attract the benevolence of the other principals and some real reservations. At the moment when Cohn-Bendit wanted to show that one could support Faurisson without inevitably sharing all his theses, *Le Monde* made him say exactly [92] the opposite! And Serge Quadruppani authenticates the false rumor of a hostile standpoint toward Faurisson on the part of Daniel (he of May 1968) Cohn-Bendit, who has never done anything like that, his only public standpoint on this subject having been to denounce the persecutions of which Faurisson was victim!

Is the rest of the chapter of better quality? It has the advantage of revealing, to a public which knows nothing about it, certain elements of the case published by La Vieille Taupe; it copies them. Serge Quadruppani's own contribution is either non-existent or false. Documentation is incomplete, uncertain; the citations truncated or false. The author is superbly unaware of Faurisson's *Answer to Pierre Vidal-Naquet*. He knows the judicial developments of the affair only through the press. He is unaware of even the two brochures from La Vieille Taupe, *L'Affaire Papie-Barbon* and *Épilogue judiciaire de l'affaire Faurisson*. The reason is simple: having written very civilly to Faurisson to ask for these documents, he was upset at the suggestion of the latter that he should pay for these books! The same noble soul denounces the persecution of which Faurisson's editor is victim, but does not hesitate to insult Faurisson (delirious, antipathetic, insensitive, perfectly hateful)!

Faurisson has summarized his research in the following sixty-word sentence:

The alleged Hitlerian gas chambers and the alleged genocide of the Jews form one and the same historical lie, which has permitted a gigantic political-financial swindle, whose principal beneficiaries are the State of Israel and international Zionism and whose principal victims are the German people, but not their rulers, and the entire Palestinian people.

One should either refute this sentence or admit that it states a truth....or play the clown. We soon will see all the French intelligentsia indulging in all conceivable intellectual contorsions so as not to pronounce the following three words: "Faurisson is right." One will barely concede, after four years of legal debates, that there is not a single proof of the existence of a single gas chamber; our beautiful minds will be ruined in sempiternal discussions [93] on the true and the false and the "truth" in history, without being able to provide a single new argument since Thucydides. About the genocide, there will remain the possibility of playing on words.

Let us observe, in this exercise, the "rigorous" Quadruppani (*Catalogue*, page 292, below on the left in italics):

When he denies the genocide, Faurisson plays upon words.

When he denies the genocide, Faurisson does not play upon words. He is clear.

He is neat. He is precise. He denies the

To say that the Nazis perpetrated the genocide of the Jews would mean, according to him, that they had wanted and planned for a long time the death of millions of Jews and that they subsequently organized this by an exceptional method.

genocide!

To say that the Nazis perpetrated the genocide of the Jews means, according to Faurisson, to say that the Nazis perpetrated the genocide of the Jews! A point, that is all! The question of whether the Nazis had the intention to do this, or of whether the genocide results from the operation *sui generis*⁷⁵ of the German railroads does not pose itself for the moment. Faurisson leaves to others the interesting metaphysical problem of the relationship between intention and action. He denies that the genocide took place in Europe between 1933 and 1945. A point, that is all!

The word genocide was created in 1943 by Raphael Lemkin to differentiate clearly the fate of the Jews in Nazi Europe from the massacres of civilian populations perpetrated during wars (for example: the massacre of the Armenians). Not long ago, Jewish organizations regarded it as a sacrilege to speak about the “genocide” of the Armenians. The evolution of the ideology in this regard is recent and significant. Genocide means extermination of an ethnic group because of its race. A point, that is all!

The exterminationist historians (Hilberg, Poliakov, Reitlinger, Lacqueur, Gilbert, Friedlander [94], etc.) always maintained that the Nazis had wanted and planned the death of millions of Jews and that they subsequently organized it by an exceptional method. This consistent doctrine of Faurisson’s adversaries, repeated in many ways for

⁷⁵ *sui generis* Latin “of its own kind”; French uses this phrase to mean “special,” “particular,” “unique.” The point is that it would indeed be a unique event if the mere putting of people in railroad cars was sufficient to kill them.

years, was, according to Quadruppani, an invention of... Faurisson!

To make the massacre a question of intention, of formal decision, and to center everything on this question is a point of view that Faurisson shares with his most fanatical detractors, but not with all the historians.

Faurisson has never centered his criticism on this question of intention. He showed that the “proof” of the allegedly proven intention of Hitler and the Nazi leaders to exterminate the Jews rested only on truncated, denatured or falsified citations. He showed that the claimed intentional or functional realization of this extermination rested only on extrapolated and not very credible testimonies, extorted confessions, abusively interpreted, denatured, truncated and falsified documents.

His most fanatical detractors, who are precisely the supposed historians whose only activity of historical criticism consists in meeting from time to time to put the curse on revisionist works while reaping the fruit of this work by attributing to themselves the research results which it is no longer possible to hide, setting each time the boundary between what it is acceptable to say, what it is preferable to keep quiet about and what it will remain infamous to envisage.

These great well-funded priests of the holocaust, all shortly before “intentionalists,” have just carried out a strategic retreat in good order onto [95] “functionalist” positions, carefully prepared in advance.

A single document proving Hitler’s intention would be enough to ruin any possibility of existence for a “functionalist school.” By staging the gadget of an opposition between “intentionalist school” and “functionalist school,” the Sorbonne conference shows *ipso facto* that the intentionalist school, in that it does not support its thesis on the basis of any document, is not a historical school but a metaphysical

school. It thus recognizes, implicitly but without daring to say it, that the alleged

At the conference already cited, the uncertainty of history, on this point, appeared:

“Protocol of Wannsee” is a denatured document.

The demonstration of this was made by Stäglich, whose book was seized—and destroyed in Germany, and who has just seen his rank as doctor withdrawn by the ex-University of Göttingen.

At the conference already cited, the uncertainty of history, appeared on many other points, although the audience was handpicked and the results of the conference are known only through accounts given by the only authorized journalists—Messrs. Lindenberg, Finkielkraut, Rosensweig and Théolleyre—and by a press conference given by Messrs. Aron and Furet *ad usum delphini*,⁷⁶ of which an Anglo-Saxon journalist sent us a recording.

Serge Quadrupani’s way of proceeding merits our attention for a few moments in that it provides a paradigm of pure malfeasance and incompetence (*de la maspérisation à l’état natif*).

Some very official historians concede, under the pressure of the works of revisionist [96] historians, a certain number of obvious facts which have been established in an irrefutable way under extremely difficult conditions by their adversaries. The results of these works are credited to the official historians and serve to devalue the originality and the relevance of the revisionist works!

⁷⁶ *ad usum delphini* Latin “for the use of the dauphin.” The “Dauphin” is the heir apparent to the French throne. The cited Latin phrase came into common use when the Duke of Montausier made a collection of Greek and Latin texts which he expurgated for the use of the son of Louis XV.

Nothing that was not envisaged
and forecast by Robert Faurisson
(*Mémoire en Défense*, page XVII).

After a long quotation from Luc Rosenzweig (the cited article), Quadruppani again takes Faurisson to task:

When Faurisson advances the idea of a Jewish war to justify his denial of the genocide, he adopts again an anti-Semitic argument (see, in *Les Infortunes de la vérité*, pp. 105-106, the arguments of *Je suis partout*).

Let us admire his way of proceeding. The author tells us neither where nor when Faurisson has advanced the “idea of a Jewish war.” He attributes to Faurisson a supposedly defamatory reference to *Je suis partout*. He states, without argumentation, that the argument was anti-Semitic and that Faurisson adopts it again in order “to justify his denial of the genocide.” There is such an interweaving of sophism and bad faith in this triply allusive sentence that it is not easy to perceive them at first.

Faurisson has never sought to justify his denial of the genocide of the Jews by anything other than the fact that the genocide of the Jews did not take place. They have much reproached him for being satisfied with this trivial justification. Ah! if Faurisson had only integrated his denial of the genocide in a vaster prospect, a *Weltanschauung!* ... How all would have been simpler and more in conformity!...an anti-Semitic *Weltanschauung*, for example, and it would be easy to cut him to pieces; or a Communist *Weltanschauung*, with a finger of abolition of commodity, two fingers of abolition of the State, and a situationist cherry, and it would be more gratifying to collaborate with him. But no! The abominable Faurisson does not comply with the rules of the *game*.

[97]

Moreover, one sees badly—and Quadruppani does not explain—in what way the idea of a Jewish war would justify the denial of the genocide. The war could have been Jewish without the genocide taking place. It could just as easily have been exclusively *goy* with the genocide nevertheless taking place and the Jews taking no part in the conflict, except as the only innocent victims.

In fact, Faurisson has never suggested the idea of a Jewish war. Never has he claimed to explain the causes of the Second World War or to distribute the responsibilities for it. And Quadruppani brings, in support of his charges, not the least quotation, the least argument. He does this again at the bottom of this same page 293, where he writes:

Faurisson is delirious [!] when he exposes [!] his general conception [!] of the Second World War.

But he does not indicate to us where he has unearthed the delirious one’s exposé of his general conception. The rise to power of this phantasm merits a few moments’ attention. For that, it is necessary to return to pages 290-291. Serge Quadruppani writes:

Robert Faurisson is delirious when he asserts: “Never did Hitler order or allow that anyone be killed because of his race or his religion.”

He does not indicate where and when, or how Hitler ordered or allowed that the Jews be killed merely for the fact that they were Jewish. A single authentic quotation, a single verifiable document would be enough to close the debate. Faurisson’s sentence has a sense; this sense is clear. It is true or it is false. In addition, this sentence is written in a context. What is this context?

The exterminationist “historians” wrote in tens of books, hundreds of publications, that Hitler had ordered the extermination of the Jews only because they were Jewish. Then, some modified this assertion. Hitler had not ordered, he had only suggested, he had *allowed*, he had, to some extent, let loose the reins on the neck of the exterminating logic. The exterminationist historians used the “notoriety” of the exterminating “vow” of Hitler for [98] refusing any debate. Their constant attitude was as follows: how could one put in doubt the factuality of the extermination when the great exterminator has explicitly ordered, or *allowed*, what, in practice, would come to the same thing?

No one disputes that a great number of Jews died during the Second World War, and a certain number because of the racial persecutions of the Third Reich; what is in question is the real, concrete mechanism of this destruction of human beings. As long as it is believed that Hitler ordered, or allowed, the genocide, it is *impossible to penetrate the real logic of the concentration camp system*. The depiction (*représentation*) is not in conformity with reality. In fact, Hitler did not order or allow that the Jews be killed because Jewish; authorities of the Third Reich ordered that a part of them, only a part, be deported. It is only by starting from these obvious facts that one can understand really and profoundly what occurred.

And in fact, the functionalist historical school recognizes *ipso facto* that all the quotations attributed to Hitler were manufactured or denatured in their text or their context. The whole functionalist school recognizes in fact that this sentence of Faurisson is true! ... but continues to throw a curse on him who told the truth too early. (It is always too early.)

Faurisson by no means seeks to decrease Hitler’s responsibility for the deportation and death of a certain number of Jews. Everyone can judge, and it turns out that Faurisson does judge, that Hitler however bears a heavy responsibility. But this involves a statement of a speculative nature, which must be argued. The statement of Faurisson is factual. It is not speculative. It does not prohibit the following speculative statement: Hitler bears the responsibility for the death of many Jews, although he never ordered or allowed that anyone be killed because of his race or his religion.

This sentence was taken out of its context and blown up out of all proportion by the media, and was used to organize the campaign against Faurisson, because it clashed with common sense and generally accepted ideas. This campaign could function only because nearly all of the mediatized public was absolutely convinced that there existed [99] a great number of proofs that Hitler had ordered the genocide, but among the specialists one started seriously to worry.

With such a sentence made public, it became obvious that one could not much longer circle around the pot.⁷⁷ David Irving, an independent British historian, had established, without questioning the reality of the genocide, that in any case no document showed that Hitler had been informed (*avait été au courant*), and he put forth several documents which showed that Hitler could not have been informed. *Hic Rhodus, hic*

⁷⁷ *circle around the pot (tourner autour du pot)*: to use circumlocutions in order to avoid having to explain oneself clearly.

salta.⁷⁸ It was necessary to throw ballast to save the hot air balloon. This is what was done at the famous conference.

Quadruppani was apparently not aware that this famous sentence, on which all the anti-Faurissonian ideologists threw themselves for the edification of the good people, was never mentioned by any expert historian, and that it was hardly touched on by Vidal-Naquet who is at the hinge between the two worlds. Well, our Quadruppani continues his demonstration imperturbably:

And when he tries to defend this sentence, he [Faurisson] develops a delirious argumentation...

In fact, Faurisson has never “tried to defend” this sentence. He has always maintained that it defended itself in that it stated a truth. Twice, he has at most *explained* the meaning of this sentence. This sentence has been over-interpreted. They have made it say what it does not say. They have injected into it a meaning that it does not have. Between two correct quotations of Faurisson, Serge Quadruppani introduces a false relationship; but, let us see what constitutes, according to Quadruppani, a delirious argumentation (on the left in italics Faurisson cited by Quadruppani):

⁷⁸ *Hic Rhodus, hic salta* Latin: “Here is Rhodes, here jump.” Marx’s version of the last line of Aesop’s fable *The Boastful Athlete*. “The story is that an athlete boasts that he once performed a stupendous jump, and can produce witnesses: the punchline is the comment of a bystander, who says that there is no need of witnesses, since the athlete can demonstrate the jump here and now” (<http://www.marxists.org/glossary/terms/h/i.htm>). For the peculiar history of this line, see this same website.

Hitler always considered the Jews as enemies, and has treated them accordingly. Hitler and the Nazis said: “The Allies and the Jews want our destruction, but it is they who will be destroyed.”

What is delirious in the presentation which Faurisson makes of Hitler’s attitude?

[100]

In the same way, the Allies and the Jews said: “Hitler and the Nazis want our destruction, but it is they who will be destroyed.”

What is delirious in the presentation that Faurisson makes of the attitude of the Allies and the Jews?

For one camp as for the other, the first concern was to win the war, against both the soldiers and against the civilians (men, women, children, old men all mixed together).

What is delirious in all that, except the warlike delirium that Faurisson describes?

But let us listen to Quadruppani’s comment:

Hitler and the Nazis on one side, the Allies and the Jews on the other: this delimitation of the camps involved is historically false ...

Quadruppani would give more weight to his words if he himself offered us a definition of the involved camps which is historically accurate, according to him. It is true that Jewish organizations obstinately proposed an alliance with Hitler and refused to be assimilated to the camp of the Allies. This was the case of the Stern group and especially of its extremist splinter group, the Lehi group, to which the current Prime Minister for the State of Israel, Itzakh Shamir, belonged.

But the partisans of this Jewish war, of whom many are currently in power in Israel, made up a very small minority, and this Jewish war, however real and objective, is not to be confused with the Second World War. It was an internal affair. Globally, representative Jewish organizations as a whole were on the side of the Allies, although there were more nuances to the relationship between them and the Allies than is generally believed.

It is true also that the “representative” Jewish organizations are not the Jews, and that many Jews found themselves embarked on an adventure which hardly concerned them (*ne les concernait guère*), both because of Hitler’s delirium and because of the contradictory deliria of some of their leaders. Can one not say the same thing with regard to the nationals of all the belligerent States?

But about this delimitation, which Quadruppani decrees to be historically false, he adds that it should be odious to all those who are not anti-Semites. One passes from history to morals. Quadruppani pleads for [101] a world with morals. Quadruppani is not anti-Semitic. Morally, that’s all well and good. Moreover, all that smacks of anti-Semitism should be odious. Morally, this boy (*garçon*) is definitely very very good.

The excellent morals of this excellent boy lead him both to find odious the following delimitation: Hitler and the Nazis on one side, the Allies and the Jews on the other, and to decree to be anti-Semites all those who do not think like him. Insofar as he specifies that this speech should be odious to all those who are not anti-Semites, one can deduce from this that it is the global usage of the term Jew which seems to him odious. The usage of the term Allies does not seem to him odious. So be it. What does that imply? First, that implies an insurmountable contradiction.—When Hitler says “the Jews,” he delimits a whole people to whom he assigns an identity, the Jewish identity. All identity-speech (*discours identitaire*) is totalitarian, not in that it notes such and such an objective characteristic, but in that it assigns to people an identity, and in that it locks them up in an identity. But totalitarian identity-speech is precisely the constant speech of all the Jewish organizations, of the Jewish leaders and the Jewish ideologists, whom it is difficult to put in the anti-Semite category. Moreover, in the totality of “anti-Semites,” there are many whom these subtleties have not escaped and who challenge the totalitarianism of identity-speech.

If Quadruppani managed to get us out of this dilemma, we would be ready to braid laurel wreathes for him and to forget the trifles which he commits here and there.

That implies then that the totalitarian identity-speech which he challenges when it is applied to the Jews Quadruppani implicitly allows when applied to others, and it then does not seem to him odious; he uses it in all the other cases (the Allies, the Nazis, the anti-Semites).

The subjects of political history are, since other kinds of communities have been eliminated or subordinated, the States. When they make war, States involve the fate of their nationals. When France enters into war with Germany (September 3, 1939 at 5 p.m.), all the French nationals become enemies of all the German nationals, and [102] vice versa. All other classification (*détermination*) must be eliminated, for example, sexual or proletarian internationalism. The war always entails the triumph of the totalitarian identity-speech of the States, which it reinforces.

For whoever is not completely victim of this ideologically dominant speech, the totalitarian identity-speech is odious in all cases, and not only when it is applied to the Jews. The term Allies indicates a conglomerate of States which subsume their nationals, engaged in a war with complex causes, for the most various reasons, which galvanize their respective populations by the ideology of a crusade of democracies (popular ones included) and against racism (with the assistance of South Africa). And the Allies’ bombardments made at least twice as many French victims among the civilian population as the German repression during the occupation! Quadruppani seems to believe that the concept Allies poses less of a problem, but what about the Africans and the West-Indians mobilized in the European bonfire by the French State?

Quadruppani says to us that Hitler and the Nazis constitute a unit easily delimitable. Indeed. The Nazi party, unlike the Stalinist party, a party of executives, was a party of the masses. Millions of cards were distributed to millions of members, and membership could have meant many different things. And, anyway, what is the real content of this “Nazi” identity, which one attaches to large numbers of people? It means that all these people are identical to the monster whose image we have been given and which the word suggests? Totalitarian identity-logic is odious also when it is applied to

the Nazis. It was used to justify many massacres of populations. It lasted much longer. It still exists.

Quadruppani explains to us:

But, unless one thinks, like the anti-Semites of the pre-war period, that Jews manipulated the democratic regimes, it is false to present the Jews as a belligerent entity, on the same level as the Allies.

We leave to the author the responsibility for presenting the Allies as a belligerent entity by nature (*qui va de soi*). But let us note that in writing, in the last part of [103] the sentence, “on the same level as the Allies,” he withdraws any relevance from his words. Indeed, even Hitler, however anti-Semitic he may have been, realized that he did not have opposite him a Jewish army, a Jewish State, etc., and thus, while he regarded the Jews as his enemies, he did not regard them in any event as a “belligerent entity on the same level as the Allies.” And why would it be necessary to think this (and think like our famous anti-Semites of the pre-war period who are everyone’s favorite target) that the Jews manipulated the democratic regimes in order to think that the Jews were hostile to Hitler! One would like Quadruppani to make his demonstration precise. And besides, is it not anti-Semitic to deny the eminent role that very many Jews claim in the anti-fascist crusade?

Faurisson’s whole proof (*démonstration*) aims at making the racial persecution undergone by the Jews a banal act of war.

This time, the somersault reaches virtuosity.

In fact, let us read again the citation from Faurisson. On his part there is no proof. If there is an attempt at proof, it is on the part of Quadruppani. Faurisson was satisfied to explain as succinctly as possible what was the explicit logic at work, first, in Hitler’s behavior, and, secondly, in each of the camps in the war. In writing: “For one camp as for the other, it was before all else a matter of winning the war, both against the soldiers and the civilians,” Faurisson indicates that in his opinion the Jewish question, in both camps, was subordinate. But the whole attempt at proof by Quadruppani rests on an abusive assimilation of Faurisson to Hitler! When Faurisson explains the explicit logic of Hitler—“Hitler always regarded the Jews as his enemies,” Quadruppani attributes to Faurisson himself Hitler’s analysis! His proof rests on this assimilation and only on this assimilation! That is, on a falsification. (This assimilation should be odious to all those who are not...)

And what is the conclusion of all that?

Faurisson’s whole proof aims at making the racial persecution [104] undergone by the Jews a banal act of war [...] It thereby enters into contradiction with one of these massive facts within the reach of any non-specialist equipped with a little critical sense...

I await with interest the statement of a *fact*, a solid, obvious fact. What is the *fact*?

... to know that racism cannot be reduced to a policy, or to a warlike strategy, or to economic determinations.

And here is the somersault! This *fact* is a speculative and empty statement, which constitutes the summary and the basis of the anti-racist ideology, by which Quadruppani intends to persuade the reader, and to persuade himself, that he has a profound interpretation of racism, about which he will tell us nothing! The essence of the chapter

consists then of the pure and simple reproduction of documents already published by La Vieille Taupe. Let us thank the author and pass on. Page 315, Quadruppani writes:

The mocking way in which Faurisson comments on Müller's horrific descriptions makes one sick. For, however imaginary they may be, these descriptions evoke the memory of quite real horrors. This Faurissonian insensitivity is not the least anti-pathetic feature of him who presents himself as a "maniac for the truth." We will reconsider this point.

It does not seem to occur to the mind of the author that Faurisson reserves his sensitivity for the quite real sufferings, those really undergone, and that the descriptions of Filip Müller do not serve to evoke these real sufferings, but to cover them with a wheelbarrowful of refuse which prohibits any "comprehension.

Then Quadruppani reproaches Faurisson "for having said too much elsewhere that the genocide was a political-financial swindle." The quotation, reported in indirect speech, is false. Did Faurisson say and write (too much?) that the genocide was a *historical lie* which *had allowed* a political-financial swindle. In the form in which Quadruppani reports it, the statement has no sense, but it suggests interpretations contrary to the sense of the real statement!

To write: "the genocide is a swindle" is devoid of sense.

To write: "The evocation, the claim of the genocide is [105] a swindle" has a sense, but that is not what Faurisson wrote. This second statement could suggest that those who evoke or claim the genocide commit a swindle consciously, or even as the swindle is the source of the evocation or of the claim of genocide. Faurisson did not write that because he does not think it. Faurisson wrote:

The alleged Hitlerian gas chambers and the alleged genocide of the Jews form one and the same historical lie [not just any lie: a historical lie], which *has permitted* a gigantic political-financial swindle...

One will note that he took care to specify the ideological term (susceptible to various interpretations) of genocide, by indicating that alleged gas chambers and the alleged genocide formed one and the same historical lie. What *has permitted* the swindle is neither the real sufferings, nor the racial persecutions, neither the deportations, nor the concentration camp decimation, but rather the representation of genocide and gas chambers indissolubly associated together, the representation of a systematic extermination, in the human slaughter-houses intended for to this purpose and wanted by the highest authority of the State: the *Hitlerian* gas chambers.

And now, the last two examples of the approximate manipulation of concepts and of language by the author:

*The idea that the genocide was the most sadistic and the most monstrous persecution that the world has ever known, as well as the whole current picture of the Second World War, is today in crisis. For a bundle of reasons of which the first, and perhaps the most important, is the triumph of this society of the spectacle theorized by Guy Debord.*⁷⁹

If there was a genocide, it constitutes indisputably the most sadistic and the most monstrous persecution that the world has ever known. If the picture of the genocide, as well as the whole current picture of the Second World War, are today in crisis, it is because the various elements, that this quasi-religious picture was supposed to unify, have started to diverge. Faced with a return to reality and with revisionist criticism, the official picture is no more maintained except by artifices and thanks to the triumph of the society of the spectacle theorized by Guy Debord.

⁷⁹ On Guy Debord, see <http://www.bopsecrets.org/SI/debord/> and <http://www.nothingness.org/SI/debord.html>.

One will note, not without stupor, that, according to Quadruppani, the crisis of the false picture, and then the eruption of the truth, is due to the triumph of the society of the spectacle, poor Debord!

The dominant anti-fascist speech drew all its force from really lived horrors.

The dominant anti-fascist speech drew all its force from the horrors which it was materially able to inflict upon its adversaries, fascists or not, horrors that it was necessary to deny or justify by creating the spectacle of greater horrors, real or mythical, attributed to its adversaries.

To oppose “really lived horrors,” which would reinforce anti-fascist speech, to the triumph of the society of the spectacle which would make these horrors seem unreal, constitutes an extreme naiveté combined with a complete incomprehension of the concepts which one affects to manipulate.

The ideological mobilization inherent in modern wars and the total control of the population, in particular by control of information and war propaganda, are exactly what puts into place this company of the spectacle, characterized by a disjunction between concrete experience and experience really lived but only through a spectacle staged under the direct control of the State.

Paris, December 1983.

[107]

THE WEIGHT OF WORDS

Mr. Pierre Vidal-Naquet, a historian of Greek antiquity (Centre de recherches comparées sur les sociétés anciennes, Équipe de recherche associée au C.N.R.S., École des hautes études en sciences sociales, 10, rue Monsieur-le-Prince, 75006 Paris), has presented in the columns of *Libération* (February 24, 1984, p. 28) a book entitled *L'Album d'Auschwitz* (*The Auschwitz Album*).⁸⁰ This book appeared in an edition with limited distribution and in an American edition for the general public. It is well-known to all the specialists. It was the object of more or less detailed analyses by revisionist historians. A photograph, extracted from this Album, was published in 1980 by Robert Faurisson (see Serge Thion, *Historical Truth Or Political Truth?*, p. 321). It is less this Album which we will analyze here than the presentation that Mr. Pierre Vidal-Naquet makes of it.

The Album consists of 188 photographs taken in the Auschwitz-Birkenau camp at the arrival of a convoy of Jewish deportees from Hungary, on May 26, 1944.

Mr. Vidal-Naquet writes:

One should not ask of photographs more than they can give.

One could not say it better. Will Mr. Vidal-Naquet analyze these 188 photographs as a historian, and say what they show and what they reveal?

Not at all! Let us listen to him:

A whole community of Hassidic men, women, children, and old men taken at the time of their unloading: *Nothing more banal*.⁸¹

Thus, according to Mr. Vidal-Naquet himself, it is a matter of perfectly banal scenes of unloading and of deportation.

⁸⁰ *The Auschwitz Album*. After an album discovered by Lili Meier, survivor of the concentration camp. Text by Peter Hellman. See the analysis by Robert Faurisson, "Les Tricheries de l'Album d'Auschwitz" (*The Trickeries of The Auschwitz Album*), typed text, unpublished, 1983.

⁸¹ Our italics. [Guillaume's note]

[108]
(a reproduction of the *Liberation* article)

MEMOIRE

Auschwitz: le choc des photos

Au moment où Lili Jacob descend du train en 1944, à Birkenau, un S.S. prend des photos : elles sont toutes dans l'« Album d'Auschwitz ».

L'album d'Auschwitz est un « livre de mémoire », à vrai dire, assez paradoxal. Le 26 mai 1944, un convoi de juifs hongrois arriva sur la rampe de Birkenau. Parmi ceux qui l'attendaient, un homme, un inconnu, un S.S., avait un appareil de photos. Il joua l'instant crucial de la sélection, dans ce maigre convoi, figurait une jeune fille de 18 ans, Lili Jacob. Par un hasard étonnant, Lili Jacob, dont la famille a été dans sa quasi-totalité exterminée, mit la main, le jour de sa libération, sur un album relié de toile brune, dont les pages étaient abîmées et qui contenait ces photos. Elle les emporta avec elle en Amérique et les 1946. Plusieurs de ces photos ont été soumises à des tribunaux hors de procès intentés aux responsables d'Auschwitz-Birkenau. L'édition complète a été publiée en Amérique.

qu'elles ne peuvent donner. Il s'agit là, au sens complet, du terme d'inséparables : toute une communauté, des hommes, des femmes, des enfants, des vieillards hasardeusement pris au moment de leur débarrquement : rien de plus banal. L'émotion naît du documentaire, de ce que nous savons par ailleurs de leur destin. Du rapprochement que nous pouvons faire avec ces visages d'un monde disparu, ces photographies que prit Roman Vishniac et donc certaines ont été publiées (1).

L'homme qui a écrit et commenté ces documents n'est pas un inconnu. Jean-Claude Pressac est philarmade. Issu d'un milieu d'extrême-droite, il avait des doutes sur la réalité de l'extermination. Il se rendit sur place et commença à interroger les chercheurs du Musée d'Auschwitz. Ceux-ci s'étonnèrent alors de la ressemblance entre ses doutes et ceux d'un certain professeur « Oursison ». Ramé en France, il trouva facilement quel était le véritable possesseur de ce patrimoine défiguré. Il devint son grand foumisseur de documents, obtint grâce auquel une vidéo-cassette put être réalisée et proposée à nombre d'ama-



Percuté sur le toit d'un fourgon, le S.S. photographie le moment de la sélection des déportés.

baseuses étrangères. On n'avait pas de mots pour qualifier l'émotion qu'inspiraient ses recherches. Et puis, un beau jour, au Musée d'Auschwitz, l'évidence le terrassa, l'évidence des documents qui s'accumulaient sur sa table et dont certains étaient innocents de leurs possesseurs eux-mêmes, l'évidence des plans, l'évidence des photos, l'évidence des restes. Il fit connaître les résultats de son enquête et du coup, ses anciens amis le qualifièrent de « maffioso ». Ce livre, présenté sur le ton froid qui convient, est la marque de son retour au réel et l'adieu qu'il fait au mensonge.

Pierre VIDAL-NAQUET
(1) Certaines de ces photos ont été publiées sous le titre : *Les Juifs du pays*, Albin, Paris 1979. Il en existe une édition beaucoup plus complète sous le titre : *A. Varsheid World*, Farrar, Straus et Giroux, New York 1983.
L'album d'Auschwitz, D'après un album découvert par Lili Meier, sur-

Un autre survivant

C'est que les images ne peuvent tout à fait dire, en dépit de leur caractère immédiat, le réel peut le dire, à condition que le témoin soit capable de parler. Moshe Garbarz a été déporté à Auschwitz, il y a maintenant bien plus de quarante-deux ans. Il a vécu à Paris comme immigré, il a connu après Auschwitz la mine à Jawischowitz et puis, l'évacuation qui pendant l'hiver 44-45 le conduisit à Buchenwald d'où il fut libéré par l'armée soviétique. Pourquo, comment, ce récit après tant d'années ? Il existe, bien sûr, des témoignages plus proches que d'autres, mais il n'existe pas de témoignages directs. Tout témoignage est différé. Le tout est de s'en rendre compte. Moshe Garbarz nous parle donc quarante ans après et c'est son fils Elie qui met en forme ses paroles, la mémoire de l'un et l'écrit de l'autre. C'est un livre d'une étrange, d'une abnaisante brutalité. Le personnage central n'y est pas le S.S. c'est le kapo, un tueur. Ainsi celui-ci qui disait à ses victimes : « Hitzraime (fils de putain), tu ne vois pas que je te rends service ? tu es malade, tu es vieux, tu es trop faible pour travailler, ta femme et tes enfants sont morts depuis longtemps, et j'ai besoin de trente personnes pour demain ». C'était aussi cela, Auschwitz, en 1942.

Pierre VIDAL-NAQUET
Un survivant de Moshe et Elie Garbarz, Pollogne 1913-1929 - Paris 1929-1941. *Auschwitz-Birkenau* Jawischowitz-Buchenwald 1942-1945. Plon, 70 francs.

[109]

Mr. Vidal-Naquet continues:

The emotion is born from the commentary, from what we know of their destiny.

One could not say it better.

In other words, there is nothing in the photographs, all is in the commentary. Mr. Vidal-Naquet will tell us nothing about the sources of his knowledge, nor upon what documents rests “what we know of their destiny.” Mr. Vidal-Naquet knows! Mr. Vidal-Naquet knows all! Besides, is it not enough to read the newspapers and to look at television in order to know what occurred at Auschwitz?

Thus, after having written: “One should not ask of photographs more than they can give,” Mr. Vidal-Naquet will endorse a comment which constitutes a pathetic and ridiculous attempt to make the photographs say infinitely more than they can give.

Let us cite an example of one such comment (a facsimile of page 74 of the Album):

*This photograph does not fail to recall the account of an eyewitness of a bludgeoning and the sending into the gas chamber of Crematory III of more than six hundred young boys in October 1944—the 20th one believes—, a frightening number even according to the standards of Birkenau. The report of it would come from the journal either of a member of the Sonderkommando named Salmen Lewental, or of another member called “the unknown author” (Leib Langfus, according to the historian Ber Mark). They have not survived but their journals (included in the collection *Au sein d’un crime hallucinant (Inside an incredible crime)*, published by the National Museum of Auschwitz) were found after the war along with several others, buried in bottles and cans close to the crematories. It is written there that “the boys seemed so beautiful and so well built that not even (their) rags impaired their beauty.” Then, wretched detail, it is told how the SS armed with bludgeons pursued them, naked and howling, around crematory until all are finally brought down “to the bunker,” that is, the gas chamber. About these SS, it is written: “Their joy was indescribable.” And this report finishes by raising the question: “Did they then never have children?”*

[110]

Photograph No. 28, p. 75

Regardons maintenant la photo (n° 28, p. 75) :




Now let us read again the commentary opposite the photograph and compare it with the image.

*This photograph does not fail to recall the account of an eyewitness of a bludgeoning and the sending into the gas chamber of Crematory III of more than six hundred young boys in October 1944—the 20th one believes—, a frightening number even according to the standards of Birkenau. The report of it would come from the journal either of a member of the Sonderkommando named Salmen Lewental, or of another member called “the unknown author” (Leib Langfus, according to the historian Ber Mark). They have not survived but their journals (included in the collection *Au sein d’un crime hallucinant (Inside an incredible crime)*, published by the National Museum of Auschwitz) were found after the war along with several others, buried in bottles and cans close to the crematories. It is written there that “the boys seemed so beautiful and so well built that not even (their) rags impaired their beauty.” Then, wretched detail, it is told how the SS armed with bludgeons pursued them, naked and howling, around crematory until all are finally brought down “to the bunker,” that is, the gas chamber. About these*

SS, it is written: "Their joy was indescribable." And this report finishes by raising the question: "Did they then never have children?"

[112]

Now let us imagine a photograph which would represent the S.S. armed with bludgeons and pursuing six hundred children, naked and howling, around crematories in order to make them enter into the gas chamber. The indescribable joy is read on their faces.



And on the preceding page, one would read the following comment:

This photograph cannot but recall two young boys on a platform along railroad tracks. They are warmly dressed and throw an anxious glance at the places and the crowd which surround them.

Is it really necessary to draw a conclusion?

And what should one think of the unexplained knowledge ("what we moreover know of their destiny") of a historian who lets pass similar whoppers (*énormités*) in a book that he comments on?

Let us note that our own comments do not require, in order to be understood, any particular knowledge of the subject and the documentation available on Auschwitz; it is enough to confront the photographs and comments, and everyone can find in the Album many equivalent examples (in particular on pp. 178 and 205).

[113]

One could also point out the intrinsic absurdity of the comment:

The report would come from the journal, either...or...

We will add that the Warsaw Institute of Jewish History and the Auschwitz Museum still have not managed to come to an agreement on the supposed text of the supposed journals of the supposed Leib Langfus and Salmen Lewental; that one of these journals has been found "miraculously" close to the crematories, not during a systematic excavation or by chance during work, but at the bottom of a hole approximately 40 centimeters deep and 13 centimeters in diameter, dug miraculously at the exact place where the invaluable relic was. One of the discoverers, the historian Ber Mark, was moreover accused of having manufactured false journals of children of the Warsaw ghetto (On this last point, see Michel Borwicz, *Revue d'histoire de la Seconde guerre mondiale*, January 1962).

Thus, confronted with 188 photographs taken on May 26, 1944 at the Birkenau camp, the historian Pierre Vidal-Naquet comments neither on the photographs nor on the

commentary on the photographs, but the historian Pierre Vidal-Naquet will make us a commentary on the commentator.

What obviously interests the historian Vidal-Naquet is that the commentator, the pharmacist Jean-Claude Pressac, believes in the gas chambers. For, according to Mr. Vidal-Naquet, this Jean-Claude Pressac, “issuing from an extreme right-wing environment, had doubts about the reality of the extermination.”

What Mr. Vidal-Naquet will tell us is the history of a conversion. The pharmacist had doubts; he went to Auschwitz, to the museum, and then one day, “the evidence struck him down.” Paul of Tarsus persecuted the Christians, but one day, on the way from Damascus, he met the light, and the evidence struck him down. All reports of conversion are apologetic and contribute to the edification of the good people. They implicitly use the argument from authority. I cannot make you meet the Holy Spirit here and now, but Saint Paul attests that he met him. This attestation, *unless* [114] *doubted in its turn*, establishes without question the reality of his meeting with the Holy Spirit.

Better, Saint Thomas doubted the resurrection of Christ but, when he had touched the wound in his side, when he had put his fingers in the wounds of his hands, he doubted no more that he had before him Christ resuscitated. Saint Thomas is the figure of hyperbolic doubt, who lets himself be convinced only by material arguments; his systematic incredulity comes to reinforce the authority of his faith and should make fall the last reservations, although you cannot yourself touch the side and put your fingers in the wounds of the hands, for Christ rose up to heaven in his glorious body...

Thus, the pharmacist went to the spot, “and then, one fine day, at the Auschwitz Museum, the evidence struck him down.”

What evidence? Mr. Vidal-Naquet does not specify it.

From where does this evidence come?

From documents: Mr. Vidal-Naquet does not cite any.

From plans: which? great gods!

From photographs: fantastic! where are they?

From remnants: what remnants?

Mr. Vidal-Naquet has suddenly become *cahotier*:⁸² there are at the Auschwitz Museum documents which are able to strike incredulity down, but I prefer to speak to you about a book of photographs which presents “banal” scenes and the conversion of a suburban pharmacist. Such, in substance, is the story that one tells us.

The inevitable conclusion is quite simply this: if such documents existed, these documents would have been published and commented on a long time ago. They would have been used in the lawsuits brought by the L.I.C.R.A. against Professor Faurisson. They would have been published by the A.S.S.A.G., an association of which Mr. Vidal-Naquet is a member, created on April 21, 1982 for the sole purpose of seeking and publishing such documents.⁸³

⁸² *cachotier* “secretive” about things of no real importance.

⁸³ And to collect public and private funds for this purpose. See the statutes of the A.S.S.A.G. [text: <http://www.vho.org/aaargh/fran/revu/rhr/rhr3/rhr31.html>] [Guillaume’s note. ASSAG: Association pour l’étude des assassinats par gaz sous le régime national-socialiste (Association for the Study of the Murders by Gas under the National-Socialist Regime)]

The conversion of Saint Thomas “testifies” to the miraculous intervention of divine power, but the theologian will admit that grace is necessary for faith, [115] since no profane verification of Christ’s resurrection is now possible.

The parable of the pharmacist Pressac is unusual in that it testifies that the *profane* verification of the existence of the gas chambers is *now* possible at the Auschwitz Museum.

In the first case, the discussion on the truth and the materiality of Christ’s resurrection is likely to go on still a long time...

In the second case, the account of Pressac’s conversion is true, or it is false, but in any case the perceptible presence of the documentary evidence of the Hitlerian gas chambers is verifiable at the Auschwitz Museum in Poland.

Hic Rhodus, hic salta!

So we will wait until Mr. Pierre Vidal-Naquet decides to take the plunge (*sauter le pas*). While waiting, there remain the 188 photographs taken in May 1944 inside the camp. In at least 13 photographs, Crematories II, III, IV and V are perfectly visible. Several dozens (lit. “tens”) of the photographs were taken in the immediate vicinity of these buildings. These photographs establish that these buildings were perfectly visible from many points in the camp. They were not the object of any particular protection. Not only is no device designed to separate systematically the newcomers from the old deportees detectable, but many photographs prove on the contrary that such a device did not exist. These photographs establish that, if there had been mass gassings in the buildings of Crematories II, III, IV and V, no deportee of the camp could have been unaware of it.

However, it is enough to read the deportees’ testimonies at our disposal to observe that, apart from a small number of generally late “testimonies,” the majority of the deportees, although they doubted nothing less in the world than the reality of these massive gassings, located these massive gassings elsewhere than in these four crematories, and outside the camp of Birkenau. The prisoners (*concentrationnaires*) of Auschwitz 1 and of Auschwitz III often located the gassings at Birkenau (Auschwitz II), but the prisoners of Birkenau (Auschwitz II) located them elsewhere!

[116]

The most characteristic and probably most revealing example is that of Ana Novac, *J’avais 14 ans à Auschwitz (I Was 14 Years Old At Auschwitz)* (Paris 1982, Presses de la Renaissance, 239 pages). This testimony is of major interest for having been composed from a book of notes taken down on the spot and preserved in the debacle. These notes reduce the possibility of modifications of memory *a posteriori*. What does one discover there? Upon arrival at the camp, the deportees are regularly threatened with “the gas chamber” by the camp hierarchy made up of deportees (*Häftlingsführung*). Then, at the beginning of 1944, after a stay of several weeks at Birkenau, Ana Novac was transferred to Plassow.

She [the kapo] always threatens us with stupefying things: if we do not get down immediately from the straw mattress, she may have us sent, forthwith, to Dachau to the gas chamber, she may have us imprisoned, frisked, etc. [Page 54.]

She threatens us, with a more haggard look than usual, to send us right away to Buchenwald to the gas chamber. (This gas chamber is located alternatively at Auschwitz, at Dachau or at Buchenwald, according to her mood.) [Page 68.]

She distributes death by gas with as much of levity as the Professor Wuntsch distributed the zeros. [Page 68.]

Obviously, Ana Novac does not grant any credit to these threats. However, little by little, Ana Novac will gradually come to believe in these massive gassings. She is even convinced that she escaped them by escaping a transport headed for an unknown destination.

So, upon return to Auschwitz II (Birkenau), she reports a conversation.

“The wind always smells of smoke, here, have you noticed?

- Yes, I say. Because of the crematory.
- One burns the refuse.
- One burns also the dead.” [Page 158]

A short time later, she escapes an evacuation in “a large red ambulance.” She is convinced that she has escaped death (pages 163-164). She reports the following conversation:

“You did not know it? She says, surprised. One incinerates the sick. Calm yourself, not alive! One passes them first by the gas chamber.

- You are sure of this?” [Page 164.]

[117]

It is the sudden evacuation from the camp of the Czech families, men, women, and children, which seems to have convinced her of the reality of the gassings (p. 165). Although she knew herself seven evacuations or transfers, she is convinced that the occupants of these blocks could be evacuated only in order to be gassed. So (page 168) she is convinced that the death, which she thought to have escaped on page 164, was death by gas... However, at no time does she indicate near-by and visible crematories as a place of execution and the site of these gas chambers.

Finally, Ana Novac will be transported once again, by train, in a travellers coach, towards a new sub-camp of Auschwitz. Upon arrival, the “usual disinfection.” But the deportees do not want to penetrate into the shower! They fear being gassed. Once she has entered, she is gripped by terror, but finally it is hot water which spouts out! (page 192).

It is clear that, being at Birkenau, Ana Novac located the gassings, in which she now believed, far from Birkenau.

So, an attentive reading of Ana Novac’s testimony, of the account made by herself of her own conversion to the belief between the beginning and the end of 1944, and the comparison of this account with the 188 photographs of the Album, reveal insurmountable impossibilities for the official thesis. But Ana Novac’s account is interesting for many other reasons. It contains many very sincere notes, and its description of life at Auschwitz frequently deviates from the imposed stereotypes in this matter.

Ana Novac took part—on one of the three Jewish Parisian radio stations before their regrouping—in a program on the holocaust in the company, in particular, of Mr. George Wellers, the former director of the Center of Contemporary Jewish Documentation in Paris, and highpriest of the holocaust. All that Ana Novac said gave proof of her great sincerity, simplicity and sensitivity, and a certain sense of humor.

To all the questions about the gas chambers, she retorted by invoking science and the works of Mr. George Wellers and asked that one address oneself to him. She herself knew nothing.

[118]

This same George Wellers, a deportee to Auschwitz III (Monowitz), at the time of a two-hour conversation with Serge Thion, and in the presence of Nadine Fresco, has declared, in order to show to what point these things are complex and how much deportation could involve various realities, that he himself, during his whole stay at Auschwitz, had been a victim of no brutality on the part of the S.S.! It is the evacuation march which was the occasion for sufferings and unspeakable brutalities!

Thus two authentic witnesses can authenticate perfectly a stereotyped description of Auschwitz, which is now official and canonical, even when this official and canonical description is extremely different from their real experience!

If the conversion of two deportees to belief in the gas chambers does not constitute a proof for the reasons explained above, what about the conversion of the pharmacist Pressac? And first of all, who is this Pressac?

The governmental historian Pierre Vidal-Naquet presents him to us as follows:

Issuing from an extreme right-wing environment, he had doubts about the reality of the extermination.

There still, Mr. Vidal-Naquet suddenly shows a surprising discretion. I do not know anything about the environment from which Pressac issues, but he received a reprimand in 1959 from the administration of the military academy La Flèche, following a Nazi-inspired sketch which he had staged at the time of a school festival (he was then in a class of elementary mathematics, 4th company). Later, without properly-speaking being a militant, he supported an organization of the extreme right-wing and took part in banquets and meetings organized by Pierre Sidos. Pressac is and remains a man of the extreme right-wing. Like the majority of extreme right-wing people, he by no means questioned the reality of the extermination. Quite to the contrary, he had been fascinated by his reading of the book *La mort est mon métier (Death Is My Trade)* and by the personality of the civil servant in charge of the extermination envisioned by Robert Merle. He had himself written a Nazi-inspired novel on the Second World War and, concerned with precision and material details, he went to Auschwitz to [119] write the chapter on the final solution, with an aim of describing in the most concrete way possible the process of execution by gassing. He thus believed “hard as iron” in the official version at the time of his first voyage to Auschwitz, and it is on the site there that he started to have doubts: confronted with the ruins and the plans, he did not manage to reconstitute the concrete process of the gassing of a convoy! And it is during his research at the museum that he heard Kazimierz Smolen and Tadeusz Iwaszke talk of Robert Faurisson; they knew perfectly the spelling of his name from having maintained a technical correspondence with Faurisson. It is in this state of mind that Pressac contacted Faurisson as soon as he returned to France.

Faurisson opened *all* his files to him, presented all his documents to him, exposed all his research. From time to time, Pressac’s own research permitted greater precision about details which had remained in the dark (in particular the sewage system of the crematories and the septic tank, which had been presented by the L.I.C.R.A., during their lawsuit against Faurisson, as a “pit for corpses”—with the help of a whimsical translation). It is during these working sessions, which Faurisson maintained strictly and

rigorously for the sake of technical matters, that I learned the biographical and psychological elements reported above.

As the confrontation went on, Pressac took fright. The mere idea that one could think that he was evolving toward Faurisson's theses filled him with terror. To each meeting at my home, he said upon arrival: "Ah! no, Guillaume! Faurisson screwed up" (*s'est planté*), and it was necessary to take out again all the plans, the photographs, etc., to analyze objections which finally disappeared. When Faurisson arrived at the meeting before him, we generally greeted him with: "Well then, Pressac, has one screwed up?"

As the civil trial required a crushing amount of work and access to the documentation held by the Auschwitz Museum which refused all forms of communication with Faurisson, it was agreed that Pressac would go back to Auschwitz, that he would present himself to the museum authorities as "decided to begin all again from zero to make a rigorously technical study and to refute Faurisson who [120] was making so much trouble (*des ravages*) in France." He was employed only to send us copies of the documents of which Faurisson had need. And we encouraged him to urge and to even take part in the publication of any document that he would find, a scientific, strictly material publication.

The first part of the contract was scrupulously respected, except on one point: Faurisson had asked Pressac to bring back from Auschwitz two documents, one concerning the register of the dead in Auschwitz (the *Totenbuch*), the other concerning the register of the cremations. Pressac had preferred not to ask the museum authorities to see these documents "in order not to put a flea in their ear." "That would have compromised [his] projects of publication and collaboration."

Upon returning from this second voyage, Pressac definitively seemed convinced that the official thesis did not hold up, but he seemed also very sensitive to the excellence of his relationships to the museum authorities, in whose circle he had become a personality, and who, in his opinion, were disposed to accept questioning of the official doctrines, and in particular the usually proclaimed figures for the victims, as long as one did not deny the existence of homicidal gassings; they would even accept a figure of just a few thousands of people (instead of hundreds of thousands or millions). Moreover, a charming Polish woman seemed to have made him share a less positive view of Uncle Adolf and the German occupation. He maintained also relations with Mr. Vidal-Naquet, George Wellers, and with Mr. Silbermine, a deportee to Auschwitz, whom I met myself and with whom I had several conversations.

In the meantime, two factors strained our relations: firstly, we did not have anything any more to learn from each other with regard to material knowledge of the documents and the ruins of Auschwitz; secondly, Faurisson, seriously sick, cut back on his trips to Paris.

However, the appeals trial was approaching, and Faurisson, very sick, feared not to be able to personally present his works to the court and the specialists. We decided to organize a minimal synthesis on video-cassette in case [121] Faurisson's health did not improve. Filming was done in difficult (*dramatiques*) conditions and twice had to be stopped because of the professor's exhaustion. We also had to hide his state of health, for, in the lynching ambiance and in the tragic insolation of the time, any mark of weakness would have been exploited against him. It was one more reason not to meet with Pressac in order not to let him know and reveal Faurisson's extreme weakness. Contrary to what

Mr. Pierre Vidal-Naquet affirms, the documents presented in this cassette do not come from Pressac, except the photograph of the ceiling of the “gas chamber,” which was taken while penetrating under the ruins. On the other hand, we used cardboard panels on which Pressac, a precise and meticulous draughtsman, had reproduced synthetically the essential elements drawn from the originals (this cassette was offered to no one else, even if, of course, I cannot exclude the possibility that one or two among the forty copies of it may have fallen into someone else’s hands).

For all this period—more than one year—we did not have any relations with Pressac, except two or three telephone conversations in which I encouraged him to pursue all projects of publication, although I knew that he would capitulate on the basics and even that he had already completely capitulated, but without managing to know, on the one hand, what his game was; and on the other hand, his inner conviction; nor even if he had what one might call an inner conviction. My own conviction is quite simply that, having decided that it was in his interest to believe in the gassings and having continued to say that he believed in them even when he hardly believed in them any more, he ended up believing in them more or less. Pressac had quite simply applied the formula of a certain Blaise Pascal: “Put yourself on your knees, pray and implore, pretend to believe, and soon you will believe,” according to the friendly advice of the neighbor of George Brassens, who is, as everyone knows, “as happy as a pope and as stupid as a basket.”

In any case, at the end of June 1982, after more than six months of total silence, Pressac passed by to see me to announce as a common victory the fact that he had been invited by Mr. Pierre Vidal-Naquet to take part in the conference on National-socialism and the Jews at the Sorbonne. His paper was to cite and underscore what he [122] owed to the works of Faurisson and to myself! (But finally one asked him to remove this, and he accepted. “You understand, Guillaume, I am obliged!”)

All that turned into a farce, all the more so as Pressac was not able to support in front of me a single argument in favor of the materiality of the homicidal gassings, which did not break down immediately. I tried to draw out the worms from his nose, to reassure him; I repeated to him that I was ready and that I had always been ready to admit the existence of makeshift gassings, and he limited himself to repeating: “One cannot deny that something happened.” “Agreed, Guillaume, what they said. . . the testimonies. . . that does not hold up. But, you know, they are all aware of that. . .” Lastly, pushed into his last retrenchments, I obtained the immortal: “There were certainly some gassings.”

I avidly encouraged Pressac to give his talk, while asking him simply to mention Faurisson’s works and the fact, of which he was convinced, that Faurisson and I were supported by documents and were in good faith—which he did not do.

Three days after his talk, on July 5, 1982, he read me some passages from it over the telephone. I stopped him three times to point out to him three whoppers which we had discussed two years earlier. Three times he answered me: “Yes, but there, Guillaume, understand me, I was obliged.” He says to me in addition that all the congress was aware that “Wellers was completely obsolete” and, “as for Poliakov, he is in the cabbages; no one takes him seriously any more.”

Jean-Claude Pressac’s talk was finally published in *Le Monde juif*, revue du Centre de documentation juive contemporaine de Paris, No. 107, July-September 1982, published at the end of October 1982. Faurisson’s reply appeared November 3, 1982 and

appears in the second and enlarged edition of *Response to Pierre Vidal-Naquet* (La Vieille Taupe, 1982).

In *Le Monde juif*, Pressac was presented eulogistically in terms which could apply rigorously to Faurisson,⁸⁴ except for two: Pressac was presented [123] as young and Catholic. Pressac is young and Faurisson is not any more. Pressac is no more Catholic than Faurisson. They are both atheists (me too).

Our psychological and material situation at the time was tragic, tragic to a point that it will be difficult to render comprehensible to those who did not live it, and which it is even difficult for us to reconstruct (*reconstituer*) since we are so little inclined to be spiteful. But, in brief, I was fed up. I telephoned Pressac. He had always expressed a panic-like fear at the idea that his relations with us be known. He had asked me for anonymity. I agreed to this, while pointing out to him that our adversaries would not have the same scruples and if his name appeared publicly, I could not do otherwise than to take back my freedom. That was only natural. But, most importantly, Pressac had not acted properly: he had greatly drawn on Faurisson's works by putting them into his own sauce but while dissociating them point by point from their source; he had used the documentation and he impudently took part in a lynching party.⁸⁵ I thus proposed to him the following deal which, to my mind, constituted a test. I would forget it all, I would erase it all, I would dedicate myself to no personal attack on him, on just one condition—but an absolute and imperative condition: that he get published in *Le Monde juif* a denial specifying that he was not a Catholic but an atheist. Or else, I would assert myself without restraint.

Pressac promised. Pressac swore.

The following edition of *Le Monde juif* contained no denial. “You understand, Guillaume, it is a manner of speaking! My parents were Catholic and I was baptized.” In other words, the atheist Pressac “was obliged” to be Catholic!

And for this reason I will tell a last anecdote before concluding.

First, the anecdote.

After his return from his second trip to Auschwitz, Pressac brought back, besides a mass of photocopies, several hundred slides which had to be studied and, for that, one needed a screen and projector. It seemed simpler to go at his place, in the suburbs. When we arrived, Faurisson and I, he at first had led us into [124] the living room. He seemed to hesitate. We understood that all the material was set up in the attic. Why not go up? Finally, he resolved to make us go up. “Listen, Guillaume, I know that you are broad-minded, but after all, pay no attention, close your eyes.” “OK, hein? You will not be frightened?” We went up. Pressac had soundproofed his attic in order to listen tranquilly to Nazi military songs, but also such songs of the Red Army and the Israeli army, as he pointed out to me it. There was one bust of Hitler, a S.S. helmet, a militia helmet, an old Russian rifle and a belt loop of the Red Army, in brief, all the odds and ends of a perfect mytho-Nazi. (See the note on p. 87.)

⁸⁴ Likewise, Faurisson is presented as a member of the extreme right and a neo-Nazi, which is completely false, but Pressac, who is such a person, is presented as a disinterested researcher after the truth. Mysteries of information! [Guillaume's note]

⁸⁵ The French reads: “Il avait formidablement pompé les travaux de Faurisson en les mettant à sa sauce à lui mais en les démarquant point par point, il avait utilisé la documentation et il participait impudemment à une entreprise de lynchage.”

And now the conclusion.

I told in summary fashion the story of the Pressac affair because it is quite necessary that our adversaries finally understand that they cannot go on indefinitely abusing our extreme kindness with impunity.

I told it also because it contains information that is very important for appreciating at its right value the gas chamber affair, for drawing therefrom the anthropological consequences and for understanding the symmetrical and opposite reasons for which a Vidal-Naquet and a Pressac need to maintain the archetypal figure of the Nazi gasser.

But that is for later.

In the immediate future, the question which arises for the historian is the following: did the gas chambers exist or did they not exist?

To solve this question, the historian has at his disposal documents and testimonies of which he must make critical analysis. The arguments on the one side and on the other must be considered for what they are. Pressac's arguments, and those of Faurisson, are published, and everyone can take note of them. I devoted myself to a digression on Pressac's conversion because Mr. Vidal-Naquet himself thought it clever to lead us onto this ground and I wished to show that we were able to follow him on all grounds, even the most shifting (*mouvant*). Mr. Vidal-Naquet tells us that there are at Auschwitz documents which prove the existence of the gas chambers! Let him tell us which, and—I repeat—we will follow him onto this ground too.

[125]

Hic Rhodus, hic salta.

We leave him the choice of the weapons, the choice of the ground, the advantage of the wind, and let us agree to fight facing the sun. With regard to our own testimony about Pressac, the majority of the cited facts are verifiable, and in any case this one is: the article of J.-C. Pressac, in *Le Monde juif*, refutes the thesis of the conversion of the unbeliever maintained by Mr. Pierre Vidal-Naquet. It is on the contrary obviously the text of somebody who believed in the thesis of massive extermination planned in gas chambers conceived to this end and whom the material observations on the spot force to fall back on the thesis of makeshift (*artisanaux*) gassings in buildings designed for other ends and arranged in an incoherent way.

If Christ was not resuscitated on the third day, the account of the conversion of Saint Thomas is as mythical and untrue as the account of the resurrection. But proof that Saint Thomas is a false witness would not entail proof that Christ was not resuscitated. This is why, even though the parable of the unbeliever has been reduced to its just value, we remain disposed to discuss the proofs of Mr. Vidal-Naquet.

Hic Rhodus, hic salta.

On the same page of the newspaper *Libération*, Mr. Pierre Vidal-Naquet presents, under the title “Un autre survivant” (“Another survivor”), the book of Moshé and Élie Garbarz: *Un survivant (A survivor)*, Plon 1983, 252 pages. It is about the testimony of Moshé Garbarz, a deportee to Auschwitz-Birkenau, Jawischowitz and Buchenwald, from 1942 to 1945, put together by his son Élie.

Mr. Pierre Vidal-Naquet writes:

The central character is not the S.S., it is the kapo, a killer.

Paul Rassinier, since 1948, in the *Le Passage de la ligne* (*The Passage of the Line*), and then in 1950, in *The Lie of Ulysses*, had drawn attention to this aspect of the concentrationary universe [126] and on the role of prisoner-leadership (*Häftlingsführung*) in the concentrationary horror. He had been calumniated and vilified for this deed which contradicted the dominant mythological image at the time.

This fact is now universally admitted, and Jorge Semprun, in *Un beau dimanche* (*A Beautiful Sunday*), could make a description of the role of prisoner-leadership (*Häftlingsführung*) in all regards identical to that of Rassinier, while still wanting to send him to his doom on the *gémonies*.⁸⁶ Mr. Vidal-Naquet does not quote Rassinier but pretends to discover, in Garbarz's book, a new and "stupefying" thought. But that is not the essential point. In the report which he makes of this book, Mr. Vidal-Naquet does not speak at any time of a gas chamber. However, Moshé and Élie Garbarz speak about them! Moshé has seen the gas chambers, with his own eyes. He is an *eyewitness*, and he tells about his experience on pages 109 to 116 of the book.

As a historian, Mr. Pierre Vidal-Naquet knows that there are many mythical testimonies of gas chambers by supposed eyewitnesses. All those testimonies concerning the camps at Dachau, Buchenwald, Oranienburg, Ravensbrück, Bergen-Belsen, where, notably, everyone now recognizes that there were never any gassings. It should not have escaped him that the psychological mechanisms which had led many deportees to invent out of nothing their personal participation in horrible scenes which they nevertheless *believed* to be real, could also play a role in the case of deportees at Auschwitz, even if one holds the chambers of Auschwitz to be real. And, since Mr. Vidal-Naquet is one of the historians who maintain the thesis according to which gassings actually took place at Auschwitz-Birkenau, against the revisionist historians who maintain on the contrary that these gassings are also mythical, one would logically expect that he make a pronouncement in particular on the allegedly eyewitness testimony of Moshé Garbarz and that he tell us finally what makes it possible to differentiate a mythical eyewitness testimony of a veracious eyewitness testimony, a question which Faurisson has asked him for three years, a question which arises for any person in good faith who reflects on the subject. In place of that, silence!

On the other hand, Mr. Vidal-Naquet speaks in praise [127] of the whole book and expresses no reservations about it. To create a relation to the *Auschwitz Album* which he has just presented, he writes this:

What the images cannot completely say in spite of their immediate character, the account can say, provided that the witness is able to speak.

That it may be necessary that the witness be able to speak, so that the account be able to say what the images cannot completely say; well, that is a truism of an admirable depth, like all the thoughts of Mr. Vidal-Naquet.

This witness, in any case, is able to speak, since he does speak and he tells of his experience of *Sonderkommando* and of the gas chambers on the pages 109 to 116 of his book. Mr. Vidal-Naquet does not say to us if he puts faith in this testimony, and it is

⁸⁶ *gémonies* The Gemonian Stairs (Stairs of Mourning): a stairway on the Capitoline Hill in ancient Rome where criminals were executed and their bodies exposed.

surely a pity, for Vidal is a recognized authority on the matter. We will thus be constrained to study this testimony in itself.

In order to allow the reader to judge, we give this testimony here *in extenso*.

The following eight pages are a facsimile of the original book (pages 109 to 116).

[128]

THE SPECIAL KOMMANDO

One morning, one interrupts the work of our kommando (= squad) of electricians: inspection. We must align ourselves in a single line and not stand five by five. A S.S. passes. He chooses seven deportees, among whom are Grastain and I (the future chief-electrician of Jawischowitz). We seven, we are unaware of what chore awaits us. We know only that it is about electricity. I was afraid: "Now, they will see that electricity is foreign to me, that I am a handyman and a bad handyman."

The S.S. did not ask whether we were really [practitioners] of this trade. I notice other bizarreries: never I had seen so small a kommando, seven people! Moreover, a S.S. held the place of kapo, and not just any S.S., an *Unterscharführer*, the equivalent among us, I believe, of a sergeant.

[129]

The *Unterscharführer* had not selected us according to our knowledge, but according to our external appearance ; therefore, I still appeared in good physical shape in spite of more than two months spent here, in our camp of Auschwitz-Birkenau. As for my clothing, I still wore the underpants (*slip*) with which I had started from Pithiviers and the same shirt; I said to myself: "The winter is going to come, and if I still live, it will be quite useful for me, and perhaps I will have the opportunity to wash it." But it started to disintegrate, I feared that it would not last until it got real cold. I was likely to remain, like many comrades, naked under my jacket.

Meanwhile, even in tatters, my shirt protected me. From time to time, I took it off to delouse it, this operation relieved me temporarily...: shortly thereafter I found myself with as many lice. Sure, I felt very bad, but I could do nothing about it. The last shower which we had taken was not for washing oneself, but for receiving blows of sticks and frozen water. Moreover, one had stolen from me there my invaluable long underwear (*maillot de corps*).

I return to my new kommando. The S.S. walked along three meters away from us. I do not know if he feared to be attacked or if he was simply avoiding breathing our stench. Contrary to custom, he did not speak. He did not reproach us for advancing too slowly or for not marching correctly. If I had not gotten to know the S.S., I would have thought that this one was a man like others, and not a killing and torturing machine. Only once, during the trip, did he speak friendly to us, too friendly even, with the voice of a father addressing his children, to explain to us our future privileges. Each one of us will receive three cigarettes and a bottle of beer or another drink of our choice (the water there was repugnant). We will eat our fill, and, in eight days, if we work well, one will allot us new clothes and we will officially have the right to wash ourselves; we could not wish a better fate.

All seven, on arrival, without exchanging a word, we understood why our S.S. had shown himself to be so benevolent; immediately, I had a stomach ache. We see two large rectangles traced on the ground, twenty to thirty meters wide by fifty to sixty meters long. In one of them, the ground is stained with red. Three regularly spaced posts, bearing reflectors at the top, stand upright in the center. The second rectangle is a simple drawing on the ground, the ground there has its ordinary black color and, in the place of the posts, there are three holes dug.

[130]

The S.S. explains to us: “You see the installation here. (He points out to us the posts in the first rectangle.) It is necessary to make the same thing over there (he shows us the second rectangle). You are electricians, you do it.” Then, he moved away thirty to forty meters. Why so far? I do not know. Perhaps the preceding kommando had revolted?

We begin our work. Our team of seven included only two true professionals. One received special hooks to lift himself up to the top of the posts. He disconnected the electricity and let down the wire and the reflectors. Then, we put ourselves in position to uproot the posts. And then, we waded in the red and the red is...blood. The first contact with that gave us the shivers, we lost the use of speech. However, we knew. But, between knowing that and the food, no comparison is possible. Below us there are men similar to us, and, it is sure, the team of our seven predecessors is under our feet.

Yesterday, the posts, it is they who inserted them. We trample in their blood as others will come after us and will trample on us. One morning we will plant our three posts; that afternoon, one will gas us and we will be thrown in the pit, beside our posts. Our own work will be used to illuminate our burial.

Momentarily, I speak all alone: “I do not want to die like the seven before me, even if they were able to eat, to drink and to smoke. On the first occasion, if one presents itself, I will run away, and if need be, I will risk my life and I will die. A little sooner, a little later, I am not near to three months.” At that time, and no one in Birkenau was unaware of it, this type of kommando was eliminated and renewed each quarter.

We transport the three posts, we set them into the already prepared holes and we install the reflectors. This first day, we hardly work three hours. Then we remain locked up in the barrack where we eat lunch. We are forbidden to look at what occurs outside.

The second day we are on the spot a little earlier than the day before. We must wait at a distance until the *besonderkommando** (the special kommando—it is so called) finished its work—work which I will describe for you in a moment.

With the passing days, our *Unterscharführer* neglected more and more [131] to supervise us. What good was it? To escape was impossible for us. Thus us saw all without really seeking to.

We saw a kind of barn closed on three sides, identical to those where the peasants shelter hay and, not far from it, three or four little pretty buildings similar to country houses, of which only the first was close enough to be definitely visible. The convoys arrive, adult men and little boys together, women, girls and infants

* My comrades and I call it so in the yiddish language. The German word is *sonderkommando*.

together. They move, all naked, by groups of twenty, towards the small house. In spite of the distance we realize that they are not afraid. A strange kommando, dressed in white, leads them: four men only, plus two S.S. When people entered the small house, one locks them in; a rather strong door.

When the door is well bolted, a S.S. passes by with a box (the box that I saw had exactly the appearance of a painting pot) and disappears from our eyes, hidden by the house. Then, we hear a banging, that of an opening, more like a trap door than a window. Twice, after the noise of banging, the prayer CHEMA ISRAEL^{**} reaches us, then we perceived some cries, but very weakly.

From time to time, at the last minute, right before disappearing behind the door, people understood. I saw a group of men revolting. The incident was foreseen: a kommando of four or five persons waits beside the entrance and pushes them inside while a S.S. uses his revolver to shoot them in the head.

The external appearance of the small house was so ordinary that such an incident was very rare. In seven days, I was present at and saw with my eyes only one revolt. But others took place, for, on several occasions, from afar, we perceived this same noise characteristic of a shooting at close range.

Let us go back now to the morning of the second day. The rectangle where we have, the day before, installed the posts was dug out and transformed into an empty type of swimming pool, with the properly cut walls, of approximately a meter fifty in depth. The ground was left around our posts to prevent them from collapsing.

Some rails are installed, they start one meter from the small house. As soon as the Jews are gassed, a new team steps in and adds rails to the edge of the swimming pool. This team also belongs to the *besonderkommando*. The men of this kommando, [132] eat well; they are correctly equipped. They live entirely separately; to sleep, they do not return to our camp. The S.S. said, in eight days, one will enroll us among them. I have from now on less than one week to go for it all.

We see the special kommando installing rolling platforms on the rails. Then, they bring out the gassed men, women and children to load them onto these flat cars. In order to avoid losing them on the way, they arrange them like bags of flour, five widthwise, five lengthwise.

Their work is painful, the kapo, a German, does not grant them a second of rest; he shouts unceasingly: "Schneller! Schneller! (More quickly! More quickly!) If I do not liquidate you, I will gas you at once!" And he kicks them with his foot. Quickly, all the men, women and children are thrown into the hole and covered with earth.

Then, we enter in action, we wade in human blood to recover (*recupérer*) the posts. I do not understand moreover why the dead bleed. The pressure when one packs the earth around them? Or the effect of the gas? My six companions received almost new shoes, but not I, because my mountain shoes were still in good condition.

At night, another kommando certainly comes to dig a new swimming pool around and within the light from our posts, since we find it in the morning when we arrive. I never saw this kommando, but a comrade told me, once, that he had

^{**} Hear, Israel, eternal is our God, eternal is a.... A fundamental Jewish prayer.

belonged to a group given such a chore. One had brought him from his barrack, with many deportees, perhaps two hundred. They did not belong to the *besonderkommando*, these were guys from the camp and they had not guessed the purpose of this pit.

The fourth day one lets us approach beside the special kommando, to the door of a gas chamber. What we saw traumatized us—whole families hooked one to the other in bunches. Dead children still clung to their mother, to separate them was a horrible task. All had their eyes out of their sockets, twisted horrified faces. That day they had brought a transport of women with their kids. We understood that the majority of them had strangled their child. We understood that to see one's child agonize so was unbearable. They preferred to shorten its suffering by killing it with their own hands.

For the men of the *besonderkommando* that also had to be terrible. We imagine that one of them, by chance, may see his mother, or his sister, [133] or his father, or his wife, or a member of his family. What can he do? Nothing.

Once, Grastain, the electrician, penetrated into one of the small houses to repair a wire and told us: "The interior is empty and very black, without the smallest window. I did not have time to look in detail, I was so afraid."

From our place, we see the victims only at the time when they arrive near the nearest gas chamber. Some of us think that they remove their clothing in the barn. I do not agree. They would discover there, stored, masses of hair classified by color, stockpiles of dolls, glasses, clothes, all well sorted and arranged. They would suspect that it is an ambush. Moreover, the women would refuse to strip in public... No, in my opinion, there are, a little further, hidden with our view, some cabins for undressing and, then, people pass behind the barn without ever seeing its contents.

We also try to imagine a means for us to get out of this trap. Only two among the seven of us prefer to remain: "No matter how, to die here or elsewhere, it's all the same; at least here we suffer only in morale, but we are able to eat and we do not receive blows, we will sleep alone in a bed, we will be able to wash ourselves and, the day when we want to, we will commit suicide."

After our short work, we remain idle, locked up alone in a barrack. For the first time since our arrival at Birkenau we have enough leisure to discuss and reflect. We speak about the camp, about the gas chambers, about death... about our own fate. "will the S.S. let us be electrocuted when we wish it or will we have to end up gassed?" Today, I tried to gather my memories concerning gas chambers into a coherent unit. But, in my head, they are presented like a succession of clear and still (*figées*) photographs." I contemplate them one by one, but I have difficulty organizing them logically. So, the hole was gigantic, made ready to bury several thousands Jews. Moreover, if it had contained only some corpses, the ground would not have been impregnated with blood. However, four houses and twenty people per house were not enough to fill such a swimming pool.

I believe that the *besonder* worked a good part of the night. We [134] saw only the last group of victims, the preceding ones being already buried in the pit. However, this explanation accords badly with another one of my memories: one morning when arriving, I approached the edge of the pit. One made me move back, but it is then that I had the opportunity to see the depth of it, for it was still empty. I

think that this night, exceptionally, the *besonder* had rested and that one was going to be satisfied with filling the pit with the bodies of comrades killed in the camp. It was quite necessary to get rid of the corpses and, at the time, the crematory was not finished.

These small gas houses belonged to the first type installed at Birkenau. They were replaced later by industrial gas chambers where one liquidated a thousand people at a time who, then, were not buried but immediately passed on to the crematory. Of that, fortunately, I was not witness, I was indirectly informed of it. On the other hand, I learned from the mouth of a direct witness, Erko Haiblum (wearing the number 49 269 and having come not from Pithiviers, but from Beaune-la-Rolande), what had become of our swimming pools for corpses. I let him speak for himself: “When the first crematory was in condition to function, victims were picked up to be burned. I belonged to the kommando given the job of unearthing the dead, the thousands of dead.

We waded in a mixture of putrefied bodies and mud. We could have used gas masks. The corpses seemed to go up on the surface, one would have said that the ground did not want any. What you went through Maurice is nothing compared with “that.” At the end of eight days I felt that I was going to become insane, I then decided to commit suicide by letting myself die, like many comrades had done around me. I was saved in the following way.

A friend worked in Canada,* the great sorting office of Birkenau. He could not endure to see pass before him these multitudes of clothes and personal objects coming from the gassed Jews. He succeeded in entering as an instructor in the kommando of masons and left me his place. “Two months later, I met a deportee who was still employed in unearthing the dead. No more mud: the ground had frozen. It was necessary to break the ground and the corpses with blows of a pickaxe.”

[135]

We lose our appetites. I am surprised to dream that I gas my whole family. Not only my family, but everyone. In the following nightmare, I myself am gassed. An atrocious fear settled into my belly.

Laybich knows already that I work over there, that I help the *besonderkommando* and that, soon, I will leave his barrack. He has started to look at me differently. Once he spoke to me as if I were his buddy:

- What is it your first name?

- Maurice.

- What! Maurice, you don't say! Is your name Moyshè or Moszek?

- Moyshè.

- Then, Moyshè, listen to me well: if one day, one never knows, I arrive over there so that they can gas me and if, at this time, you have a club, don't let it bother you, crack my skull with a good blow, well applied.

- I have understood why you want me to do that.

* The massive exterminations led to a multiplying of the *Bekleidungskammer*, and all of them were gathered together in a section of the camp which was called “Canada.” [*Bekleidungskammer* “clothing rooms”]

- You can address me as *tu*,⁸⁷ I see that you are not stupid.

I thought to myself: “Filthy bastard, if this opportunity arises, you will burst at low heat.”

Laybich always repeated: “What do I want? To die, but as the last, because nobody will leave here alive. Band of cretins, if I kill you, it is for your good, thus you will suffer less long.” Such was his alibi.

[136]

We are there faced with an account. A particularly dramatic and upsetting account. Is this account credible? Is this account truthful (*véridique*)?

Let us note initially that this account is obviously credible since it is generally believed. Is it truthful?

What does the account say?

- Seven deportees are selected by a debonair S.S *Unterscharführer* who talks to them pleasantly, with the voice of a father, to explain to them [their] future privileges.

This S.S. is a killing and torturing machine.

- The seven deportees see two large rectangles traced on the ground; in one of them, the ground is stained with red.

The seven understand instantaneously that these are gigantic common graves and why the S.S. was benevolent (?).

- The seven are given the job of moving the electric installation of the common grave towards the future pit to dig, to allow for night-work.

- The seven waded in blood.

- The seven understand that they will be exterminated like their seven predecessors.

- What the seven have just understood at the moment, no one was unaware of it!

“At that time, and no one in Birkenau was unaware of it, this type of kommando was eliminated and renewed each quarter.”

- So that the seven do not discover what they know already and which no one is unaware of it in Birkenau. Draconian precautions are taken.

“Then we remain locked up in the barrack where we eat lunch. We are forbidden to look at what occurs outside.”

- The killing and torturing machine neglects his work so much that the seven will see what it is absolutely necessary that they not see, “without really seeking to.”

- To escape is impossible for the seven.

- So they see; and see again; are present at a revolt, approach the doors of the gas chamber.

⁸⁷ *tu* the familiar form of “you,” in contrast to the formal form *vous*.

[137]

“What we saw traumatized us” (sic!).

- Thus every night, a team of two hundred deportees digs pits of 1500 to 2,700 cubic meters, either 7,5 to 13,5 cubic meters per deportee, or from 15 to 25 tons of excavated dirt per deportee per night. Still it is not a question of a trench where each digger throws out the excavated dirt by shovelfuls, but of a pit whose dimensions impose a complex system for transporting the excavated dirt.
- Thousands of corpses are thrown into these pits and are covered with earth.
- The layer of earth is not very thick since the seven waded in blood.
- But, when they arrived, the seven saw two rectangles traced on the ground; they did not see the 1,500 to 2,700 cubic meters of movable dirt which had to remain after each pit had been filled and recapped, if one admits a surface layer of earth of approximately 50 centimetres (indeed, 1 cubic meter of earthwork gives approximately 1.5 cubic meters of movable dirt).
- The members of the earthwork kommando who dig these pits do not guess or suspect their purpose (although deportees having penetrated the secret circulate in the camp).
- There remains no trace of these pits since they were reopened and emptied of their contents, then recapped.
- The contents of these pits were burned in the newly built crematories at Birkenau (whose cremation capacity is, at the maximum, five hundred per day).
- Moreover, the terrifying kapo, Laybich, also, penetrated the terrifying secret, he who *“knows already that [Moshé] works over there, that he helps the besonderkommando and that soon he is going to leave his barrack,”* because the seven, in isolation, returned nevertheless, however, and notwithstanding, each evening to their block.
- Thanks to God, the witness is not in the end exterminated and will be able to reveal the truth to the flabbergasted world. The electrician Grastain also survived, and also Erko Haiblum (identification number 49269).
- Erko Haiblum, promised to death since employed at unearthing the corpses of the gigantic pits and thus [138] witness to the terrifying secret, exchanges his place with a friend who worked in “Canada,” who himself had penetrated the terrifying secret. But how the witness Moshé Garbarz survived in the end and thwarted the diabolic S.S. organization and the terrifying paternalist *Unterscharführer* is what we learn in the following chapter.

[139]

THE DEPARTURE FOR THE MINE

The seventh day, I had lost my last hope escaping, it was finished, I was trapped... That evening, for an unknown reason, we returned to camp a little earlier. Perhaps our S.S. had a lot of work and preferred to avoid letting us stay idle over there. Hardly had we crossed the grid when the camp loudspeakers launch a call: “We ask for volunteers for a coal mine, but the seven electricians should not present themselves.”

For me it was either leave my current kommando or die there. To see the gassed and to trample the reddish mud was unbearable for me and made me sick. I made my decision: “If they catch me, so much worse! I will die!” One lines us up in

front of a S.S. doctor. We undress for him to allow him to check if we are not Moslems, that is, if there remains any meat on our buttocks. Moreover, he asks us to jump over a ditch of fifty to sixty centimetres in width; for me it was child's play, but not for all the deportees. Fortunately, our S.S. was not there, otherwise he would have recognized me.

We are supervised by kapos and some S.S. with dogs, as for each incursion out of the immediate perimeter of the camp. It was, barring error, at the beginning of September 1942.

We leave, we do not know exactly towards where. We fear a trap. Several similar cases had already occurred. So, one day, a S.S. had come and ordered: "The tailors and the shoe-makers, leave the ranks!" He had chosen forty from among [140] the best built men. A week later, we had learned that these men were working in the *besonderkommando*.

We are all the less reassured since the night is starting to fall.

We are marching already five pe row. I am always afraid that they may call my number to tell me: "You, you are forbidden to leave the camp." But, once outside, I am happy not to have to wade in the blood and to see what one is doing with the Jews. My destination does not interest me and, if it is a trap to gas us, I am almost content with it. Soon I tranquillize myself : we take the direction opposite to the gas chambers. I am saved.

The *Unterscharführer* could no longer control if I were alive or if I had been slaughtered in my barrack; he would no longer be concerned with me. (Or rather with the two of us, because, later, I realized that Grastain had, also, tried his luck.) Our S.S. considered us unable to disobey the order given over the loudspeaker, since we were not eating too badly and since one had promised us individual beds and the authorization to wash ourselves. He thought that these prospects would be enough to stifle our continual nausea.

The sun has already set when we arrive at Auschwitz. We are glad to rest our legs and to undress, probably for a shower. But, as one says among us, there is never good without evil. While removing my underpants, I note that I will no more succeed in resewing it. It tears, and the pieces are black and rigid, as if starched with filth.

[141]

We are thus there in the presence of an eye-witness testimony, by a living witness, a survivor. Moshé Garbarz saw on several occasions, from afar and from close up, the complete process of a mass gassing of human beings. He could observe, reflect, re-examine. He belonged to a group of seven people with whom he could discuss what they had seen:

After our short work, we remain idle, locked up alone in a barrack. For the first time since our arrival at Birkenau we have enough leisure to discuss and reflect. We speak about the camp, about the gas chambers, about death... about our own fate. [Page 114.]

In Jawischowitz, the witness meets another survivor, the electrician Grastain, who was a witness of the same scenes and, moreover, penetrated to the interior of the room to carry out an electric repair. This testimony of Élie is clear, precise, detailed, and clarifies the surrounding circumstances. However, on page 114, he specifies:

Today, I tried to gather my memories concerning gas chambers into a coherent whole. But, in my head, they are presented like a succession of photographs, clear and still. I contemplate them one by one, but I have difficulty organizing them logically.

What ought one to think of this living witness and his testimony?

This testimony is credible since it is generally believed by the nearly all the readers of holocaustic literature. The scenes of gassings, the ambiance, the reflexions of the witness are in conformity with what the reader of 1984 expects from this kind of reading.

The credibility of a testimony has nothing to do with its veracity. Credibility is an intersubjective relationship between the witness and his listeners. Veracity is a relationship between the account and the reality of the event which is the subject of the account.

Consequently, when the collective representation is structured by an effective myth, any account in conformity with the myth is credible.

If we read again today the *Seraphic Flowers*, or Lives of the Saints of the XVI or of the XVII Century, the accounts of the apparitions, the cures, the miracles, will leave the reader incredulous. These accounts, in conformity with the mythical representations [142] of the time, will appear dated, and it will even be difficult to understand how they could be taken seriously. However, the best minds put faith in these accounts and almost nobody dared to question their veracity. Still these accounts made explicit appeal to the supernatural and the intervention of the divine power. The account of Moshé, formatted by Élie Garbarz, does not make appeal to the supernatural nor to divine intervention. What it tells unrolls in a profane world.

The gassing is the dramatic center of the account, the element which gives all its credibility to the whole of it (while at the same time the remainder of the account which aims at explaining the witness's presence and survival is a little confused and contradictory) since everyone knows that there were gassings and that the things occurred somewhat like that (notwithstanding the distortions due to the imperfection of the witness's memory and to his emotion).

How a gassing occurs:

1. The convoys arrive, separated by sex;
2. They move in groups of twenty, all naked, towards the small house;
3. They are not afraid (the twenty); during this time the others wait;
4. There are only four men in white plus two S.S.;
5. Sometimes the victims revolt;
6. There are four or five people beside the entrance in addition to the four men in white;
7. A S.S. shoots them in the head while one pushes the victims;
8. The deed is extremely rare;
9. But in seven days, it occurs several times;
10. Bolting, Zyklon B, trap door, Chema Israel;
11. Opening of the doors;
12. Another team emerges, one does not know from where;
13. This team installs rails and flat cars;
14. They bring out the men, the women and the children (see point 1);

15.
[143]
16. They pile up the corpses, minimum ten per flat car, perhaps fifteen, perhaps twenty (in this last case, only one outward trip of a single flat car is enough to empty the gas chamber);
 17. The work of this well nourished and well equipped commando is painful. They do not have one second of rest (twenty corpses per cycle);
 18. The seven enter in action and wade in human blood to recover the posts;
 19. The witness does not understand why the dead bleed (it is true that a corpse never bleeds. The bleeding of someone wounded and whose wounds are open ceases as soon as his heart ceases to beat; someone gassed of course has no wounds);
 20. Another batch of twenty naked people who would have refused to strip themselves in public, men and women mixed together and separated by sex, trustful and not seeing the pits where the seven are wading in blood, let themselves revolt seldomly often, and penetrate into the gas chambers so that a new cycle is achieved;
 21. Conclusion: whoever is not astounded at this insupportable account is an inhuman monster.

This account, credible in 1984, is not truthful for the simple reason that it is of the same type as the following childish nursery rhyme:

Sitting in the shade of a streetlight on a moonless night I slept upright while reading a closed book in the light of an extinguished gas burner.

It contains, moreover, something quite peculiar, the almost explicit avowal of its phantasmatic character (on pages 114 and 116).

The Witness, The Testimony And The Historian

Élie Garbarz was deported. He stayed in Auschwitz-Birkenau. He was cold, he was hungry, he received blows. He was afraid he was going to die. He was sick. He lived a martyrdom. He heard talk about the gas chambers from his companions and in the kapos' threats. Like [144] the majority of the deportees, he ended up believing in these human slaughter-houses which played a role in his terrors. He dreamed at night of them. There are certainly many true elements in his testimony: rails, flat cars, posts supporting reflectors, pits dug in the ground, corpses that one transports, and some debonair and paternal S.S., and boxes of Zyklon B which resemble boxes of paint, and four men in white, and groups of naked men who wait...

After the Liberation, sick, exhausted, in a terrible physical and mental state, Moshé has the confirmation of all his terrors. He learns, from the media and the rumors of his environment, **what really happened**.

Moshé's confused memories carry no real weight in comparison to **what really happened** and what is irrefutably established, over a course of years, by the Nuremberg Tribunal, the testimonies of Höss, Gerstein, etc, then *the testimonies which are published*,

then indisputable historical studies of historians who are all the more admirable in that they ally to a specific sensitivity a particularly developed moral sense.

What really happened, the son of Moshé, his family, his friends learn in the press, in the books, in the rumors, and Moshé learns it too by the same means. For soon the entourage and Moshé's own son know better than he **what really happened** and Moshé is obligatorily led to try "to gather his memories concerning the gas chambers into a coherent whole," "but, in [his] head, they are presented as a succession of photographs, clear and still," that he has "difficulty organizing logically."

The most remarkable thing of all is that, although after forty years an "eyewitness," supposed to have been in the very center of the process of extermination in industrial human slaughterhouses, still has not manage to logically organize his memories in order to provide a coherent account, and that, moreover, no one has succeeded in doing so. Moshé's account does not contain a single sentence, not a single statement which is not contradicted by a contrary statement or by a material or psychological or administrative or logical impossibility. Better: each statement seems caused by an effort at refutation of an implicit, sometimes contradictory objection.

[145]

Moshé's account, put into its present form by his son Élie, informs us about the status and the function of the gas chamber in the familial novel of a "survivor"—and about the way in which the myth imposes itself on, colonizes and seizes an average mind confronted with situations which exceed its capacities. It shows at what point the myth can make absurd accounts seem credible and completely suspend the critical mind. For what is surprising in this account is less the account itself than the fact that it passed such as it is through the screening of Élie Garbarz, a polytechnician and executive in an insurance company, and that of the editor and readers, of whom Mr. Pierre Vidal-Naquet himself is one, and that Moshé Garbarz was gradually led to tell himself so poor and so absurd a story simply because he was at Auschwitz-Birkenau from July to September 1942, and because he had to make the synthesis between his memories and the official myth, under penalty of disappointing... everyone.

Let one now imagine the courage and the force of character which would have been necessary for a deportee to say, after the myth had taken shape, not simply, like the majority of the deportees, *who have not been heard*: "I did not see, I did not know, I did not hear talk of," but "I was on the spot, and the official account is incompatible with what I saw." All those who had this courage were not believed, remained insolated and were reduced to silence by direct persecution, or by this feeling which is worse than all persecutions: what good is it?

Epilogue

L'Assurance française (French Insurance) is a professional semi-monthly. In its number 481 (September 11-45, 1984, page 424, under the heading "Current Events"), one finds the following article that we reproduce *in extenso*:

Read

A Survivor, by Mosché and Élie Garbarz (Plon, 252 p., 70 F).

From Moshé and Élie Garbarz, *A Survivor* (Plon), the subtitle is almost sufficient (*Poland, 1913-1929, Paris, 1929-1941, Auschwitz-Birkenau* [146],

Jawischowitz-Buchenwald 1942-1945). They both have made the book, the son who listens and the father who tells.

A poor childhood in the suburbs of Warsaw, then Paris. Lastly, the incredible happens: the camps.

“Thousands of pages had been written on the hell and yet Dante has been read, the son says. No reader will learn, without trembling, from the mouth of one of the rare survivors that, in 1942, in Auschwitz-Birkenau, a block-chief was to align thirty corpses each morning in front of his barrack to make place for the newcomers. But that if somebody died at the last moment, bringing the number of the corpses to thirty and one, it was necessary at once to assassinate four more deportees because the S.S. counted in multiples of five (*Le Dauphiné libéré*, 27/3/84). As A. G. Slama writes in *Lire* of last May:

“That this man could survive such a hell, that too does not appear possible. As for those who still doubt the existence of the gas chambers, one suggests to them to open this book to page 113—if they have courage of it. An incredible voyage in the territory of inhumanity, an accent of authenticity which does not mislead.”

The son, Élie, who is a chief insurance controller, makes you live this descent into hell through Moshé’s memories, with just and simple words.

A testimony not to be forgotten.

At Auschwitz-Birkenau, in 1942, there were more than two hundred blocks. There were no crematories. The construction of crematories was completed in the spring of 1943.

The S.S. counted in multiples of 5.

This important information had escaped me, undoubtedly because I read in a cursory way the passages of the book which did not relate directly to the gas chambers. *Le Dauphiné libéré* of March 27, 1984 passed on this information. It is a true-life detail, registered in Moshé’s memory. An accent of authenticity which does not mislead. It is a detail which one cannot invent. It is the historical truth. That is said without hatred and without a spirit of revenge, for the sole purpose of testifying for history.

With just and simple words.

Amen!

[147]

An Eyewitness Above All Suspicion

Elie Wiesel, The Night, foreword by François Mauriac, Édition de Minuit, Paris, 1958, 178 pages, Re-edition: November 1983.

THE NIGHT, p. 59

a few seconds. It had seemed to me an eternity.

The rod towards the left. I went a half-step ahead. I wanted, to see initially where my father would be sent. If he went to the right, I would have caught up with him.

The rod, once again, leaned for him towards the left. A weight fell from my heart.

We did not know yet which direction was the good one, that toward the left or that toward the right, which led to the bath and which to the crematory. However, I felt happy: I was close to my father. Our procession continued to advance, slowly.

Another prisoner approached us

- Content?

- Yes, somebody answered.

- Unfortunately, you are going to the crematory.

He seemed to speak the truth. Not far from us, flames went up from a pit, gigantic flames. One was burning something there. A truck approached the hole and discharged its load there: they were little children. Babies! Yes, I had seen it, seen it with my eyes... Children in the flames. (Is it then surprising that since this time sleep eludes my eyes?) Here then is where we were going. A little further would be another pit, larger, for adults.

[148]

THE NIGHT, p. 58

I pinched my face: was I still living? Had I woken up? I did not succeed in believing it. How was it possible that one burned men, children and that the world kept silent? No, all that could not be true. A nightmare... I was soon going to wake up with a jolt, with my heart beating and find my childhood room, my books...

My father's voice tore me from my thoughts:

- It's a pity... It's a pity that you did not go with your mother... I saw many children of your age go away with their mothers...

- His voice was terribly sad. I understood that he did not want to see what one was going to do to me. He did not want to see his only son burn.

A cold sweat covered my face. But I say to him that I did not believe that one burned men in our time, that humanity would never have tolerated it...

- Humanity? Humanity is not interested in us. Today, all is permitted. All is possible, even the furnaces, the crematories... His voice choked up.

- Father, I tell him, if it is so, I do not want to wait any more. I will go toward the electrified barbed wires. That is better than to agonize for hours in the flames.

He did not answer me. He cried. His body was shaken by a shudder. Around us, [THE NIGHT, p. 59] [149] everyone cried. Somebody started to recite the Kaddich, the prayer for the dead. I do not know if it has ever happened, in the long history of the Jewish people, that men recite the prayer of the dead for themselves.

- *Yitgadal veyilkadach chmé raba...* Let His Name be magnified and sanctified...my father murmured.

For the first time, I felt the revolt grow in me. Why had I to sanctify His name? The Eternal, Master of the Universe, the Eternal Almighty and Terrible was keeping quiet; for what was I going to thank Him?

We continued to walk. We approached little by little the pit, from which emerged an infernal heat. Twenty steps yet. If I wanted to kill myself, that was the time for it. Our column had no more than fifteen steps to go. I bit my lips so that my father not hear the trembling of my jaws. Ten steps yet. Eight. Seven. We walked slowly, as after a hearse, following our burial. No more than four. Three steps. It was there now, very close to us, the pit and its flames. I gathered all the strength that remained to me in order to jump out of the row and to throw myself on the barbed wires. At the bottom of my heart, I bade farewell to my father, to the entire universe and, in spite of me, words formed and presented [THE NIGHT, p. 60] [150] themselves in a murmur on my lips: *Yitgadal veyitkadach chmé raba...*, That His name be raised and sanctified... My heart was going to burst. *Voilà*. I found myself opposite the Angel of Death...

No. Within two steps of the pit, they ordered to us to turn left, and they made us enter into a barrack.

I grasped the hand of my father real tight. He says to me:

- Do you recall Mrs. Schächter, in the train?

Never will I forget this night, the first night of camp which made of my life one long night and seven times bolted closed.

Never will I forget this smoke.

Never will I forget the small faces of the children whose bodies I had seen transformed into plumes of smoke under a silent azure.

Never will I forget these flames which consumed forevermore my Faith. Never will I forget this nocturnal silence which has deprived me for eternity of a desire to live.

Never will I forget these moments which assassinated my God and my heart, and my dreams which took on the face of the desert.

Never will I forget that, even if I were condemned to live as long as God himself. Never.

[151]

Mr. Elie Wiesel, deported shortly after Pentecost 1944 to Auschwitz-Birkenau and liberated in Buchenwald on April 10, 1945, was named by President Carter to be president of the Special Commission "to gather documentation on the genocide of the Jews at the time of the Second World War."

His testimony has taken on a cardinal importance. It shows that in May-June 1944, in Birkenau, the Germans burned children, babies! in a large pit, and adults in a larger pit still, in the sight of all the deportees and with their knowledge, even in the vicinity of the blocks. Consequently, tens of thousands of (rare!) survivors who did not

mention these facts have kept quiet under the social pressure exerted by neo-Nazi revisionism. In the same way, we thus have proof that the hundreds of aerial photographs taken in April-May-June 1944,⁸⁸ and on which one sees nothing like this, were falsified to hide the responsibility of the Allied leaders, who were unaware of nothing and kept quiet.⁸⁹

March-November 1984

⁸⁸ *The Holocaust Revisited: A retrospective analysis of the Auschwitz-Birkenau extermination complex*, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C., February 1979, ST-79-10001. [Guillaume's note]

⁸⁹ Turlututu, chapeau pointu! [Note of December 1985.] [Guillaume's note. "Turlututu, chapeau pointu" ("Turlututu, pointed hat") is the title of a French nursery rhyme; cf. <http://www.paroles.net/chansons/23093.htm>].

A CLARIFICATION⁹⁰

[p. 152]

Noam Chomsky was attacked with the greatest crudeness in a letter dated June 26, 1984, signed by Chantal Beauchamp and distributed in circles supporting Faurisson, a letter in which I myself am accused of dissembling (see *nota bene*, p. 172).

This brings me, a bit earlier than envisaged, to clarify a point of history.

I met Noam Chomsky in 1979. He had a meeting with Serge Thion for a short academic discussion about Cambodia. Serge Thion introduced me and we were able to talk for about fifteen minutes. I quickly explained to him the outline of the Faurisson affair, which, of course, he had never intended to discuss. Let us recall that at this date Serge Thion's book had not yet been published, or written. We had therefore issued almost no material and no documentation, and even if we had been able to assess the seriousness of Faurisson's work, we had nothing to make anyone share our judgment and we did not ourselves have a final opinion on the correctness of Faurisson's conclusions.

Chomsky asked me three questions to ascertain the sincerity of my involvement and assured me that he would try his best to defend the freedom of expression and the rights of Faurisson.

Some months later, and without further communication between us, Chomsky signed and made his colleagues sign the following petition:

Dr. Robert Faurisson has served as a respected professor of twentieth century French literature and document criticism for over four years at the University of Lyon-2 in France. Since 1974 he has been conducting extensive independent historical research into the "holocaust" question.

Since he began making his findings public, Professor Faurisson has been subject to a vicious campaign of harassment, intimidation, slander and physical violence in a crude attempt to silence him. Fearful officials [p. 153] have even tried to stop him from further research by denying him access to public libraries and archives.

We strongly protest these efforts to deprive Professor Faurisson of his freedom of speech and expression, and we condemn the shameful campaign to silence him.

We strongly support Professor Faurisson's just right of academic freedom and we demand that university and government officials do everything possible to ensure his safety and the free exercise of his legal rights.

This petition, lodged with the court, had the effect of a shower on our enemies and played a role in determining the course of the affair.

⁹⁰ Reprinted here is a previous translation of this chapter (not by G. F. H.), already available at: <http://www.vho.org/aaargh/fran/livres6/PGclareng.pdf> and culled from <http://www.paulbogdanor.com/guillaume.html>. The translator is a rabid Zionist.

The lynch-trial that LICRA [League Against Racism and Antisemitism] was preparing, with a case that was empty but stuffed with the sob-stories of a crowd of avengers and fabricators, came to a sudden end. Finally appreciating the nature of the obstacle, our enemies went looking for documents to support their case, [the supposed existence of the gas chambers. aaargh.] which at last allowed us to write about the historical controversy, to assemble and define a body of documentation, which at long last allowed a rational scholarly debate in which they entangled themselves.

Chomsky's signature also played a role determining the attitude of the court, which suddenly understood that a shoddy judgment would not easily put an end to the matter.

At the time Faurisson, tormented by worries provoked by the repercussions of the affair on his family, saw his ability to work reduced virtually to nothing ; the task was crushing, the situation almost desperate.

While he was himself preoccupied in a difficult battle in the United States, beset by calumnies, Chomsky jumped into the water to help us and to stand up in practice for his own principles, without calculating the personal risks he was taking.

It is easy, now, in 1984, after the symposium of July 2, 1982 and the press conference by Raymond Aron and François Furet, after the publication of the *Réponse à Pierre Vidal-Naquet* [by Robert Faurisson. a], after the end-point on April 26, 1983 [i.e., the date of the court decision], to take Faurisson's research seriously. One needed a lot of courage, conscience and rigor to take the position that Chomsky took in 1979.

For this reason alone, Chomsky has earned the unanimous respect and recognition of La Vieille Taupe, whatever positions he may have taken later.

[p. 154] But Chomsky did not stop the concrete application of his principles there.

He sent friendly replies to two of Faurisson's letters, which did not relate to the historical scholarly discussion, but the general circumstances of the debate. We are well placed to know how rare and courageous such politeness is.

Better still : Jean-Edern Hallier, who had hoped to stage a red-hot publicity stunt, had offered me editorial control over a book series on the Faurisson affair ; then, suddenly appreciating the difficulties and risks, he took fright. To compensate me for his promise, he offered to let me publish *Political Economy of Human Rights*, by Chomsky, and *Khmers Rouges !*, by Serge Thion, two books languishing for lack of money with Editions de la Différence. Chomsky accepted without demurring that his book should be published in a series that I directed and proposed Serge Thion and Michele Noel for the translation. That is, he accepted that his personal work would suffer harshly from the backlash of the vile reputation given to us, rather than joining, for whatever reason of his own, in the ostracism and isolation of which we were the victims. It was perhaps also to show our enemies in the clearest way that he remained firm on his principles and very attentive to the outcome of the affair.

Chomsky knew very well that we attached sufficient importance to his book to be ready to conceal our involvement so as not to damage his audience. He did not even ask us to do this. However, as soon as this publishing project was known, our enemies were ready to guarantee this publication, to guarantee him the widest publicity, to cover Chomsky with praise, to make allowance even for his "courageous defense of freedom of expression" by affirming that they themselves had nothing against it, that there had been a misunderstanding, that Faurisson could express himself, etc., provided that Chomsky agreed

to distance himself from us. At the time Faurisson could no longer express himself and our enemies again believed that they would easily triumph. Chomsky did not give in. His book appeared with Hallier-Albin Michel Publishing, in my series. It was received by the impressive silence of unanimous rejection. [p. 155] Its distribution remained clandestine. Weakness of sales led the publisher to pulp the stock in 1984. [*]

At this time I wrote Chomsky a letter in which, recalling the tremendous power of our enemies, I concluded by saying that revolutionaries retained a decisive advantage over them : we were communicating instantaneously via “thought transmission.” I’ll explain. Facing compound conspiracies, we always had the absolute, permanent certainty that our mutual relations could always develop absolutely along the lines of our principles and that they were therefore predictable. No Jesuitism, no casuistry, no opportunism, and therefore absolute trust, which doesn’t imply any loyalty, and which accepts as self-evident that each one of us maintains a no less absolute “mistrust” towards the other. It is the same type of rapport that I maintained with Faurisson. It is the only organizational structure of La Vieille Taupe.

The petition, lodged with the court, set off for Chomsky an avalanche of letters from his good friends in Paris, among them Jean-Pierre Faye, who had returned from various ideological wanderings and was relying on the learned American’s works to make himself look good and to restore his reputation in Parisian opinion, and was presenting himself everywhere as the Chomskyan of Paris. People there were describing La Vieille Taupe in hellish terms. All the resources of political science, psychology, psychoanalysis and psychiatry were being mobilized to explain the diabolical association of Faurisson and La Vieille Taupe. The situation in France was being portrayed in an apocalyptic manner. Nazism was at the doors. (This was the period of media reporting on FANE [National European Action Federation, a fascist organization] and [its founder, Marc] Fredriksen; because they had discovered a policeman located in FANE’s ranks, they were portraying the police as thoroughly riddled with neo-Nazis.)

Confronted by a good dozen renowned intellectuals, some of whom had published him, invited him to conferences, distributed his writings, sung his praises for his scientific work or his political commitments, [p. 156] Chomsky had nothing but the rigor of his principles and his power of analysis. Chomsky answered firmly. He sent me, for my information, not only our enemies’ letters (as manners require), but some of his replies. As attacks raged against us, I asked him for permission to publish this correspondence. As is his right, he thought it improper to publish letters referring to private correspondence. Therefore he offered to write an essay that would have the same contents but would refer only to our enemies’ public writings. Such is the origin of the polemic appearing as the preface to the book *Mémoire en défense contre ceux qui m'accusent de falsifier l'histoire*, by Robert Faurisson. This polemic, sent to Serge Thion to make best use of it, was lodged with the Paris court. Informed by LICRA, our enemies resumed the siege of Chomsky. The latter, disturbed by the atmosphere of hysteria and total irrationality that he perceived, was afraid that the fact of even appearing to support the contents of Faurisson’s ideas would have the effect of destroying any credibility for his point of view and that we would all be swept away by the storm. We are in October 1980. To date, nobody, absolutely nobody, in the University, has taken a position in favor of Faurisson’s ideas or even in favor of his freedom of expression. *Mémoire en défense*, by definition, has not been published. Nobody can be sure, have a guarantee, that Faurisson’s historiographical conclusions are accurate. It is wholly reasonable to establish several lines of defense. It is necessary to require of our enemies a respect for a minimum of formalities. Our camp, at the time, was overwhelmed, its survival was permanently threatened. It should be recalled that the book *Intolérable Intolérance*, with the viewpoints of Karnoouh, Monteil and Tristani, will only appear more than a year later. No-one, in September-October 1980, can foresee how the debate will turn

out. Our enemies have serious and obviously solid arguments, which will require a huge task of deconstruction from us. Many of the sledgehammer arguments we're using now had not yet come to mind. Many of the documents we're using in [p. 157] 1984 were not known, except perhaps to Faurisson. At this time, neither my own nor Thion's convictions were wholly established. It was to a great extent the monograph by Vidal-Naquet, *Un Eichmann de papier*, which, after verification and reflection, definitively convinced us through his sloppiness, his falsehoods and his displays of ignorance that our enemies really didn't have anything to say in reply. Still, time and effort were required from us.

Let us return to Chomsky's polemic. It was dated October 11, 1980. In a letter written on December 6, 1980, which was posted on the 9th and arrived on December 16, 1980, Chomsky wrote to me:

I've received stacks of letters from France asking me to withdraw the thing I sent you on civil liberties and Faurisson. The general tone of what people are writing to me indicates that the general level of hysteria is so high that no-one will pay attention to the facts in any case, and that the whole anti-imperialist effort will be undermined by a campaign aiming at linking me with neo-Nazism. It is with reluctance that I finally tend to agree. I don't know what the situation is at the present time. If publication not yet in hand, I suggest firmly that you do not put it in a book by Faurisson [...] but that you either drop this essay or publish it separately elsewhere. I'm sorry, perhaps it's already too late.

We (Thion and Guillaume) immediately phoned Chomsky who, in the meantime, on December 12, had received copies of the book. His immediate reaction was clear : he stood by his preface and asked us to treat his letter as null and void.

So, at the matter's boiling-point, when no French intellectual had made a stand, Chomsky, who could reasonably fear seeing all his political work ruined in an instant, had not even withdrawn his essay, as he had the right to do, but had "firmly suggested" that we do so – explaining this to us with a mild statement of serious and considered arguments – and then he had abandoned this final reservation the moment he received the book.

One must say that, in any case, Chomsky stood by the contents of his essay, which was a true beacon of hope in the atmosphere of the time. He had already done a huge amount in practice to defend Faurisson's rights [p. 158] and resist censorship, including by involving himself personally through numerous private letters, care of his acquaintances in Paris – and it is this courage, unique among all intellectuals, that gets him attacked by Chantal Beauchamp today !

Let's return to December 1980. Things were thus perfectly clear between Chomsky and La Vieille Taupe. But on Thursday, December 18, in the course of Anne Sinclair's program, "Thursday Guest," Jean-Pierre Faye, a surprise guest, mentioning "his long friendship with Noam," quoted a truncated and out-of-context sentence from a personal letter from Chomsky, announced that Chomsky was retracting his essay, and claimed possession of Faurisson's book, which he was holding for safekeeping as a bibliographical collector's item that would be one of the few surviving copies!

On December 18 at 11pm, after Chomsky's agreement by telephone, Thion communicated to AFP [Agence France Presse] and all the national newspapers the following release, which AFP did not reproduce and all the newspapers ignored. To the contrary, on [December] 19, the entire press announced Chomsky's "volte-face" and communicated Jean-Pierre Faye's version.

The Chomsky-Faurisson Affair

Released by Serge Thion

Paris, Thursday, December 18, 1980, 11pm.

In the Faurisson affair, Noam Chomsky is withdrawing nothing. In the course of the program "Thursday Guest" on Channel 2, Jean-Pierre Faye mentioned a letter that Noam Chomsky had sent him and he quoted the following sentences: "OK, you've convinced me. I've written to Faurisson's editors not to publish the preface or to dissociate it from any publication that has a connection with Faurisson."

In the private letter he sent to Serge Thion for Faurisson's editors (letter written on December 6, posted on the 9th, arrived the 16th), Chomsky says in particular (and we quote with his permission):

I've received stacks of letters from France asking me to withdraw the thing I sent you on civil liberties and Faurisson. The general tone of what people are writing to me indicates that the level of hysteria is so high that no-one will pay attention to the facts in any case, and that the whole anti-imperialist effort will be undermined by a campaign aiming at linking me with neo-. It is with [p. 159] reluctance that I finally tend to agree. I don't know what the situation is at the present time. If publication is not yet in hand, I suggest firmly that you do not put it in a book by Faurisson (or in whatever you intend to publish) but that you either drop this essay or publish it separately elsewhere. I'm sorry, perhaps it's already too late.

There was therefore a campaign waged in Paris to establish that Chomsky is withdrawing his libertarian positions, which remain unchanged. Jean-Pierre Faye has even cited these names: Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Mitsou Ronat, Jacqueline Gueron, Dan Sperber. It happens that Faurisson's work has appeared, preceded by Chomsky's essay. The latter has received Faurisson's book and for him there is no question of disavowing his essay. Questioned by telephone, Chomsky has just declared that he takes full responsibility for an essay enunciating principles that Faurisson's detractors would like to see applied only themselves.

Without the means of distributing our message, we had to leave unchallenged the version that Chomsky would have withdrawn his essay but was too late to stop publication, though he firmly stood by its contents. Unlike our enemies, we had no access to the press, and it is harder to disseminate information that is even remotely accurate on the subject of the gas chambers than it is to climb up the Niagara Falls by swimming.

The Jean-Pierre Faye/Ann Sinclair circus had succeeded perfectly. Chomsky was about to endure all the burdens of his intellectual courage, exacerbated by the fact that the public had the impression that all this was not very clear.

But if the storm was raging in the press and on the airwaves, the essay itself was lodged with the court, along with the book. And the judges well understood that, whatever the unanimous press might say, if the book wasn't being recalled, if our enemies weren't even producing a letter from Chomsky, the reality is that Chomsky had in no way departed from his uncompromising support for Faurisson's freedom of expression and civil rights. It would be necessary to take it into account. The rest was no more than the frothing of waves.

Only in 1981 did systematic study of massive communications of materials by LICRA allow us to make decisive progress in the project of strictly scholarly research on the gas chambers and to arrive at collection of findings transmissible to a rational mind without demanding an enormous personal effort from our interlocutors, and which [p. 160] therefore made it possible to reinforce the initial revisionist core. And, one has to say, this decisive step could be taken only thanks to the invaluable support that Chomsky afforded us, not because he would have defended Faurisson's analyses in any way, whether openly or covertly, as devilish people want to believe, but because Chomsky had held himself, with a rare firmness, to his principles: knowledge of facts can emerge only from an open, honest and sincere debate.

The scandal ignited around the Chomsky-Faurisson affair gave the issue an international resonance and led new readers to learn about these writings.

On December 16, 1980, Ivan Levai hosted on Europe 1 [radio] channel LICRA president Jean-Pierre Bloch, who in a few minutes uttered no less than thirteen outright lies. The reason for this invitation : Chomsky's stand.

On December 17, in reply, Faurisson in turn went on the channel, where Ivan Levai had invited him expecting to catch him in a trap, to make him stumble and to expose him to ridicule once and for all. This program, where Faurisson pronounced his famous sentence of sixty words, set fire to the gunpowder.

All that, we owe to the intervention of Chomsky, who found himself at the center of a campaign without precedent.

In France, the consensus tale spread in the intelligentsia that Chomsky must have been deceived by La Vieille Taupe, that Faurisson's freedom of expression and civil rights are not threatened, that Chomsky understands nothing about anything. In the United States and in England, where the imperial ideology of the West has been reconstituted, Chomsky had already seen his audience reduced and was the victim of crude defamation campaigns. The same man who had criticized the American war in Vietnam, without ever idealizing or deluding himself about Eastern-bloc regimes, saw himself accused of supporting Pol Pot or North Vietnamese Stalinism, including by the very people who had held precisely this attitude and wanted to make people forget it. They now accused him of supporting Faurisson's views, with the intention of destroying him [p. 161] completely. On this side of Atlantic, where the Faurisson question was shaking the temples of thought, people were claiming that in the end Chomsky was opposed to Faurisson's ideas. On the other side of Atlantic, people were claiming the opposite. Certain very Parisian clowns managed to make both incompatible claims at the same time (see Chomsky's *Réponses inédites à mes détracteurs parisiens*, Paris, Cahiers Spartacus, 1984).

Chomsky was constrained to answer this flood of madness and frenzy in order to restate the facts, all in "defending concretely, forcefully and effectively" Faurisson's freedom of expression and civil rights. He successively answered Nadine Fresco in American magazines and Gitta Sereny in the British weekly *New Statesman*, then tried to

reply in France, but his responses were censored (see *Réponses inédites...*). Therefore he reiterates the facts against his slanderers by saying that he has never taken a position in favor of Faurisson's ideas. He quotes a phrase of his, written in 1969 and included in his book *Peace in the Middle East* in 1974, according to which "the massacre of the Jews was the most fantastic outburst of collective insanity in the history of humanity," and thus, as long as he writes nothing that contradicts this phrase, all those who accuse him of being a revisionist must have patience and interpret Chomsky's essay only as it was written.

Truly, Chomsky's enemies are first of all the enemies of freedom of thought, freedom of expression. They are opposed to an open, honest and sincere debate, because this debate definitely couldn't come out their advantage. If they were really convinced that the gas chambers existed, they would seek out debate, or at least not avoid it.

The position adopted by Chomsky is unavoidable and unanswerable. It is absolutely essential for anyone who has not abandoned any strength of character. It is minimal, necessary and sufficient so that the knowledge of facts advances and the truth triumphs.

Is it because in their confusion they smell the danger that our enemies try by all means to flush Chomsky out of this position by force?

And hasn't Chantal Beauchamp found some task more urgent than helping them there?

[p. 162] She quotes, mockingly, this sentence from Chomsky:

If, contrary to what I believe, someone demonstrated that there had been no gas chambers, but that the of millions of Jews was the result of dreadful conditions in forced labor camps, it would not change my evaluation of the Nazi genocide.

This sentence, published in 1984, was written in September 1981 (*Réponses inédites*, p. 46). At this time, though we knew with certainty that the figure of six million Jewish victims of Nazism was very exaggerated, we had no serious or verified statistical formula for advancing a well-founded calculation and there is still no serious statistical publication. [†]

The huge mortality in the camps is disputed by no-one. It was not until 1983 that we began assembling irrefutable documents proving that the number of survivors was much higher than we had believed and especially that the great majority of the victims had died in the last three months of the war and the two months following the liberation, and that, therefore, their decimation was attributable neither to the permanent living conditions in the camps, nor to a deliberate policy of extermination, but rather to hunger and lack of hygiene, caused not by the green or red *Häftlingsführung* [prisoner leadership], but by hellish and uncontrollable chaos resulting from total war and from the final collapse of the German state, by famine and epidemics that also decimated the German civilians in the cities.

It was only in May 1984 that the testimony of a deportee allowed me to confirm this analysis, and the sentence by Chomsky that Chantal Beauchamp mocks in 1984 probably represented the thought of a good part of those who supported Faurisson in 1979-1980. And if this sentence may seem erroneous and excessive to a small number of informed persons, it is thanks to [p. 163] a keen research effort that could develop only because the courageous positions of Chomsky made it possible for the minimal conditions to exist. Besides, this sentence, written *urbi et orbi* by Chomsky, had, at the time it was written, the priceless advantage of transmitting the essential message: questioning the existence of the gas chambers by no means implies that one is abandoning radical criticism of Nazi ideas and condemnation of the concentration camp system and antisemitic measures.

A final remark on Chomsky's standpoint: he multiplied the number of viewpoints supporting Faurisson's freedom of expression, denounced in particularly energetic terms the lawsuits brought against him and the low blows of his enemies, while leaving to Faurisson the responsibility and the glory of defending his own work. Every time he has said that his opinions remained "diametrically opposed" to those of Faurisson, he has done it in terms that were incapable of harming Faurisson; and he has always indicated, by a word or a phrase, that his "diametrically opposed" view was more a matter of opinion than of scientific knowledge.

In fact, this sudden aggressiveness with regard to Noam Chomsky rests on a phantasm and an illusion. Chomsky is perceived as an academic enjoying a considerable media influence who could reverse the situation with a single word and a wave of the magic wand. All that is entirely wrong. Chomsky, whose work in linguistics has gained a worldwide reputation, was always terribly isolated in his political commitments, save for brief moments when his commitments corresponded to vast social movements (the movement against the Vietnam war), but where his notoriety was achieved by dint of the media sweetening the sum of his views. From 1973 to 1982, Chomsky was completely isolated, again. A first version of his book *Political Economy of Human Rights* had been withdrawn from circulation in the United States by the publisher, and the second publisher, South and Press [sic] [In fact "South End press, aaa"], is a minuscule publisher, hardly distributed, primarily by militant circles. While his position in the Faurisson affair should logically have received general approval, on the contrary he found himself completely alone, proof that in this affair there is a dose of irrationality that must be taken into account. If he had become [p. 164] involved in a genuine historical debate, on one side or the other, in line with his convictions, it would have been necessary for him to undertake a huge effort, because he could not have confined himself to forming a personal opinion and then expressing it; he would have had to defend it, justify it, and therefore to assimilate enormous documentation, to make an attempt to verify it, etc. - to do what we did, constrained and coerced by the French situation.

He would have needed - and here, we are well placed to know - to give up all other activity, and so to give up his own work and the drafting of his books: *Towards a New Cold War*, 1982; *The Fateful Triangle*, 1983. Without taking into account his work in linguistics. But that would have saved him from being treated as a fool by Chantal Beauchamp.

All this would not have much importance if it were not the sign of a real danger.

Chantal Beauchamp no longer believes in the gas chambers. She has been persuaded that Faurisson is right. So be it. Me too. I hope that this conviction spreads and I think that if this conviction happens to spread I will have been one of those who played a certain role in this complex process. But, for Chantal Beauchamp, this newfound conviction is instantaneously becoming a new truth, fortified by a fixed division of good and evil that will allow a new inquisition against all those who do not share her own personal conviction. The logic of her five pages is no longer the logic of La Vieille Taupe, it is the constitution of a Faurissonist cult, a new LICRA. In the name of the new dogma, people will hunt the heretics. Soon, it will be necessary to distribute numbered cards to certify the date of admission to Faurissonism and to create an order of companions of the liberation.

The same causes produce the same effects; this logic will lead Chantal Beauchamp to use immediately, and ipso facto, the same methods as our enemies.

She quotes Chomsky in quotation marks: "There are no [p. 165] reasonable grounds to doubt the existence of the gas chambers." Chomsky himself wrote to her: "For

me, there are no...” [“Pour moi, il n’existe pas...”]. Chantal Beauchamp excises the “For me, ...” [“Pour moi, ...”] and replaces the lower case “i” following the comma with an “I” [i.e., she changes “... il n’existe pas...” to “Il n’existe pas...”]. The “For me,” is important; it was not necessary to remove it from page 3 of her essay in support of her reasoning, even if she had already quoted it, correctly this time, on page 1 of her letter. Especially since this passage followed a long excursus where Chomsky forcefully stood up for Faurisson and was followed by an unambiguous statement: “Only a religious fanatic could refuse to investigate questions of fact”; then by a second unambiguous statement: “I myself have not undertaken such an investigation”; then by a third unambiguous statement: “The thesis that there were no gas chambers seems highly improbable to me and the denial of the holocaust seems totally impossible to me.” So Chomsky clearly meant that his present opinion (September-October 1981) had no other source nor any more weight than conventional opinion and that therefore investigation was legitimate.

By the suppression of this “For me, ...” Chantal Beauchamp distorts Chomsky’s position and affords herself the luxury of “discovering,” in his writings, an inconsistency that he himself acknowledges unambiguously and that to some extent he himself brings into the picture. And, so that everything is perfectly clear, here is Chomsky without ambiguity: “It has been claimed (for instance by Vidal-Naquet) that it was ‘scandalous’ to defend Faurisson’s right to free expression without denouncing his conclusions.” How better to say and show that Chomsky is not denouncing Faurisson’s conclusions, something he takes care to state unambiguously: “That of course would require me to analyze scrupulously all his documentation, etc.”

After the specious truncation of a text on page 3, Chantal Beauchamp is about to use another method hitherto characteristic of our enemies: denounce and hurl anathemas, firmly entrenched in her righteousness and moralism. I must be a dissembler! And that, for having published completely, in succession, the petition, polemic and unpublished clarifications by Chomsky! And I must take my readers for fools for having written: “Noam Chomsky, who prefers not taking [p. 166] a position on the basic issue of the affair”! Well, I insist on it: Chomsky did not take a position on the basic issue of the affair, he is someone who invokes the status of his opinions only while making his own relative amateurism clear and while underlining the equal amateurism of most of those who believed they were able to take a position against Faurisson. I maintain that Chomsky defends Faurisson’s freedom of expression concretely, energetically and effectively. And I add that I would equally have published any clarification by Chomsky, even if he had taken a position against Faurisson’s ideas.

A third approach characteristic of our enemies: the search for hidden and shady explanations to explain unwelcome behavior. Chantal Beauchamp writes :

Anyway, having no particular insight into what motivates Guillaume, I cannot therefore determine if it is to speak further about these dismaying facts of deception, dishonesty, and attempted of Chomsky by Guillaume or mutually. One thing is certain, however: Guillaume tried to manipulate people he knows to be convinced of the accuracy of Faurisson’s works, by gravely misleading them about the contents of an essay, hostile to the aforementioned works, that he himself published.

My relations with Chomsky, as with Faurisson, as with the persons present at the meeting of June 16, 1984, and with the readers of my circular of May 18, 1984, are crystal clear. There is neither falsehood, nor dissimulation, nor conspiracy, nor manipulation. Everyone is free to get together on foundations other than those of La Vieille Taupe and establish a league of guardians of the truth waging war against heretics and the

“lukewarm.” This type of behavior will immediately reinforce the delusions of our enemies, who will not fail to find there the justification for refusing any debate, for refusing to take the measure of the controversy and study our arguments and for substituting political and ideological confrontation for historical and scientific debate. The danger is great that our work and all our progress could see themselves swept away because our enemies don’t care about accuracy. It is in any case a good thing that Chantal Beauchamp’s letter demonstrates such an unbelievable belligerence with regard to myself and [p. 167] La Vieille Taupe that she makes it clear that her attitudes are completely foreign to La Vieille Taupe.

It remains no less true that the publication in May 1984 of writings by Chomsky that were written in 1981-1982 and censored at their inception appears out of step with the development of the historical debate in France. That makes it possible to measure the tremendous progress achieved in two years. The freedom to express ourselves, we won through major confrontation, even if it is still very far from being exercised under normal conditions and even if one needs a lot of courage and determination to use it. The historical debate made decisive progress thanks to the lawsuits whose actual historiographical results we have yet to learn.

Chantal Beauchamp, a historian by profession, would have been better advised to write a synthesis of a dozen pages, to circulate it and send it to Chomsky asking what he thought of it, rather than hurling anathemas and pronouncing the excommunication of Chomsky, René Lefeuvre (publisher of *Cahiers Spartacus*) and myself in a collective *Herem* [sic: Hebrew for ban] that lacks even the minimum of politeness...

It is true that René Lefeuvre lacked clarity and firmness in this affair and I targeted him for it at the time (*La Guerre Sociale*, supplement to number 3, p. 84). It is no less true that he was also opposed to my slanderers and that his attitude in his circle certainly prevented several plans of attack against me from materializing!

In this affair, very few are those who stayed firm and irrepensible on principles on every occasion. If it can be convenient to denounce weaknesses, it is often criminal and always absurd to denounce weak people, and it is often what marks the degeneration of revolutionary comradeship in the militant underground. What matters is to reduce the causes of the excessive pressures we’re all undergoing.

Chomsky got involved while he was also personally involved in work and in taxing struggles that absorbed all his attention and all his energy. Dramatic events were taking place in the Middle East. His own work exposing the material and psychological sources of [p. 168] American imperialism, the realities of Zionism and the State of Israel, took on an immediate significance, something that could lead to practical results. How is this work less important than Faurisson’s and why should his have been sacrificed as soon as the false appearances imposed by fanaticism were able to generate a conflict between them?

Shouldn’t he have preoccupied himself more with the debate raging in France, abandoning all his projects? Why wouldn’t Chomsky summon Faurisson or Chantal Beauchamp to take a stand without delay on his own efforts? These attacks targeting him today at any rate confirm his evaluation of the irrational and deranged character of intellectual circles in France and justify his trying first of all, at the time of this affair, to revive thoroughly forgotten general principles.

Let’s imagine a point when, the taboo being broken, a real debate commences and the non-existence of the Hitlerian gas chambers and the genocide of the Jews is accepted by all historians. Those who continue to maintain that these chambers existed and publish studies

compiling testimonies, admissions and documents that official history has acknowledged as legends could be accused of disturbing social order and inciting hate. Wouldn't it be necessary to forbid this literature? Wouldn't it be necessary to suppress these peddlers of hateful and self-serving war propaganda? It certainly seems that in France the after-effects of collaboration, resistance and Stalinism at the root of the ideological struggle leave the mind defenseless in the face of such a childish hypothetical.

There is a fundamental opposition between conceptions of the social and political order structured by monotheism (or its atheistic inversion) which make the social order depend on collective adherence to a universal ideology, therefore on shared belief, and conceptions which hold that ideologies, states of consciousness and beliefs are products of social experience and are attributes of the individual or a people. According to this second conception, it is up to the social order to organize the coexistence and confrontation of ideologies and beliefs, and to react against the hegemonic and totalitarian claims of a particular ideology.

[p. 169] In the latter case, scientific progress has the privilege of imposing consensus views without any mechanism of authority and constraint.

To appreciate how odious are the attacks targeting Chomsky, on the part of someone who poses as a defender of Faurisson, one may want to think hard about the following analogy.

At the height of the affair, during a trip to Bolivia, a Professor Faure meets a friend who tells him about the case of a Bolivian professor persecuted for having published conclusions about population genetics that the whole intellectual establishment regards as an incitement to the massacre of Indians!

The Bolivian professor defends himself. He seems to know his case but cannot make himself heard. It is clear, for Faure, that if the Indians are massacred in Bolivia, it's for economic, social and political reasons that have nothing to do with scientific arguments on the monogenism or polygenism of humanity. The reactions of the intellectual establishment have more to do with protecting the taboos of the tribe (of intellectuals) than protecting the Indians. In any case, the Bolivian professor's scholarly conclusions are either true or false and their truth or falsity must be established within the framework of debate and normal scientific procedures. It is also clear that to support this professor will lead to the most insane associations and will paralyze a little more, if not totally, the debate arising from Professor Faure's own work. Besides, all of Faure's Bolivian friends beg him not to get involved, maintain that this Bolivian professor is a dangerous nut, an eccentric, perhaps even a Nazi, that he has been used! It is clear that to make a stand will have little or no benefit, but will involve a terrible setback to any possibility of reasonable reflection concerning Faure's work and the whole revisionist school.

What should be done? And what would Faure have done? Nobody can tell him and nobody has the right to require anything from him. (If they persist, these cannibals, in making heroes of us, they will soon see that our bullets are for our own generals!)

The only thing that can be said is that to capitulate on one point or other means an irreparable defeat [p. 170] for the spirit. If, by contrast, someone finds in himself the strength to concede nothing, it is probably a sign that a whole historical era has ended and a new spirit is being born.

Well, Faure jumped into the water. He underwent all the foreseeable ordeals and, three years later, he is being vilified for not having taken a position in support of the Bolivian

professor's genetic hypotheses, by a Bolivian qualified in genetics from whom this is the first known public intervention!

- September 28, 1984.

The first version of the preceding text included numerous errors of detail and an error of evaluation that Chomsky indicated to us while reaffirming that his position was fixed and unchanged. We corrected in the text errors that did not affect the reasoning and we give Chomsky's comments below.

My case was not in the least unique in the world ; the story is entirely typical and could be illustrated with numerous examples. My case was perhaps more remarkable because I had been very visible, undoubtedly, from 1969 to 1973, to the point where, in a study undertaken in 1970 on the "American intellectual elite" (a ridiculous concept, it goes without saying), the majority of participants (rather paranoid) attributed to me almost magical powers over the mass media and public opinion. Three reasons explain why I was particularly vilified : first, I was particularly "visible"; second, in 1969 I began treating Israeli policy in a rather critical fashion, which, among American intellectuals, is comparable to criticizing the Soviet Union among Stalinists; third, a large proportion of my writings was devoted to critical analysis of the activities of the "intellectual elite," which is not likely to make you a sympathetic figure among the commissars.

In the first years of the Seventies, this situation worsened. Publications "that count" aren't publishing my articles any more, apart from very rare exceptions, and a flood of slanders and insults, like the ones you've been used to for some years, made its appearance and is still continuing, in fact continuing to grow. The reason for this is transparent, and the comparison you make can be misleading. Although it is perfectly true that both other people and myself, those of us who deviated from the party line, have been marginalized (neutralized, as Vidal wrote in the *New York Review*) since the Seventies, the situation has not reverted to what it was in the middle of the Sixties. On the contrary, although the vast popular movements of the Sixties have become [p. 171] less visible, they're surviving and even growing during this period, to the great distress of the commissars - I mean the liberal intellectuals who constitute the priesthood of the State religion. There is even a technical term to describe this disturbing phenomenon: "the Vietnam syndrome" or the "crisis of democracy." That's continuing to our day. In fact, that's why Reagan calculated that he could not attack Central America directly, as his model, John F. Kennedy, had been able to attack Vietnam twenty years earlier. Also, throughout this period, while I was excluded from fashionable and polite circles (without much regret, I should say, given my total contempt for their intellectual and moral level), urgent requests for conferences, etc., kept increasing, the audiences grew and became more supportive and so on.

That continues to be true today, causing much hysteria in the establishment. Last week, for instance, *The New Republic*, in a new stream of its Stalinist-type lies (invoking what must be my "denial of the holocaust," etc.) proclaimed despairingly that I am completely discredited and that even my friends no longer want to be associated with me. This was printed in a pamphlet distributed by a group of fanatical and rather clapped-out Zionists, outside a room where I spoke about the Middle East to an enthusiastic audience of over a thousand people at the University of Michigan, before rushing to Detroit the same evening to speak on the same subject in front of another packed room. And this happens all the time. For instance, *Political Economy of Human Rights*, which received zero publicity in

the mass media and which many retailers refuse even to stock, is nevertheless selling many more copies than the books I wrote at the height of the anti-war movement. There is a real *Kulturkampf* [ideological struggle] here. The secular priesthood has lost control over public opinion and they very much want it back. They don't stop pretending that people like me are "isolated" or "discredited" and they do it with all the more passion as they know that exactly the opposite is true. I cannot accept even a fraction of the speaking invitations sent to me, and it isn't like the Sixties, when I spoke to five people in a church, instead there are real crowds on campuses and in communities. In the same way, they write non-stop about how the popular movements of the Sixties have disappeared and been discredited, and how the country is "swinging to the Right," knowing that the popular movements have survived and remain effective and full of life, and that anti-interventionism is much more powerful now than in the past. In fact, in the last Gallup poll I saw, more than 70% of the population (but far fewer of the "leaders of opinion" and practically none of the establishment intelligentsia) answered "yes" to the question: "Was the Vietnam war 'fundamentally wrong and immoral,' and not simply a mistake?" This is the type of phenomenon that terrifies the commissars.

- Chomsky, October 27, 1984.

[p. 172] **NOTA BENE** - To make this text comprehensible, let us simply clarify that the letter he is answering had been provoked by the volume published through my efforts, *Réponses inédites à mes détracteurs parisiens*, by Noam Chomsky. In a circular to customers of La Vieille Taupe, I had introduced this work as "a concrete, energetic and effective defense of Faurisson's freedom of expression." In the same circular, I shamed "all those who make a profession of thinking up and inventing a thousand reasons for not familiarizing themselves with the evidence, for running away from the key texts, for postponing debate."

However, in the published material, written at different times, not only does Chomsky not take a position on the basic issue, but he even writes that for him, "there are no reasonable grounds to doubt the existence of the gas chambers."

Inconsistency on my part?

That would be to forget that Chomsky showed exceptional courage and determination, that he got involved unambiguously by denouncing the dishonesty of Faurisson's enemies and that he firmly indicated that the defense of freedom of expression wasn't limited to the defense of the freedom of allies. Careful reading of his writings leaves no doubt in this regard.

So that the references are less murky, let's add that Chantal Beauchamp is a qualified history professor. Close to far-left circles, from whom she originally learned of the case, she began to adhere to revisionist ideas and, unlike many, became involved in activism as a result.

Monogenism and polygenism, to which reference is made at the end of the essay, are two opposing doctrines on the origin of the human race. Monogenism believes in a single origin and a successive differentiation of the human groups constituting, notably, the three major races. Polygenism believes in a plural origin from a process of humanization of apes. Voltaire, for instance, was a polygenist, more as a reaction against biblical monogenism than for scientific reasons. Independently of the scientific debate (essentially paleontology and genetics), some partisans of monogenism accuse their enemies of the blackest intentions

and, notably, of wanting to exterminate their “others.” For my part, I don’t have the necessary competence to resolve this and, above all, I don’t care.

FOOTNOTES

[p. 155] [*] Informed by the publisher Albin Michel, I offered to find a fair solution. They replied that the stock had burned, except for copies in storage, i.e., a few hundred.

[p. 162] [†] Since then, there has appeared in the United States: Walter N. Sanning, *The Dissolution of Eastern European Jewry*, which closes the demographic debate by confirming point by point, in an exhaustive fashion, Paul Rassinier’s work, *Le Drame des juifs européens*, reissued by La Vieille Taupe.

AN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS

[174]

Éditions La Découverte
1, Place Paul-Painlevé
75005 Paris
Tél : 633 41 16

Monsieur Pierre Guillaume
La Vieille Taupe
B.P. 9805
75224 Paris Cedex 05

Sir,

April 9, 1985

I have taken note of the use which you made, on the back cover of your republication of *The Drama of the European Jews*, of a sentence extracted from Yosef Haylim Yerushalmi's book, *Zakhor, Jewish History and Jewish Memory*, which I published in 1984.

I wanted to let you know all the disgust which this unqualifiable manipulation inspires in me. It is really scandalous in effect to claim to guarantee Rassinier's infamous study by a quotation of Mr. Yerushalmi, whose work obviously is enrolled at the antipodes of "revisionists" vaticinations.

Symptomatic of the procedures to which "revisionist" authors and their editor do not hesitate to resort to disguise the truth, this practice does not even deserve that one respond to it by action in the justice system, although it undoubtedly would condemn you.

I simply ask you, in the hope that the word deontology may still be able to have a meaning for you, to withdraw Mr. Yerushalmi's sentence from all future republications of Rassinier's book.

François Gèze

[175]

PIERRE GUILLAUME
Éditeur à l'enseigne de La Vieille Taupe
B.P. 9805
75224 PARIS CEDEX 05

Monsieur FRANÇOIS GÊZE
Éditions La Découverte
1, place P.-Painlevé
75005 PARIS

April 14, 1985.

SIR,

I indeed published on the back cover of the republication of *The Drama of the European Jews* the following sentence:

The Holocaust has already incited more historical research than any other event of Jewish history, but I do not doubt that the image which emerges from it, far from being forged on the anvil of the historian, has been mixed (*fondue*) in the crucible of the novelist.

Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, *Zakhor, Jewish History and Jewish Memory* (Paris, 1984, p. 114.)

I quoted it exactly, while giving exact and complete references for it. This sentence contains four propositions. It has a meaning. It is not ambiguous. Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi's book is an important, profound, honest book, which announces with great perspicacity a specific relationship of the Jewish community to the "memory" and the "history" as something constitutive of the anthropological identity of the community.

This book, moreover, is remarkably discreet on the question of the holocaust, since the sentence that I extracted from it is the only one which refers to it.

A contrario, its placement on the book cover was obviously not devoid of a malicious intention on my part. But there is in it no manipulation, and it is ridiculous to believe that this quotation would guarantee Paul Rassinier's study, which does not need a guarantee of any kind.

At the time of a debate on France Culture,⁹¹ when asked about whether he did not fear that his book be interpreted as an encouragement to revisionist theses "*à la Faurisson*," Professor Yerushalmi did not indicate that he shared the fears expressed by his interlocutors, since he answered, in substance: "In any [176] case, with regard to the holocaust, the Jews are in the universe of myth."

I do not deduce from this that he shares the revisionist analyses entirely or in part. I know Professor Yerushalmi only from the text which you published. Consequently, I restrict myself to observing that Professor Yerushalmi recognizes [lit. "measures"] the

⁹¹ France Culture, a French national radio station.

distance which separates the image of historical events “forged on the anvil of the historian” from an image “mixed in the crucible of the novelist”; and, on this precise point, the drama of the European Jews, according to Rassinier, is, after the tragedy of the Second World War, to have built their relation to the world on a representation which does not distinguish sufficiently these two kinds of images.

I suppose nevertheless that Professor Yerushalmi probably does not appreciate the (im)-pertinent use (according to whether one takes his presumed point of view or mine) that I made of this sentence, but I have difficulty believing that a person of his quality would associate himself with the impudent blunder which your step constitutes.

It is undoubtedly an editor’s duty to defend the texts which he publishes against any manipulation when the author is not able to do it, and it is what I have been brought to do, including by legal action, and victoriously, as an editor of Bernard Lazare, when faced with specious interpretations and abusive heirs. It is certainly not an editor’s duty to claim to protect a text from the universal activity (*movement*) of criticism and the exchange (*commerce*) of ideas, in which consists precisely the usage—it was malicious—which I made of an exact and referred quotation. All the more so, it is not the duty of an editor of a living author to replace him.

If, under the circumstances, you acted without the agreement of Professor Yerushalmi, you have, Sir, committed an indelicacy and a mistake, and I ask you to free me of this doubt, so that I can give to your letter the follow-up that, according to the case, it deserves.

But, as of now, I can specify the reasons which make me qualify your letter as an impudent blunder, while making it quite clear that in my mind (while I await your response on this point which it is your duty to clarify) Professor Yerushalmi is not associated with your letter.

It is a blunder indeed to confirm by a reaction of this kind that I have put my finger on the spot where the pack-saddle wounds. It is a blunder to display your hatred, without making any argument.

It is a blunder to qualify as vaticinations the works of revisionists. Vaticination literally means prediction of the future. Revisionism aims at putting the historical account in agreement with the verifiable facts. It does not vaticinate. It is devoted to the study of the past. It aims at differentiating in the image which we have of the past what “is forged indeed on the anvil of the historian” from what is “mixed in the crucible of the novelist.” It may be that revisionist works have not succeeded in doing that, and that they are false. It is then a question of criticizing them, of discussing them and of opposing to them documents and arguments. Adjectives (“unqualifiable,” “scandalous,” “infamous”) and an emotional reaction (“disgust”) are poor substitutes for these.

But ought one to see, in the use of the word vaticination, an ignorance of the meaning of the word or the indication of an unconscious perspicacity vis-a-vis the only implicit “vaticination” which animates [177] revisionist work, and which I will here make explicit: the ineluctable triumph in the future of the revisionist theses?

La Vieille Taupe had to adopt as its own the formula of Guillaume the Taciturn: “It is not necessary to hope in order to undertake nor to succeed in order to persevere.”

But it is because it found the strength to do it that I can allow myself to make explicit this vaticination, which it is indeed necessary to postulate in order to explain the permanence of the revisionist effort.

Your letter is also impudent.

First, by the tone that you adopt and for which you do not have the mental faculties. It is impudent with regard to the justice system of our country when you have the presumption to believe that it could follow you in your exorbitant claims to the point of affirming that “it would undoubtedly condemn” me for the indefinable crime which consists in taking a sentence seriously.

I think that what precedes exempts me from any need to expound on your ultimate impudence: your evocation of the deontology of the edition.

PIERRE GUILLAUME

P.S. – to avoid any malevolent interpretation, a small lexicon drawn from the Petit Robert, Paris, 1969⁹²

MALICE [malis]. N. f (déb. XIIe ; lat. malitia « méchanceté »). – 1° Sens fort (Vieilli) Aptitude et inclination à faire le mal, à nuire par des voies détournées. V. Malignité, méchanceté. « La meilleure (femme) est toujours en malice féconde » (MOL). - Mod. Il est sans malice, sans méchanceté, sans détour, simple, naïf. Ne pas entendre malice à qqch. : n’y rien voir de mal. – 2° (Sens faible). Mod. (1667 : « ruse », XIIIe). Tournure d’esprit de celui qui prend plaisir à s’amuser aux dépens d’autrui. Un grain de malice. Une pointe de malice et de moquerie. Réponse pleine de malice.

MALICIEUX, EUSE. [malisje, ez]. adj. (Malicios, fin XIIe ; lat. malitiosus « méchant »). Qui a de la malice. – 1° Vx. V. Mauvais, méchant. – 2° (1690 ; « rusé », XIIIe). Mod. Qui s’amuse, rit volontiers aux dépens d’autrui. V. Coquin, espiègle, malin, spirituel, taquin. Avoir un esprit vif et malicieux. - Par ext. OEil, regard, rire, sourire malicieux. V. Narquois. Réflexion, réponse malicieuse. V. Piquant. * ANT. Bon. Naïf, niais.

BALOURD, LOURDE [Wur, urd], adj. et n. (v. 1550 ; it. balordo, fin XVI-) – 1° Personne maladroit et sans délicatesse. V. lourd, lourdaud. Il est un peu balourd. « Si je n’étais pas l’obstiné, le maladroit, le balourd que je suis » - (DUHAM.). - (ANT. Adroit, délicat, fin, spirituel, subtil).- 2° N. m. Mécan. Déséquilibre dans une pièce tournante dont le centre de gravité n’est pas sur l’axe de rotation.

BALOURDISE [balurdiz]. n. f. (1640 ; de balourd). – 1° Propos ou action du balourd. V. Gaffe, maladresse, stupidité. Faire des balourdises. – 2° Caractère balourd. Il est d’une balourdise étonnante. - ANT. Délicatesse, finesse, subtilité.

VATICINATION [vatisinasjz]. n. f. (1546 ; lat. vaticinatio). Littér. Prédiction de l’avenir. V. Oracle, prophétie.

VATICINER [vatisine]. v. intr. (1481 ; lat. vaticinari). Littér. Prédire l’avenir (en parlant comme un oracle), prophétiser. – S’exprimer dans une sorte de délire prophétique. « Il vaticine, il recommence ses discours passionnés et mystérieux » (BARRÈS).

moderne (insiste sur le fait qu’un sens, un emploi est d’usage actuel, quand le sens précédent ou les emplois voisins sont vieux, abandonnés).

⁹² Translation of this section seems unnecessary; *balourdise* has been translated in Guillaume’s letter above as “blunder.”

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Four books make it possible to discern the ensemble of the anthropological problems raised by the Faurisson affair.


GERBER, Alain : *Une rumeur d'éléphant*, Paris, Robert Laffont, 1984, 465 pages. [English trans. *Rumor of an Elephant*, Jeremy Leggatt and Alain Gerber, Consortium, 1987.]

GIRARD René : *La Route antique des hommes pervers*, Paris, Grasset, 1985, 249 pages.

DISPAUX Gilbert : *La Logique et le quotidien. Une analyse des mécanismes d'argumentation*, Paris, Éditions de Minuit, 1984, 189 pages (especially pages 65-82).

HERGÉ : *Tintin en Amérique*, Tournai, Casterman, 1947, 62 pages.


ILLUSTRATIONS




L'école intentionnaliste et l'école fonctionnaliste faisant progresser la recherche historique sans risque de rencontrer l'école révisionniste.



*La chambre enfin reconstituée grâce aux indications
des témoins oculaires.*



Holocauste toujours, tu m'intéresses.





● **MARC FERRO** : *l'Histoire sous surveillance*. — Chaque nation veut écrire « son » histoire, passant les événements au tamis d'une mémoire sélective. De cette « fabrication », source d'images stéréotypées qui imprègnent notre vision du monde, Marc Ferro en dévoile le processus. Il livre aussi un diagnostic sur l'histoire et une réflexion sur l'historien au travail. Par l'auteur de *la Révolution russe de 1917*. (Calmann-Lévy, 216 p., 88 F.)

(Recension parue dans Le Monde.)

On consultera plus particulièrement les pages 217 et suivantes.

LA VIEILLE TAUPE.



« Enfin, le célèbre portrait de jeunes filles du caricaturiste Hull peut être interprété comme un portrait de vieille femme. Si vous "voyez" la jeune fille, représentez-vous que son menton est en réalité un nez, son oreille un œil et son collier une bouche. Vous "verrez" alors une vieille femme. »

(Gilbert DISPAUX, La Logique et le quotidien.)




CHAMBRE À GAZ DU CAMP DE MAIDANEK
La mort mobile ou la mort lente ?

Enfin, la célèbre photographie de la « chambre à gaz » de Maïdanek, illustrant l'article de Pierre Vidal-Naquet dans Le Nouvel Observateur (21 sept. 1984, p. 80) peut être interprétée comme une salle de douches et une antichambre avec caillebotis au sol, vivement éclairées par des baies vitrées sur la gauche qui provoquent les ombres portées. Si vous voyez une « chambre à gaz », représentez-vous que la baie vitrée, en verre banal, existe bel et bien, ce qui exclut l'interprétation « chambre à gaz ».

COVER (last page)

The gas chambers did exist



ISBN 2-903279-10-1

Prix public : 80,00 F